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Abstract
This thesis consists of an introductory chapter, which situate the central theme of the dissertation within
the intellectual frontier of political economy of development, and three distinct but related essays that
addresses issues affecting the economic and political development of Nigeria.
The first essay examines the political economy of intergovernmental transfers in Nigeria. Using oil
windfalls as a source of exogenous variation in the political discretion an incumbent government can
exert in rule-based transfers, I showed that an increase in VAT transfers induced by higher oil windfalls
improves the electoral fortune of an incumbent government in the Presidential elections. This result
questions the promotion of rule-based transfers as a one-fits-all institutional solution in resource-abundant
countries with relatively weak institutions.
The second essay exploits climatic data to study how resource inequality between ethnic groups affects
the risk of violent conflicts within Nigeria. The main results show that a one standard deviation change in
between-group rainfall inequality during the growing season increase the risks of civil conflicts prevalence
in Nigeria by about seven percentage points. This relationship is driven, in part, by declining social capital.
Specifically, I demonstrated that an unequal distribution of rainfall between ethnic groups reinforce
citizen’s grievances over the government performance and creates mistrust between predominantly
farming communities and those engaged in nomadic herding. The analysis highlights the need to develop
conflict-sensitive mitigation and adaptation strategies to reduce the adverse effects of climatic shocks.
The third essay evaluates how different punishment mechanisms may affect the incidence of bribe
requests and payments. The analysis is based on a dynamic game in which the bureaucrat moves first and
decides whether to solicits for bribe or not. Conditional on agents accepting to bribe, harsher punishment
for corrupt bureaucrat incentivize him to angle for a larger bribe to compensate for the higher risks. I
show that the effects of a switch from a fixed punishment mechanism to a proportional one that varies
with the size of the bribe depend on how much effort is needed to deliver the public service. Where the
delivery of public service requires much effort, the bribe becomes too expensive that only agent with
xii
larger opportunity cost of time would engage in bribing. The essay discuss the implications of the results
on willingness to pay and inequality.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
When you think of all the conflicts we have – whether those conflicts are local, whether they are
regional or global – these conflicts are often over the management, the distribution of resources. If these
resources are very valuable, if these resources are scarce, if these resources are degraded, there is going
to be competition . . .
—Wangari Maathai, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, 2004
1.1 Setting the agenda
Who gets what, when, how, why and at whose cost? This is perhaps one of the central questions in
political science and economics. It also sets the scene for many of the political and economic struggles in
history, as rightly pointed out by Wangari Maathai in the opening quote above. While political leaders
continue to grapple with the challenges of sustaining a peaceful world order, there has also been a rise
in populist movements who feel that the prevailing system is deeply flawed. More than that, they argue
that economic and political policies have been rigged against ordinary voters in favour of the governing
classes (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). But if politicians are intrinsically motivated to remain in office, to
what extent can they fiddle with economic policy? The answer to this question might lie in the old saying:
he who pays the piper dictates the tune. It is indeed possible to think of economic history as one that
provides tacit support for policies that are useful to fortify the continued dominance of the middle and
less secure strata of the society by the political class. For example, think about how the classical school
accentuated the self-stabilising nature of the economy, between the 18th and early-to-mid 19th century,
to suit the dominant political elites; the wealthy creditors of the time, with little interest in government
intervention. Then, fast-forward to the present-day emphasis on the primacy of institutions - rules and
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norms of the game - and how these embolden economic growth and development (e.g., Acemoglu et al.,
2002; North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1990; Williamson, 1985).
Encouragingly, the last few decades have seen an incredible advance in conceptual and methodological
tools that allow a deeper analysis of how economic and political processes interact to affect growth and
development. Within this context, several studies have focused on analysing the political economy of
generic issues such as tactical redistributive policies (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002; Dixit and Londregan,
1996), corruption (Jain, 2002; Lambsdorff, 2007), and politician competence (Dal Bó et al., 2017). In
this dissertation, I follow the path of the recent literature on the political economy of development
to analyse tactical redistributive policies in developing countries, resource inequality, and conflict. In
particular, this thesis revolves around three themes: intergovernmental transfers, communal conflict, and
endemic corruption, as they affect the economic and political development of Nigeria as a sovereign state.
Hopefully, this will contribute in a complimentary way to our understanding of the economic and political
difficulties currently facing Nigeria, and possibly pave the way for institutional and policy reforms that
can move the country towards a path of economic and political development. In the following sections, I
discuss these issues and outline the key questions that this thesis seeks to address.
1.2 Issues in Nigeria’s political economy
Nigeria is a culturally diverse society with a long history of ethnic and religious tensions that dates to the
pre-independence era. The amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914, to create present-day
Nigeria has often been cited as the roots to many of the rivalries that dot the political and social landscape
of the country (Papaioannou and Dalrymple-Smith, 2015). After gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria
was plunged into a secession crisis with the Eastern part of the country pulling out to create the state of
Biafra in May 1967.1 Perceived marginalisation in the distribution of scarce resources and political power
by the ruling Northern elites underlies some of the push-factors that led to the secession, culminating into
a full civil war in July 1967.
The aftermaths of the civil war saw Nigeria’s political institutions evolving a more formal and
proportional revenue sharing arrangement under its fiscal federalism structure. For example, revenues
from oil, combined with VAT, custom and excise duties are paid into the central pool of the Federation
1The failed state of Biafra was championed by the Igbo – a major ethnic group that resides mostly in the South-Eastern
part of Nigeria – and other minority ethnic groups (mostly in Nigeria’s oil-rich south-south region).
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Account and shared between the central and state governments at the middle of every month in accordance
to some rules.2 Nonetheless, the country continues to suffer from ethno-regional agitations and rising
religious violence that threatens to destabilise it. Indeed, the International Crisis Group in a series of
reports on Nigeria identified the country’s faltering federal system; unrest in the oil-rich Niger Delta
area; escalating farmers-herders’ crisis due to climate change; and widespread corruption as major factors
threatening Nigeria’s fragile political system.3 Three of these issues relate to the core theme of this
dissertation, which will be briefly discussed below: fiscal federalism, farmers-herders conflict, and
corruption.
Nigeria’s revenue and power sharing system has entrenched, what Richard Joseph in his work
“Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria,” described as prebendal or neo-patrimonial politics.
Prebendalism features extreme patterns of ethnic mobilisation that rests on the justifying principle that
state power should be treated as “a congeries of offices,” which can be competed for, appropriated and
then administered for the benefit of the individual occupant and their support groups. In this regard, ethnic
and kinship identities became elevated as the “official language” of political grievances and provided
formal backings to clientelistic demands for the allocation of the country’s resources (Kendhammer,
2015).
In recent years, political entrepreneurs have intensified the mobilization of ethnic networks to demand
for a restructure of the federal systems to allow for an equitable access to a “share of the national cake”
(Onuoha, 2011).4 While this has led to increased ethnic tensions and violence across the country, political-
cum-ethnic elites have continued to accept guaranteed access to federal resources alongside expanding
federal power. Motivated by the political economy literature on tactical redistributive policies, which
posits that opportunistic politicians may implement policies to maximise their chances of re-election,
chapter 2 of this thesis question whether the so-called national cake is indeed a political one.
Another major source of inter-communal tensions involves land disputes between ethnic groups and
neighbouring communities, especially those in oil-producing states where land ownership attracts some
form of compensation payments from multinational companies (Small Arms Survey, 2005). The situation
is not much different in Northern Nigeria where clashes involving herdsmen and farming communities
2The horizontal allocation rule specifies that 40% of total revenues paid into the Federation Account should be shared on
the basis of equality, while the other are distributed as follows: population – 30%; land mass and terrain – 10%; internally
generated revenue – 10%, and social development such as education enrolment, health and water – 10%.
3The reports on Nigeria are available at https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria.
4The term ‘national cake’ is used to refer to any opportunity to access national wealth, owned by none, should belong to
all, but is limited to few.
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in southern and north-central zones have surged in recent years. The root causes for this increase might
be attributed to rising population pressures and climatic-induced changes. The expansion of human
settlements together with the rapid pace of urbanisation has led to the loss of grazing lands, which
have long been designated by the central government as reserved areas, thereby increasing pressure on
farmlands and the likelihood of conflicts over water pollution and crop damages (Baca, 2015).
Besides, climate changes have intensified droughts and desertification in the semi-arid Northern part
of Nigeria. According to a report released in 2016 by the Nigeria Meteorological Agency, the annual
rainy season in the country has reduced by an average of 30 days (i.e. from 150 to 120) over the last three
decades. Furthermore, it is predicted that future dry spells, especially in Northern regions, may get worse
as the world continues to experience hot streaks of temperatures.5 At the same time, reports by the Food
and Agriculture Organisation indicates that 50 to 75% of land areas in the North-East and North-West
regions are vulnerable to desertification, and the phenomenon is spreading towards the south at the rate of
0.6km per year.6
These developments have compelled nomadic herders, most of which are ethnic Fulani from Northern
Nigeria, to move southwards in search of water and pastures for their herds (International Crisis Group,
2017).7 As they migrate into lands that are owned by predominantly farming communities, violent
conflicts over crop damages or cattle rustling, often erupts. Over the last two decades, this type of
violence has increased in both intensity and geographical scope. The Assessment Capacities Projects
(ACAPS) reported that there have been at least 360 clashes between farmers and herdsmen in the last five
years, resulting in a casualty of approximately 2,400 people in 2016 alone, compared to just 20 battles in
the fifteen years before that.8 With the conflict expanding into southern states, the herder-farmer crisis
continues to pose a major threat to Nigeria’s national security. If proactive actions are not taken, this
may likely aggravate the already fragile relations among the different ethnic and religious groups in the
country. In relation to this issue, chapter 3 investigates whether changes in the distribution of rainfall has
contributed to the increase in armed conflict prevalence in the country.
Finally, widespread corruption remains a salient feature in Nigeria’s political arena and has drained an
estimated USD 400 billion from the country, according to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission,
which was established in 2004 to combat the scourge (Okpanachi, 2011). While the country’s political
5Nigeria Meteorological Agency, Drought and Flood Monitoring Bulletin, August 2017.
6FAO Country Programming Framework (CPF) Federal Republic of Nigeria 2013 - 2017.
7The Fulanis are regarded as the world’s largest nomadic group and occupy a large expanse of land from West to Central
Africa countries.
8The report can be accessed at https://www.acaps.org/country/nigeria/special-reports.
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leadership in the last few decades have often made the “fight against corruption” a central theme in their
policy agenda, no serious progress appears to have been made. Nigeria continues to rank high alongside
other countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Yemen, Sudan, Venezuela and
Somalia in the lists of most corrupt countries in the world. For example, Nigeria ranked 32nd most corrupt
country in the world, out of 168 countries surveyed in 2016 by Transparency International. Besides the
inability of the government to end the pervasive culture of embezzlement and nepotism among political
elites, petty corruption in the form of bribery has increased exponentially in recent years. Indeed, data
from the Global Corruption Barometer indicates that about fifty-three percent of Nigerians surveyed in
2015 report to having paid a bribe to access public service, compared to around 41 percent in 2013.
This endemic culture of corruption poses a serious challenge to Nigeria’s development. Anti-corruption
crusaders sometimes try to estimate the costs of corruption to Nigeria’s faltering economy. In 2014, for
example, the head of the central bank estimated that about USD 20 billion was stolen between 2011 and
2014 alone. A recent study by economists at PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) predicts that if corruption is
not tackled immediately, the cost to Nigeria may amount to almost 37% of the GDP by 2030. Indeed, it is
now widely accepted in the economic literature that corruption does not only decrease the relative ratio
to total capital accumulation but also deters foreign direct investment, thus undermining GDP growth
(Lambsdorff, 2006; Wei, 2000). In addition, corruption creates distortionary effects in the quality of public
investments by inducing preferences for capital projects that can create an efficient base for kickbacks
(Esty and Porter, 2002; Lambsdorff, 2007). Some of these damages are already visible in the country.
Investments in health, education and public infrastructures such as electricity, water, and roads have
continued to suffer while billions of dollars in oil revenues vanish into private pockets.
Not surprising, President Buhari on assumption of office in May 2015, launched an anti-corruption
drive. Since then, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission have arrested several senior civil
officials, politicians and military elites accused of grand theft, and a new whistle-blowing bill has been
sent to the country’s parliament for passage. But, for how long can the government sustain the fight against
corruption? In the past, efforts to combat embezzlement were compromised by a weak punishment and
flawed legal system that allows corrupt persons to go unpunished.9 Motivated by economic literature on
the use of asymmetric punishment to control the “scourge” of bribery, chapter 4 offers a simple theoretical
9A striking example was the case of Mr James Ibori (a former governor of Delta State in the South-South region of Nigeria)
who was acquitted of corruption charges but jailed in the United Kingdom for the same offence.
6 General Introduction
model that looks into how different enforcement mechanisms may yield different outcomes in terms of
bribe levels and willingness to pay.
In the remainder of this introduction, I outline the arguments made in the ensuing chapters, focusing
on the empirical questions asked, contributions to the literature and the central theme that unites the
chapters.
1.3 National or political cake?
The idea that opportunistic politicians can benefit from intergovernmental transfers by strategically
targeting recipient groups is formalised in tactical redistributive models (e.g. Cox and McCubbins (1986);
Dixit and Londregan, 1996). In these models, political parties are theorised as two spatially organised
groups that allocate resources across a group of voters with a single electoral district. The voters, in turn,
are assumed to have fixed and exogenous political preferences and also receive utility from the allocations
they get. Within this context, a voter is usually modelled to prefer a party that offers her a transfer, large
enough to outweigh her ideological attachment to her own party (Arulampalam et al., 2009). This latter
theoretical postulation has some interesting implications. First, votes can be “purchased" with transfers,
as voters (irrespective of their ideological leanings) can be materially induced to a rival party if the price is
right. Second, political parties interested in maximising returns to votes engage in opportunistic policies
and strategies aimed at winning moderate or non-ideological voters because they can be bought more
easily than voters who are clearly attached to a political party (Golden and Min, 2013).
Most empirical studies (Bracco et al., 2015; Dasgupta, 2015; De La O, 2013; Larcinese et al., 2013;
Manacorda et al., 2011a; Stromberg, 2004) that have drawn on these models to investigate tactical
redistributive policies generally tend to focus on the discretionary component of public spending and
targeted transfers, but not rule-based intergovernmental transfers. The underlying assumptions for
each of these studies are that the incumbent politicians engage in clientelism and pork-barrel politics.
Moreover, tactical redistribution of transfers are more likely when politicians can exert some degree of
discretion in the allocation of resources to favour recipient groups identifiable by partisan leanings, race
or ethnicity. However, an important question which remains unanswered in the existing studies is whether
an opportunistic incumbent politician can manipulate a centralised rule-based transfer system to win more
votes. One would expect that such transfers are more likely to be subject to manipulability in countries
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with weak institutional settings and clientelistic framework in which incumbent party leaders decide who
gets what, when and how.
In Nigeria, for example, anecdotal evidence suggests that the redistribution of oil revenues has
been subject to abuse despite the rule-based nature of these transfers. Specifically, the Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission reported that between 1960 and 1999 the country’s rulers may have
stolen an estimated USD 400 billion in oil revenues (Okpanachi, 2011). Yet, the literature on tactical
redistribution in developing countries (with the exception of Arulampalam, et al. 2009 and Banful, 2011)
have emphasised the importance of ethnic favouritism without much attention to the political motives
behind the use of redistributive politics. The democratisation wave experienced in Africa over the last
two decades (Rakner et al., 2008), together with the push for further decentralisation reforms (Rodriguez-
Pose and Gill, 2004), call for paying more attention to the risk of manipulation in intergovernmental
transfers. Understanding such manipulation is key to shed light on the mixed results found on the
impact of decentralisation on economic performances and regional disparities in developing countries
(Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010, 2011).
Chapter 2 examines how much a centralised rule-based transfer system in Nigeria can be manipulated
to effectively buy political support. In this context, I use oil windfalls as a source of exogenous variation
in the political discretion that the central government can exert in rule-based transfers. By doing so, the
chapter contributes to the literature on tactical redistribution in developing countries and also sheds light
on how large increases in natural resource rents increase political power and the ability to buy votes
(Robinson et al., 2014). The main finding indicates that an increase in VAT transfers induced by higher oil
windfalls improves the electoral fortune of the incumbent government. The result questions the promotion
of rule-based transfers as a one-fits-all institutional solution in resource-abundant countries with relatively
weak institutions.
1.4 When it rains, it’s peaceful
Does a change in the distribution of rainfall between groups translate into an increase in armed conflict
prevalence? In recent years, there has been an increase in quantitative research on how climate change
may induce higher risks of armed conflict in societies (Hsiang et al., 2013; Maystadt et al., 2014). The
most immediate insight gained from this literature is that establishing a direct causal link between climate
variability and conflict is far from being conclusive. First, there is a lack of a precise theoretical model
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to guide systematic quantitative evaluation, thus leading to the absence of consensus about the actual
channel through which variations in climatic conditions might conceivably affect conflict dynamics.
Moreover, most of the analyses are conducted in a “generalizable and comparative” analytical set-up,
which are usually problematic when it comes to drawing causal inferences. Although remarkable progress
with respect to statistical techniques and data quality have aided more country-specific studies in recent
years (Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012; Hsiang et al., 2013; Maystadt et al., 2014), the inability of these
studies to quantitatively capture complex causal linkages have continued to question causality claims.
Thus, there is a growing consensus among policy-makers and academics that more research is needed to
investigate better how this broad trend translates in practice within specific contexts.
Chapter 3, will focus on the case of Nigeria to investigate the relationship between changes in the
distribution of rainfall between ethnic groups and armed conflicts prevalence. As a first step, the chapter
investigate whether changes in the distribution of rainfall across ethnic groups living within the same
state increases the incidences of civil conflicts within that state. The location of the different ethnic
groups within a state are taken from the detailed Nigeria Local Government Handbook. I then spatially
merge the location of ethnic groups with a high-frequency and high-resolution rainfall data provided
by the European Center for Medium-Term Weather Forecasts (ECMWF). The key measure of “rainfall
inequality” between ethnic groups is then constructed following Guariso and Rogall (2017) and is based
on the standard Gini coefficient. The analysis covers 37 states and 19 years, from 1997 to 2015, which is
the period for which all the data sources are available.
The main result indicates that a one standard deviation increases in rainfall inequality between ethnic
groups living in a state increases the risks of civil conflict prevalence by about seven percentage points.
In the second part of the paper, I move to investigate the channels through which rainfall inequality
may induce higher prevalence of civil conflict. In doing so, I match the ethnicity level information with
micro-level data provided by the Afrobarometer. I then construct an ethnic level indicator for general
trust; trust in neighbour and government; within-group and between-group trust; government satisfaction;
and government corruption. The results suggest that an unequal distribution of rainfall leads to lower
satisfaction with the government and creates mistrust between predominantly farming ethnic groups and
those engaged in herding.
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It is now widely accepted that corruption has detrimental effects on societies. Rose-Ackerman’s seminal
works (Rose-Ackerman, 1975, 1978), as well as Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993) influential paper, demon-
strates that the illegal system of bribe-price can be more distortionary than taxation. The rent-seeking
behaviour of corrupt government officials may induce them to redesign public systems to encourage
bribery. Such actions involve not only the illicit exploitation of individual’s willingness to pay as a deci-
sion criterion but also undermine efficient provision of public services. Yet, in many developing countries,
private citizens are often required to pay bribes to obtain basic public services. Indeed, data from the 2015
Global Corruption Barometer produced by Transparency International shows that twenty-two percent
of respondents surveyed in Sub-Saharan Africa report having paid a bribe in the last 12 months. The
situation is worst in countries such as Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone where one out of two
respondents surveyed say they paid a bribe to access public services such as education, health, customs
and tax revenue, licenses and land services, etc.
This pervasive culture of bribery has important consequences for those without money and connections.
As with the incidence of regressive tax, the burden of bribery may fall disproportionately on the poor as
they are more likely to pay a higher percentage of their income as bribes than the rich (Hunt and Laszlo,
2012). Moreover, the distortionary effects of corruption can compromise the quality of public goods
provision, in such a manner that the population may have to rely on private providers to access vital public
goods and services. This again disproportionately favours the high-income groups because the costs of
these services may be so high that the poor cannot afford to pay. This non-access to basic services such as
education and healthcare facilities has the potential to perpetuate inter-generational poverty and hence
widens income inequality. Indeed, micro-level studies such as Hunt and Laszlo (2005) and Mocan (2008)
have demonstrated that the nominal amount of bribes paid is a positive function of income, whose burden
decreases as income rises.
Given these distortionary effects, an interesting question to ask is how can the incidence of bribe
requests and payments be reduced? While recent theoretical contributions on the economic analysis of
corruption have started to focus on measures to combat it, there has been an increased debate on the
merits and limitations of the different proposals (see Basu, 2011; Dixit, 2016; Dréze, 2011; Dufwenberg
and Spagnolo, 2014; Oak, 2015). Chapter 4 offers a new view on how different punishment mechanisms
may affect bribery outcomes and willingness to pay. In doing so, the model extends the setting by Hunt
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and Laszlo (2005) and also contributes to a growing literature on measures to reduce corruption (see
Dixit, 2016; Andreanova and Melisasas, 2008; Hindricks, et al., 1999). While this literature focuses on
the role of explicit incentive structures, such as institutional controls and the use of efficient wages in
controlling corruption, I highlight how the intrinsic characteristics of public and private agents may alter
bribery outcomes.
In particular, I model the interactions between a bureaucrat and private agent as a dynamic game in
which the bureaucrat moves first and decides whether to solicits for a bribe or not. This modelling choice
is intended to elicit the conditions under which the bureaucrat may angle for bribes, given the punishment
system in place. The analysis shows that severe punishments for corrupt bureaucrats generally leads
to an increase in bribe size, making bribing more expensive (and therefore less widespread). However,
the effects of a proportional punishment, which varies with the amount of bribe, depends on how much
effort is required to deliver the public service. If the effort of delivery is large or the service is sufficiently
valuable to the agent, the bribe level in equilibrium overcompensates the bureaucrat for his effort and is
also increasing in the net surplus available for the client with the least scruples. I also discuss the effects
of the results on willingness to pay and inequality.
Chapter 2
The political economy of intergovernmental
transfers in Nigeria
2.1 Introduction
The notion that incumbent politicians may benefit electorally by strategically allocating transfers to favour
recipient groups is given formal expression in tactical redistributive models (e.g. Cox and McCubbins,
1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1993). Most empirical studies (Bracco et al.,
2015; Dasgupta, 2015; De La O, 2013; Larcinese et al., 2013; Manacorda et al., 2011b; Stromberg, 2004)
that have drawn on these models to investigate political motivations in redistributive policies tends to
focus mainly on the discretionary component of public spending and targeted transfers, but not rule-based
intergovernmental transfers. The underlying assumptions for each of these studies are that incumbent
politicians engage in clientelism and pork-barrel politics, and that tactical redistribution of transfers is
more likely when politicians can exert some degree of discretion in the allocation of resources to favour
recipient groups identifiable by partisan leanings, race or ethnicity.1 Indeed, the general recommendation
for developing countries when decentralizing is to base fiscal decentralization on a rule-based system
(generally considering factors such as population, wealth, location and density) in order to avoid graft
and elite capture (World Bank, 2004). In particular, countries such as Nigeria, Brazil, Ghana and India
1Prominent studies on ethnic favouritism can be found in Hodler and Raschky (2014), Burgess et al. (2015), and De Luca
et al. (2015).
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have introduced a formula-based intergovernmental system based on verifiable and objective criteria to
constrain politically motivated targeting of transfers.2
However, an important question which remain unanswered in the extant studies is, whether an
opportunistic incumbent politician can manipulate a centralized rule-based transfer system to win more
votes. One would expect that such transfers are more likely to be subject to manipulability in countries
with weak institutional settings and clientelistic framework in which incumbent party leaders decide who
gets what, when and how. In Nigeria, for instance, anecdotal evidence suggest that the redistribution of
oil revenues has been subject to abuse despite the rule-based nature of these transfers. Specifically, the
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission which was established in 2004, reported that between 1960
and 1999 the country’s rulers may have stolen an estimated USD 400 billion in oil revenues (Okpanachi,
2011).
Surprisingly, the literature on tactical redistribution in developing countries (with the exception of
Arulampalam, et al. 2009 and Banful, 2011) has focused mainly on ethnic favouritism without much
attention to the political motives behind the use of redistributive politics. The democratisation wave
experienced in Africa over the last two decades (Rakner et al., 2008), together with the push for further
decentralisation reforms (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2004), call for paying more attention to the risk of
manipulation in intergovernmental transfers. Understanding such manipulation is key to shed light in the
mixed results found on the impact of decentralisation on economic performances and regional disparities
in developing countries (Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010, 2011). In this chapter, we examined how
much a centralised rule-based transfer system in Nigeria can be manipulated to effectively buy political
support. To that purpose, we exploit oil windfalls as a source of exogenous variation in the political
discretion the central government can exert in rule-based transfers. In so doing, our study contributes to
the literature on tactical redistribution in developing countries, and also sheds light on how large increases
in natural resource rents increase political power and the ability to buy votes (Robinson et al., 2014).
Nigeria is an interesting case to consider for several reasons. First, since the discovery of oil in
commercial quantities in 1956, the Nigeria’s political space has been dominated by the concept of ‘sharing
the national cake’, a phrase used to refer to any opportunity to access national wealth, owned by none,
should belong to all but is limited to few. Politically, this ‘sharing of the national cake’ has led to a
prebendal system, in which elected government officials believe they are entitled to a share of government
2India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, as well as Nigeria’s Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal
Commission Act are good examples of regulations that recommends the devolution of resources to constituent parts by means
of a formulae-based system.
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revenues, and to use them to reward their supporters.3 The specific outcome of this act of sharing is further
manifested in the structure of Nigeria’s fiscal federalism. For instance, revenues from oil, combined
with VAT, custom and excise duties are paid into the central pool of the Federation Account and shared
between the central and state governments at the middle of every month in accordance to some rules.4
Thus, it is intuitive to verify whether the rules have been sufficient to avoid politically motivated targeting
of transfers.
Second, Nigeria’s high dependence on oil revenues and the fact that part of these revenues is distributed
in a proportional way to the oil and non-oil producing states allow us to exploit how exogenous variation
in crude oil prices impact on transfers and the ability of the President to buy votes. Oil prices can indeed
be considered as exogenous, since Nigeria accounts for less than 4% of world oil production (Abidoye
and Cali, 2015). Third, although Nigeria has a dominant party framework, electoral outcomes vary
greatly across states. This variation can be exploited to investigate how plausibly exogenous variations
in intergovernmental transfers affect electoral support for the central government. Lastly, while states
implement their budgets independently of the central government, they do not have control over the tax
base or tax rate in their jurisdiction. This means that the states’ main sources of revenue are almost
entirely derived from the central government transfers. Indeed, based on the Central Bank of Nigeria
2014 Annual Economic Report, the states’ own internally generated revenue typically amounts to less
than twenty percent of their total revenue. It is therefore important to examine whether an incumbent
government can use the centralised intergovernmental transfer system to purchase political support.
Moreover, analysing the effect of opportunistic fiscal transfers on the electoral fortune of incumbent
politicians can be difficult due to problems of endogeneity in the allocation of grants (Larcinese, et al
2013). To mitigate this problem, a common empirical approach in previous studies was to implement a
quasi-experimental design in which voters’ behaviour in electoral districts that receive relatively higher
grants are compared with those in districts that receive lower grants (see Dahlberg et al., 2008; Litschig
and Morrison, 2013; Manacorda et al., 2011b). However, in the absence of a quasi-experimental setting,
most studies simply assume that political competition at the sub-national level is exogenous to the use of
transfers or unobserved determinants of transfers. Our study considers an instrumental variable approach
to test the plausibility of this assumption. In particular, we exploit exogenous variation in oil windfalls as
3Joseph Richard in his work “Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria” defines prebendal to mean patterns of political
behaviour in Nigeria which rests on the justifying principle that state power should be treated as “a congeries of offices” which
can be competed for, appropriated and then administered for the benefit of the individual occupant and their support groups.
4We further discuss how revenues from the central government are redistributed to states in section 2.2.
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an instrumental variable, to estimate the impact of transfers on the re-election prospects of incumbent
politicians. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to use instrumental variables to analyse the
impact of tactical redistribution on election outcomes in a sub-Saharan African country.
Exploiting within-state variation between 2007 and 2015 for the 36 states in Nigeria, we find that an
increase in VAT transfers induced by higher oil windfalls improves the electoral fortune of the incumbent
President. This result is robust to alternative specifications (e.g. changing the definition of oil-producing
states, changes in dependent variable and the variable of interest, respectively). Our results question the
role of rule-based transfers as an efficient institutional arrangement in resource-abundant countries. It
complements the results by Banful (2011) who shows that formula-based transfers were targeted towards
swing districts in Ghana. We show that such political manipulation of rule-based transfers helps to buy
votes for the incumbent in Nigeria.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides the institutional
background of the study. Section 2.3 describes the empirical model and identification strategy. Section
2.4 focuses on the results, while the last section concludes the chapter.
2.2 Institutional Background
Nigeria is a Federal Republic, with an elected President and a two-chamber National Assembly, i.e.
the Senate and the House of Representatives. The President is elected for a 4-year term limits and is
constitutionally allowed to seek re-election for another period of 4 years after the expiration of his first
term in office. The 1999 constitution recognizes a two-round electoral system. In order to win in the first
round, a candidate not only needs to have a simple majority of vote cast but at least 25 percent of the
votes in two-thirds of the states.
The 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria also defines to a large extent, the country’s
system of fiscal federalism. The constitution defines three levels of government: the Federal, the 36
states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), and 774 local government areas. It also determines the
responsibility of each level of government. The federal government is charged with the provision of
public services that are of national importance, such as foreign affairs, defence, security, law and public
order. The states have the responsibilities to provide for education, health and physical infrastructure, and
the promotion of economic and social growth within their jurisdiction. The role of the local government
varies across the country and is not clearly defined by the constitution. Furthermore, the constitution
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outlines the manner in which revenues are shared among the three different tiers. The country operates a
highly centralised revenue system. All federally collected revenues are paid into the Federation Account,
which is then shared among the different levels of governments, strictly according to formula developed
by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) and approved by the National
Assembly. Additionally, about 4.18 percent of revenue accruing to the Federation account is kept in Four
Special Funds (Federal Capital Territory, Statutory Stabilization, Development of Natural Resources, and
Ecology and Derivation).
The major source of revenue for the Federation Account is revenue from oil, VAT, corporate income
tax, as well as custom and excise duties. Oil accounts for almost 80 percent of total federally-collected
revenue. Although oil revenues are federally-collected, the 1999 constitution requires that 13% of the
gross oil revenue should be shared among oil-producing states in proportion to their production volumes.
The remaining are paid directly into the Federation Account and distributed among the three levels of
government.
Distributions from the Federation Account to the different tiers of government are based on a vertical
allocation formula that assigns a specific share of the account to each level of government, as well as
horizontal allocation formulas that distribute both the state and local government shares of the Federation
Account among the states and local governments. Under the current vertical allocation revenue formula
edited by a Presidential Executive order given in 2000, gross allocations in the Federation Account is
shared as follows: Federal government – 52.68%; State governments – 26.72%, and Local governments –
20.60%. The horizontal allocation formula is given as follows: equality – 40%; population – 30%; land
mass and terrain – 10%; internally generated revenue – 10%, and social development such as education
enrolment, health and water – 10%. In practice, a large proportion of the total 20% designated for
internally generated revenue and social development are usually divided equally among the States. VAT
revenues are shared as follows: 50% equally to all states, 30% proportional to population, and 20% on
derivation basis (the basis of relative state contributions to VAT revenues).
It is important to note that, while substantial source of revenues accrues to the Federation Account, the
state and local governments can collect for themselves a number of minor taxes such as personal income
taxes, license fees, and market fees. Typically, these internally generated revenues do not account for more
than twenty percent of the total consolidated revenue. A notable exception is Lagos and Rivers States,
which account for 38% and 12% of the total of internally generated revenues from all states between
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2010 and 2014. In addition, even though states do not generally receive transfers from the Federal budget
(but from the Federation Account); they have no control over either the tax base or tax rate of the federal
allocations. Hence, these revenues can be considered as intergovernmental transfers to the states and local
government as opposed to their own internally generated revenue.
Moreover, the Federation Allocations are administered by a Federation Account Allocation Committee
(FAAC) in liaison with the National Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission. The
committee meets on a monthly basis to allocate the previous month’s revenue receipts among the three
tiers. The FAAC comprises of the Federal Minister of Finance, and representatives from each of the
states of the Federation, usually the states’ Commissioners of Finance and their Accountants-General, and
representatives from fiscal and monetary related federal agencies, such as the Central Bank, Customs and
Federal Inland Revenue Services. However, members of the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal
Commission are appointed by the President, and charged primarily with the responsibility of monitoring
the accruals to, and disbursement of funds from the Federation Account, and reviewing on a regular basis
the data and revenue allocation formula, respectively.5 Regarding the data revision process, the horizontal
allocation formula is updated by the commission on an annual basis to ensure conformity with changing
realities, while the vertical revenue allocation formula is seldom reviewed without due consultation with
major state and non-state actors across the Federation.
The rule-based nature of the inter-governmental transfers does not immune the system from political
agency. The dearth of data on social development factors and the lack of transparency in the data updating
process could open the door for political manipulation even with a rule-based intergovernmental transfer
system. As illustrated in Figure A 2.1 in the Appendix, there is a discrepancy between the hypothetical
allocation of transfers (based on the horizontal allocation formula) and the reality. For instance, the South-
South region from which President Goodluck is originating receives 19% of the allocations compared
to the expected 16%. That represents about twenty-eight million dollars a year, in real terms. Such
an amount represents on average 12% of the annual budget of the states composing that region. One
channel for manipulation comes from data revision on which the transfers are based. FAAC Committee
members who are politically aligned with the incumbent may strategically fiddle with the data revision
process to favour the incumbent party. Indeed, given Nigeria’s weak institutional setting and incentive
structure in which incumbent party leaders decides who gets what, when and how, it is plausible to suspect
5The commission consists of a chairperson and one member from each state of the Federation and the Federal Capital
Territory.
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political interference. As an example, while the act establishing the commission empowers the President
to appoint persons with “unquestionable integrity” to the commission, there is little information about
the criteria for such appointments and the political affiliation of the committee members. A more subtle
source of manipulation may come from the input provided by civil servants in the data revision process.
Nonetheless, we should acknowledge that the discrepancy depicted in Figure A 2.1 cannot be interpreted
as hard evidence for manipulation. Our analysis seeks to shed light on the issue by investigating how
plausibly exogenous changes in transfers can be used to buy votes for the incumbent President.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
2.3.1 Data and Identification Strategy
Our analysis spans over nine years, i.e. 2007 to 2015 for 36 states in Nigeria.6 Our main empirical
analysis is to test whether transfers allocated to a state s leads to a larger vote share for the incumbent. A
naive approach would consist in regressing the amount of transfers received in state s prior to election
held at time t on electoral outcomes in the following way:
electoutcomes,t = γ ln(trans f erss,t)+ εs,t (2.1)
One well-known problem with this approach is that the allocation of intergovernmental transfers is
not random and likely to be correlated with political characteristics or other determinants of political
competition in the concerned state. Even the theory is relatively ambiguous about the expected endogeneity
bias. On the one hand, the proponents of the core-support hypothesis posit that a risk averse politician
allocates funds to political entities that are clearly attached to the incumbent party to maximise the
return to vote and reward loyalty (e.g. Cox and McCubbins, 1986) . Such rewarding mechanism would
lead to an upward bias of the OLS estimates. On the other hand, the opposite bias would result from
the swing voter model, according to which grants are allocated to “battleground" or regions with high
proportion of non-ideological voters (e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull, 1993; Dixit and Londregan, 1996).
Similar endogeneity bias may arise due to unobserved state characteristics that would influence both the
allocation of transfers and voting behaviours. In a rule-based system, controlling for the allocation criteria
6Federal Capital Territory (FCT-Abuja) is excluded from the analysis because funds are allocated directly to it from the
Federation Account through the FCT Special Fund that is under the control of the Federal Government.
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are obviously key, but as pointed in Section 2.2, there is no guarantee such control variables are accurately
measured or even manipulated for political motives.
In the absence of a quasi-experimental setting, we propose a two-stage approach more likely to draw
causal inference. We use exogenous variation in oil windfalls as an instrument for transfers in the first
stage, with other determinants of transfers controlled for. Figure A 2.2 indeed suggests a strong link
between oil prices and the proportion of transfers allocated to oil-producing states. Not surprisingly, oil
price variations are more strongly correlated with variations in transfers in oil-producing states compared
to other states, thereby supporting the validity of the use of oil windfalls as an exogenous variation on
the amount of transfers received by state authorities.7 We include state fixed effects αs to control for
unobserved time invariant heterogeneity that may affect the allocation of transfers and voting behaviours
at the state level. We also introduce year and quarter specific dummies δt and γq, to account for unobserved
time and seasonality effects. We also augment the model with state-specific time trends in alternative
specifications.
The first-stage regressions take the following form:
ln(trans f ers,q,t) = β ′Oilwins,q−1,t +θXs,t−1+αs+ γq+δt + εsqt (2.2)
Where trans f ers,q,t are VAT transfers from the Federal government to the state s received in the quarter
q of year t, calculated based on 2007 constant Naira (199.05 NGN/USD at June 2015 exchange rate).
This data was sourced from Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Finance monthly publications FAAC Report.
Oilwins,q−1,t represents oil windfalls occurring in the previous quarter q of year t. Following Abidoye
and Cali (2015), oil windfalls are constructed by multiplying the oil production value at the state level in
2003 with the international oil price, i.e. Oilwins,q,t = poilq,t ×oils. Prices indexes have been largely used
in the economic literature (e.g. Bruckner and Ciccone, 2010; Dube and Vargas, 2013). When possible, it
is common practice to weight the variations in international prices by a weight defined prior to the period
of investigation. The reason is to render the constructed price index more exogenous. Since our analysis
starts in 2007, using weights prior to 2006 is more likely to be exogenous. Data on oil production and
prices were obtained from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation’s Annual Statistical Bulletin8
7The sharp decrease in transfers during a period of increasing oil prices observed in early 2007 for both oil-producing and
non-oil producing states could be explained by the creation of a sovereign wealth funds, reducing the total amount of revenues
to be reallocated to all states.
8These data have been kindly shared by Abidoye and Cali (2015).
2.3 Empirical Analysis 19
and Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). Transfers and oil windfalls are aggregated at the quarterly
level to capture the possible use of transfers by the incumbent (central) party to buy votes during the
next election periods, which normally falls in April. Thus, aggregating at the quarterly level allows us to
capture the variation around the pre- and post-election periods.
Xs,t−1 is a vector of socio-economic and political controls. The socio-economic variables approximate
the horizontal allocation formula for transfers, i.e. state population, primary and secondary school
enrolment rates (land mass being time-constant, its role is captured through the introduction of state fixed
effects).9 Given that our grant and oil windfalls variables are defined at the quarterly level, the inclusion
of the socio-economic and political variables may give rise to some concerns about measurement errors,
since these data are usually available on an annual basis. It is important to emphasize that while such
concerns are valid, we are only exploiting exogenous variations in oil windfalls to predict the change in
transfers received the quarter prior to each election years. Moreover, changes in VAT transfers to states
are usually conditioned on the statistical estimates from the previous year. Thus to mitigate this concern,
we lag the socio-economic variables by one year and include state fixed effects to control for unobserved
and time-constant characteristics likely to affect the allocation of transfers.
Since the horizontal formula allocation takes into account the previous year’s internally generated
revenue and given the absence of regional data on GDP for the period of our study, we use nightlights
intensity to proxy for state level GDP. Indeed, night light densities have been largely used as a substitute
for local GDP in economics (Donaldson and Storeygard, 2016; Henderson et al., 2012). To calculate the
nightlights intensity, satellite data from the Defence Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) was used.
The 30 arc second data (∼ 1km2 at equator), covers the period from 1992 to 2013 (Small and Elvidge,
2013).10 Six different DMSP satellites, F10 to F18, resulting in time series of 33 datasets, exist in total
during this time period. We used the “stable lights" data, which shows the lights from cities, towns,
and other sites with persistent lighting, thereby removing the ephemeral lights and background noises
associated with the data (Small et al., 2005).
One concern may be that oil-producing states have specific political characteristics that make them
more likely to receive transfers and buy votes in the second-stage. We, therefore, control for political
variables, namely alignment likely to capture the core support hypothesis, and swing variables, related to
9The last population census in Nigeria was conducted in 2006. The population data used are projected estimates as
computed by the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics.
10For the remaining time period (i.e. 2014 to 2015), we did a linear extrapolation for missing values of nightlights. Two
datasets of stable lights exist, the; 1) average DN value image composites, and 2) average DN value multiplied by the percent
frequency of light detection image composites. We use the average DN value image composites.
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the swing voter hypothesis.11 We construct the political variables as dummy variables. To construct these
variables, we consider the fact that decisions relating to grant allocations to a state are delayed by one time-
period. Thus, allocations that is due in January 31st of a financial year are made in Mid-February of that
financial year. The alignment indicator is defined as one if the central government and state government
belong to the same political party on the 30th of the previous month and there is no emergency rule in
the state as at that date.12 To construct the swing dummy, we first identify the last Presidential election
occurring in each state s prior to financial year t. Then we define for each election year, the winning
margin, which is the difference between the percentage vote share of the two political parties that secure
the highest number of votes in state s. We then classify a state as swing state (equals one) if the winning
margin is less than or equal to 10 percent, or non-swing state (equals zero), otherwise.13
An additional concern may be that oil producing states are more prone to the risk of violence due to
environmental degradation and resource control agitations by armed groups such as the Movement for
the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND). Interestingly, the Federal Government special amnesty
programme launched in 2009 to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate the ex-agitators, as well as the elevation
and subsequent election of Dr Goodluck Jonathan to the office of the President following the death of
the former President in 2010, brought relative stability to the region. Nonetheless, we include the lagged
number of violent events occurring in each state to control for the potential use of intergovernmental
transfers for counter-insurgency purposes. Geo-referenced conflict event data have been aggregated at the
quarterly and state level using the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED). A conflict event
is defined as a single altercation, where force is used between one or more politically organised groups at
a particular time and location (Raleigh et al., 2010). Lastly, similar to Burgess et al. (2015), we assess the
importance of ethnic and religion favouritism in determining intergovernmental transfers, and political
support in the second-stage. The co-ethnic and religion variables are constructed as dummy variables that
take the value of one for states where at least 50% of the population has the same ethnic affiliation and
religion as the incumbent President.
11Swing states or “battleground" states are states in which no single party or candidate has overwhelming support.
Interestingly, while oil-producing states are more likely to have an electorate supportive of the incumbent, mean comparisons
indicates that such states are also less likely to be defined as aligned or swing.
12In the case of an emergency rule, the Nigeria constitution empowers the President to replace an elected Governor with a
Sole Administrator who oversee the affairs of the state for a limited period of three months. While a state of emergency was
declared in Borno state where “Boko Haram" crisis was rife, the elected Governor remains in office through out the period.
13We use this cut-off value because electoral race in Nigeria are not usually very “tight" in most states, hence by using a
10% cut-off value, we reduce the risks of having few states as swings. Additionally, we increase the cut-off value to 20% to see
if this affect our results; although not reported here, the results are robust to this alternative definition. Using a winning margin
of less than or equal to 20% do not substantially alter our results.
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In the second stage equation, we estimate the impact of transfers on electoral outcomes. Given that
elections are held every four years, we consider a bootstrap method in the second stage regression, due to
the small number of clusters. Standard errors are clustered at the state level using Cameron et al. (2008)’s
wild bootstrap method.14
electoutcomes,t = γ ln( ̂trans f erss,t)+θ ′Xs,t−1+αs+ γ ′s,t +δt + εs,t (2.3)
Where electoutcomes,t refers to the vote margin between the incumbent (central) party and the other
opponent in the Presidential elections. In alternative specifications, we use the percentage of votes share of
the incumbent or the log of the absolute number of votes for the ruling party in the Presidential elections.
Electoral data was obtained from the Independent National Electoral Commission. The timespan of
the resulting dataset includes three elections periods, i.e. 2007, 2011 and 2015. In Figure A 2.3, we
summarize the political and leadership transitions in Nigeria from 1999 to 2015. ̂trans f erss,t are the VAT
transfers from the Federal government to the state s received in the quarter prior to the election, predicted
by the first-stage regressions. Similar control and fixed effects are used. Table A 2.1 of the Appendix also
summarizes the main variables of our analysis.
2.3.2 Threats to Identification Strategy
A major identification concern is the validity of the instrumental variable. To be considered exogenous,
two conditions need to be met. First of all, the sub-national variation in oil production should be orthogonal
to the allocation of intergovernmental transfers or any time-varying omitted variable that affects election.
To that purpose, we use the share of oil production prior to the period of investigation, i.e. in 2003
(and alternatively averaged between 2003 and 2005). Second, oil prices should be exogenous to shocks
occurring within Nigeria. We, therefore, use the West Texas Intermediate price taken from FRED. Oil
price is normalised to 100 for the first month of 2007. As pointed by Abidoye and Cali (2015) and Fenske
and Zurimendi (2017), oil prices can be considered as exogenous since Nigeria accounts for less than 4%
of world oil production. In our main results, we use the three-month lagged average price index. However,
to allow for cumulative effects and changes in expectation, we check the robustness of our results to
14Given the small number of clusters (n = 36) and the use of predicted regressors originating from our first-stage regressions,
which might lead to underestimation of within-group correlation, the wild bootstrap method produce estimators that are robust
to heteroskedasticity (Cameron et al., 2008)
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alternative price constructions: the use of 6, 9 and 12 months moving averages and the use of anomalies
compared to the long-term mean value (January 1986 to December 2006).
The second condition relates to the exclusion restriction, i.e. oil price variations should not affect
political variables through another channel than transfers. Given the importance of transfers in state
budgets (on average 80%), there is little scope for other budgetary mechanisms. However, we may be
concerned that variations in oil prices have direct effects on state-level oil production and therefore on
state-level economic activities. While we do not have quarterly state-level data on GDP per capita for
the period of our study, we nonetheless assess further that identification threat. To that purpose, we use
quarterly cumulative precipitation and temperature anomalies (that is, deviations from the long-term
quarterly mean defined from 1950, divided by the long-run quarterly standard deviation) to proxy for
changes in economic activities. Since agriculture accounts for about 60% of Nigeria’s GDP, rainfall and
temperature anomalies occurring in each state can be considered as a reasonable proxy for change in
economic activities. Cumulative precipitation and average temperature are constructed based on climatic
data provided by University of East Anglia Climatic Research Unit (UEA-CRU 2013). The UEA-CRU
time-series datasets report average temperatures and total precipitation by months at data points of a
high-resolution grid (of 0.5× 0.5 degree), which are based on measurements from weather stations
distributed around the world (Harris et al., 2014; Mitchell and Jones, 2005).15 As described in the next
section, we also do not find any evidence of a direct link between oil windfalls and economic activities,
proxied by night light densities.
Another concern is that oil windfalls would affect voting behaviour through more subtle channels like
the provision of public goods. We would like first to stress that it is not necessarily the case that the impact
on the provision of public goods and local economic development will be positive. Michaels (2011) finds
a positive impact of oil windfalls on long-run economic development in the U.S. On the contrary, in a
middle-income country like Brazil, Caselli and Michaels (2013) find no significant improvement in the
provision of public goods, infrastructure and household income following an increase in oil revenues in
oil-rich municipalities in Brazil. Such results are in sharp contrast with the reported increase in spending
on public goods and services, which the authors claimed, might result from a combination of patronage
or rent sharing and embezzlement by officials. Although Nigeria is characterised by a relatively weak
governance system, the literature is too limited to claim with very high confidence if the situation in
Nigeria is more likely to be similar to the US case featured by Michaels (2011) or the Brazilian case in
15We transform the gridded UEA-CRU temperature and precipitation data to one (centered) data point by state.
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Caselli and Michaels (2013). Despite the inconclusive evidence from the literature, the short-run effects of
oil windfalls on local GDP and the real income of the voters remain a concern. In this regard, we indirectly
assess the importance of unobserved income shocks following large oil windfalls by investigating how oil
windfalls affect socio-economic outcomes. We further discuss the issue in section 2.4.2.
Moreover, given the possible strategic use of intergovernmental transfers for political reasons, we may
be concerned that the political characteristics of states may also be correlated with omitted variables at the
state level. To reduce the problem of omitted variables, we take advantage of our unique dataset in several
ways. First, we restrict the transfers variable to formula-based grants allocated by the central government
to the 36 states of Nigeria. Controlling for the criteria used to allocate funds, such a restriction should
limit the risk of omitted factors affecting both the dependent variable and the main variables of interest. It
basically reduces the risk that omitted variables, including time-varying state-level changes, complicate
the causal identification. Second, we further introduce state fixed effects, αs, controlling for unobserved
time-constant heterogeneity at the state level. For instance, the distance to the capital is likely to confound
the investigated relationships. Stromberg (2004) shows, for instance, that the use of state fixed effects in
his study of the New Deal in the US changes the previous support for the swing state hypothesis. We also
introduce time specific dummies δt , to account for unobserved time effects. Third, we lag our political
variables to mitigate the simultaneity issue between voting behaviours and inter-governmental transfers.
Said differently, our political variables (i.e. alignment and swing) are defined based on the last election.
The descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest can be found in Table 2.1.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Transfers and Voting Behaviour
Panel A of Table 2.2 reports the first stage results. There is a positive relationship between oil windfalls
and VAT transfers. This relationship is robust across various specifications, i.e. whether we include
year, state, quarterly fixed effects, state-specific time trends, and control variables. A 10% increase in
oil windfalls translates into a rise in VAT transfers by about 1.99% to 2.08% (i.e. columns (4) to (6) of
Table 2.2). Table 2.2 also illustrates the strength of the oil windfalls as an instrumental variable. The
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Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics ranges between 14.78 and 18.22, well above the Stock and Yogo
(2005) critical values with 10 percent absolute bias.16
Panel B of Table 2.2 provides the second stage results. Columns (1) to (2) report the baseline
regressions with only year and state fixed effects, and state-specific time trends, respectively, while
columns (3) to (6) includes the political and socio-economic controls. Across these various specifications,
we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between VAT transfers and the margin of
vote obtained by the incumbents in the Presidential elections. Specifically, the baseline specification in
column (1) and (2) indicates that a 10% increase in VAT transfers to states would increase support for the
incumbents by 64.23 and 60.11 percent, respectively. However, this impact reduces to between 44.76 and
56.60 percent, respectively, when we control for the political characteristics of states in column (3), and
the state majority sharing the same religion and ethnicity with the incumbent President in column (4). To
increase the precision of our estimates, we further control for states socio-economic characteristics that
may influence both the allocation of transfers and voting behaviours in columns (5) and (6), respectively.
The results suggests that a 10% increase in VAT transfers increases the margin of vote scored by the
incumbent President by 48.47 (column 5) and 49.31 (column 6) percent, respectively.
The 2SLS estimates radically differ from the OLS estimates presented in Panel C of the same Table.
An explanation for such a bias towards zero would be that transfers are targeted towards swing states
where electoral victory is uncertain. The coefficients of the political variables (i.e. alignment and swing)
in the first-stage regressions (see Table A 2.2) back such an explanation. Interestingly, splitting our sample
between states that are initially defined as swing and non-swing confirms our presupposition. Although
less precisely estimated as a result of the smaller sample sizes, Panel A of Table 2.3 indicates that transfers
help to buy more votes for the incumbent in swing states, compared to non-swing states (Panel B of Table
2.3). Another explanation may be related to the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) interpretation
of the IV estimates (Angrist and Fernández-Val, 2013). The positive impact of transfers on incumbent
votes may be driven by specific circumstances in oil-producing states, limiting the external validity of our
analysis. We cannot definitely reject that possibility, but simple mean comparisons do not indicate that
oil-producing states are more likely to be swing or non-swing states. Similarly, our first-stage results are
16As an identification check, we have experimented with alternative instrumental variables, including the use of 6, 9 and
12 months moving averages and the use of anomalies. The coefficient on oil windfalls remains positive but provides weaker
first-stage estimates in the case of the 9 and 12 months moving averages. We also do not find any evidence that future oil
windfalls affect transfers, strengthening our confidence on the exogenous nature of our instrumental variable.
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similar when we split the samples between aligned and non-aligned states in Section 2.4.4 suggesting that
our analysis is not likely to capture a LATE effect.
2.4.2 Local Effects of Oil Production
The existence of direct local effects of oil windfalls would invalidate the exclusion restriction in our two
stage framework. To explore the plausible nature of these identification threats, we assess the impact of oil
windfalls on other development indicators. First, we regress night light densities on oil windfalls occurring
either the same year or the preceding year. In Panel A and B of Table 2.4, we report the regression results
for the whole period for which the nightlights data are available, while in Panel C and D, we focus on the
period of our study only. The results in Table 2.4 does not indicate any direct effect of the oil windfalls
on night light density. Second, we indirectly explore how unobserved income shocks following large oil
windfalls affects standard health outcomes. On the one hand, we can assume that such income shocks
would translate into one of the most reliable development indicators, the level of malnutrition. There
is indeed a large literature seeking to compare the health outcomes for cohorts differently exposed to
shocks in early childhood in contexts as diverse as natural disasters, weather variations (Maccini and
Yang, 2009), conflict (Bundervoet et al., 2009), famine (Currie and Vogl, 2013). We borrow from that
literature in estimating how oil windfalls may directly affect children’s health.
Exploiting the Demographic Health Surveys from 2008 and 2013, we assess how the outcome of
individual i born in state s during the first 12 months of life is affected by oil windfalls, compared to
individuals from the same cohort differently exposed to the oil windfalls. More specifically, we estimate
the following state and birth cohort fixed effect regressions:
Yi,s,t = αs+δt +βOilwins,t + εs,t (2.4)
Where Yi,s,t refers to the health outcome of child i born in state s at time t. We focus on two of
the most widely used nutrition outcomes, the height-for-age z-scores (HAZ) and the weight-for-age
z-scores (WAZ). While the former is likely to capture long-term health outcomes, the later is likely to
look at potential short-term responses to oil windfalls. Panels A and B of Table 2.5 show the results for
the effects of oil windfalls on children’s HAZ and WAZ scores, respectively. Specifically, the baseline
specifications reported in column (1) indicates a null effect of oil windfalls on children’s HAZ and
WAZ-scores, respectively. To increase the precision of our estimates, we include climatic and violence
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controls, children and parent’s characteristics that may potentially affect children’s health outcomes
(columns (2) to (4)). The results in column (4) indicates that oil windfalls occurring during the year of
birth have significant but negative effects on children’s HAZ and WAZ-scores. The relationship is even
more negative when we include state-specific time trends to control for potential differences in health
trends across Nigerian states (column 5). Lastly, at some cost of reducing much variation and potentially
changing the population of interest, we follow recent trends in the literature (see Alderman et al., 2006),
that seek to compare siblings by introducing mother fixed effects in column (6). Our results remain
negative but becomes insignificant implying that oil windfalls do not seem to have improve children’s
health outcome in the period of our study. We also test the robustness of the results to a relative variation
with respect to the critical period of child development. Based on the month of birth of a child, we assess
the impact of oil windfalls occurring during the first 12 months of life on the child’s health outcome.
Panels C and D of Table 2.5 indicate that across various specifications, oil windfalls occurring during the
first twelve months of life do not affect children’s health or at best, have a negative impact on WAZ-scores.
In any case, our results reject the risk that oil windfalls would directly translate into more votes for the
incumbent because of improved local economic development.
Furthermore, we should acknowledge another concern that oil windfalls may be associated with the
collection of more internal sources of revenues (e.g. taxes) to be spent on local public goods and therefore
affecting the electoral outcomes through another channel (voters’ satisfaction). Such channel would not
be very consistent with the lack of developmental impact of oil windfalls reported above. That would also
contradict the lack of impact of intergovernmental transfers on local public goods discussed in Section
2.4.4. Moreover, internal revenues are quite small as a share of total consolidated revenue. As pointed
in Section 2.2, internally generated revenue account for less than 20 percent of the total consolidated
revenue.17 It is not even sure that internal revenue and VAT transfers would be positively correlated.
Local authorities may even have less incentive to collect their own revenue in case of windfall and related
additional VAT transfers.
Lastly, it is interesting to note that the reduced-form estimation gives not only significant coefficients
of interest (Panel D of Table 2.2) but also very similar voting responses to variation in the oil windfalls
(compared to the 2SLS combined effects). That is reassuring with respect to the risk of weak instruments
and the exclusion restriction (Angrist and Krueger, 2001).
17Our results are robust to the exclusion of Lagos and Rivers States, which constitute exceptions with high shares of total
internally generated revenues (see details in Section 2.4.3).
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2.4.3 Robustness
The above results rely on a number of specification choices. We, therefore, examine the robustness of
our results to (1) alternative specification of the dependent variable, (2) alternative definition of our main
variable of interest, (3) controlling for past elections, and (4) changes in the analytical sample. Table 2.6
provides a summary of the main model specification and a selected set of alternative specifications.
Using an alternative dependent variable (i.e. the percentage of vote share and the absolute number
of valid votes cast for the incumbent) does not alter our results considerably. The impact of higher VAT
transfers on the percentage vote share and the absolute number of valid votes cast for the incumbent
President in the national elections remains positive and marginally significant (Panels B and C of Table
2.6). The explanatory power of the two alternative variables, however, are much lower. An explanation
for this may be that incumbent politicians care more about winning a simple majority rather than a high
share of votes, and hence strategically target those states with high numbers of registered voters (Veiga
and Veiga, 2013).
In addition, the results of the preferred model remain robust to alternative definition of our main
variable of interest. In Panel D of Table 2.6, we use the log of net transfers, which is the gross statutory
allocation plus 13% derivation for oil producing states less contractual obligation of states.18 However,
the first stage regression results presented in Table A 2.17 provide weaker instruments when control
variables are included.19 We also use the gross statutory transfers that exclude the 13% derivation for
oil-producing states as a form of falsification test. With very weak first-stage regressions, gross statutory
transfers do not affect voting behaviours as soon as auxiliary control variables are included. Given that
all revenue from oil exports above the budgeted oil price are deposited in the Excess Crude Account or
Sovereign Wealth Fund, we do not expect oil windfalls to have any significant effect on gross transfers.
Indeed, the first stage results reported in Table A 2.18 confirm our presumption.
The estimation results are also robust to using the average oil production between 2003 and 2005
as weight in the construction of the instrumental variable (Panel E of Table 2.6), as well as controlling
for past votes cast for the incumbent (Panel F of Table 2.6). Furthermore, we change the definition of
oil-producing states by classifying Lagos and Ogun, which are considered as off-shore oil-producing
18The gross statutory allocation is the main component of the federal allocations, determined strictly in accordance with the
horizontal allocation formula.
19The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-Statistics is below the rule-of-thumb of 10 (Stock and Yogo 2005) when quarter fixed
effects are included. However, such a just-identified equation is median-unbiased and therefore unlikely to be subject to weak
instrumentalization (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
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states, as non-oil producing states. In this case, we find a slightly larger impact of transfers on electoral
support for the incumbent (Panel G of Table 2.6). One possible explanation for this may be related to the
political sophistication in these two states. For example, Lagos state, which is considered an economic hub
of Nigeria, has a burgeoning middle class that are less likely to be constrained by ideological attachment
to parties and individual leaders or engaged in a cash-for-vote exchange. We further check the robustness
of our main results to the exclusion of Lagos and Rivers states, which contribute high shares of total
internally generated revenues to the Federation Account, from the analysis. The results, reported in Panel
H of Table 2.6, indicates a lower effect compared to the benchmark model. An explanation may be
attributed to the size of these two states.20
Finally, we introduce a quarter-specific effect prior to elections in order to explore the electoral
dynamics of transfers. While we do find a higher effect at the quarter just before the election, the
magnitude of the difference remains very small. This effect echoes Veiga and Veiga (2013), who find that
voters do reward increases in government spending in the period close to elections, but not over a full
election cycle. Unfortunately, the lack of transfer data prior to 2007 does not allow us to explore further
the role of political cycles in affecting the relationship between transfers and electoral support for the
incumbent.
2.4.4 Evidence of Vote Manipulation?
Political return from the incumbent may come from the efficient use of these funds to provide local public
goods. For example, voters might be rewarding the “good" use of transfers by the incumbent in providing
education, health and physical infrastructure. It is important to point out that such government spendings
are unlikely to be decided within the quarter prior to the elections on which our identification relies on.
To back up this intuition, we further test that alternative channel in two ways.
First, if such “public good” channel would explain our results, it would not matter whether the
governors are politically aligned or not. Nonetheless, Panel C and D of Table 2.3 indicates that transfers
help to support the incumbent only when governors are aligned to the President’s party. That indirectly
gives support to a mechanism where rule-based intergovernmental transfers are subject to manipulation
for political purposes.
20However, in an alternative specification, we weight the states by their initial population. While our results remain
qualitatively similar, they become less efficient with the inclusion of nightlights as economic controls. The reason is that it
gives less weight to oil producing states, which are in general and with the exception of Lagos and Rivers, less populated.
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Another way to shed light on the manipulative nature of intergovernmental transfers is to see whether
such transfers translate into improved education, health and physical infrastructure. To that purpose, we
test whether oil-induced variations in VAT transfers improve access to public goods. In particular, we
assess the probability to have access to water, sanitation services and electricity, together with the wealth
index defined at the household level based on the Demographic Health Surveys from 2008 and 2013.
Across year and state fixed effects specifications shown in Table 2.7, we do not find any statistical links
between transfers occurring the quarter prior to election and these indicators for access to local public
goods.21
From a qualitative point of view, that is not really surprising since it would require transfers to
materialize into public investment in a relatively short period of time. We indeed exploit variations in
transfers occurring only during the quarter prior to the election. But even when we conduct the analysis
using transfers occurring two quarters before the election, we do not find any statistical impact of transfers
on local public good provision. However, we acknowledge that the absence of evidence is not evidence of
absence and that our results are only an indirect support for manipulation. Nonetheless, we believe that
the mechanism through which exogenous variation in transfers would translate to investments in public
good provision is less obvious in an economy like Nigeria with weak governance system.
Another explanation for the null impact might be that oil-induced variations in VAT transfers are
positively correlated with rent sharing and embezzlement by corrupt politicians (Caselli and Michaels,
2013). We indeed admit that corruption may be a salient feature in Nigeria. While we do not have data
on corruption to be able to assess further that channel, we expect that if oil windfall is associated with
corruption aiming at increasing personal wealth, such corruption (when known) will affect the vote for
the incumbent negatively.22 That is exactly what happens to former President Goodluck Jonathan in the
2015 Presidential elections. On the other hand, if such corruption is more salient in oil-producing states,
it would mean that we are capturing a lower-bound estimate.
21Those results are obtained based on regressions at the household level, allowing to control for the socio-economic
composition within states. Not surprisingly, similar results are obtained when the development indicators are aggregated at the
state level.
22See Chong, et al. (2012) for a review of literature on scandals and voter behaviour.
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2.5 Conclusions
Recent developments in the theoretical and empirical literature suggest that partisan or opportunistic
governments use transfers to increase their chances of re-election. Thus, to constrain political manipulation
of fiscal policies, many countries like Nigeria, Brazil, Ghana, Japan have introduced a formula-based
intergovernmental system based on verifiable and objective criteria. However, a continuing debate exists
on whether such institutional arrangements are efficient in limiting political manipulation, especially in
countries with weak governance system and clientelistic framework. This study argues that such a system
is not immune to political manipulation. Using data from Nigeria, we showed that centralised rule-based
transfers in the form of redistributing VAT revenues from the central government to the States was used to
purchase political support for the incumbent government in the Presidential election. Our main result
indicates that a 10% increase in VAT transfers increases the margin of votes scored by the incumbent
President by 49.31 percent. The result is remarkably robust across a large set of alternative specifications.
Although with the data at our disposal, we are unable to prove directly manipulative behaviour,
our result suggests an indirect channel in which oil-induced variations in transfers do not translate to
investments in public good provisions but increased support for the incumbent only when the governors
are aligned to the President’s party. This gives credence to a mechanism in which large increases in natural
resource rents increase political power and the ability to buy votes (Robinson et al., 2014). Our study
has some interesting implications. First, a rule-based transfer system in which the central government
determines the distributable pool or the total amount of transfer obscurely encourages patronage politics.
Indeed, the dearth of data on social development factors and the lack of transparency in the data revision
process might have strengthened the process for political manipulation. Second, the use of transfers to buy
electoral support diminishes the ability of the state government to provide local public goods and creates
a clientelistic setting where governors who are aligned with the incumbent President can be rewarded for
their support. The way the direct redistribution of oil windfalls to citizens, as proposed, e.g. by Moss et al.
(2015) under a oil-to-cash scheme, may reduce such perverse effects remains largely unanswered. Lastly,
our analysis underlines the need for an extensive dataset that would allow researchers interested in this
subject to assess further the precise mechanism through which centralised rule-based transfers may be
manipulated to buy political support.
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Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Percentage of votes share 108 0.638 0.268 0.051 0.999
Num. of votes share (thousands) 108 635.49 404.519 25.526 2003.521
Vote margin 108 3.805 0.728 1.889 4.610
Alignment 1152 0.687 0.464 0 1
Swing 1152 0.156 0.363 0 1
Co-ethnic 1152 0.187 0.390 0 1
Religion 1152 0.500 0.500 0 1
Population (thousands) 1152 4503.67 2005.585 1753.946 12652.398
Primary enrolment (thousands) 1152 557.329 335.487 36.508 2040.945
Secondary enrolment (thousands) 1152 163.048 105.69 26.507 694.886
Violence 1152 2.759 6.937 0 84
Gross transfers 1152 1563.536 739.727 358.164 4806.2
Net transfers 1152 2084.564 2134.878 254.031 17341.395
VAT transfers 1152 353.576 180.534 104.435 1733.413
Temperature anomalies 1152 27.351 1.658 23.186 32.785
Rainfall anomalies 1152 107.753 88.893 0 472.133
Avg. 3 months oil price (no weights) 1152 277.899 60.788 139.51 402.969
Avg. 3 months oil price (weighted by 2003 production) 1152 5.468 13.654 0 88.608
Avg. 3 months oil price (weighted by 2003/05 production) 1152 4.553 10.583 0 63.781
Avg. 6 months oil price (weighted by 2003 production) 1152 5.476 13.606 0 83.935
Avg. 6 months oil price (weighted by 2003/05 production) 1152 4.560 10.545 0 60.418
Nightlights (thousands) 1152 61.613 81.707 1.633 360.083
Source: INEC, NBS, ACLED, FMOF, FRED, and DMSP .
Note: Vote margin is expressed in log form .
Transfers are measured in Naira per capita at 2007 prices .
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Table of Results
Table 2.2 Main results
Panel A. First-stage Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. Log VAT Transfers
Oil windfalls 0.189*** 0.196*** 0.206*** 0.199*** 0.208*** 0.208***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 18.22 16.25 17.75 14.78 17.18 17.20
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarterly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152
Dep. var. (Panels B, C and D) Vote margin
Panel B. 2SLS. Estimates
Pred. Transfer 6.423** 6.011** 4.476** 5.660*** 4.847** 4.931*
(2.935) (2.504) (1.722) (1.799) (1.876) (2.455)
Adj. R-squared 0.337 0.535 0.654 0.736 0.737 0.788
Panel C. OLS Estimates
VAT transfers -0.022 0.158 0.205 0.315 0.273 0.400
(0.463) (0.361) (0.527) (0.659) (0.972) (0.782)
R-squared 0.552 0.552 0.717 0.764 0.781 0.783
Panel D. Reduced form Estimates
Oil windfalls 1.177** 0.922** 1.041** 1.126** 1.009* 1.027*
(0.561) (0.396) (0.438) (0.464) (0.549) (0.576)
R-squared 0.572 0.730 0.739 0.772 0.785 0.787
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108
Controls (for all panels):
Alignment and swing No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Co-ethnic and Religion No No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No No Yes Yes Yes
Primary and secondary enrolment No No No Yes Yes Yes
Violence No No No Yes Yes Yes
Temperature and rainfall anomalies No No No No Yes Yes
Nightlights No No No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
All variables (except alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion) are in log form.
The same regressions are estimated in both panels.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Detailed results are provided in Tables A 2.2, A 2.3, A 2.4, and A 2.5 of the Appendix.
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Table 2.3 Alternative samples definition
Panel A. Swing states (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Vote Margin
Pred. Transfer 10.836** 10.369* 8.581* 10.257
(4.411) (5.761) (5.208) (7.820)
Observations 42 42 42 42
Adj. R-squared 0.293 0.307 0.348 0.359
Panel B. Non-swing states
Pred. Transfer 3.302* 4.665** 1.794** 0.242**
(1.718) (2.344) (0.866) (0.116)
Observations 66 66 66 66
Adj. R-squared 0.511 0.636 0.682 0.704
Panel C. Align states
Pred. Transfer 3.539*** 3.240** 2.284* 2.285*
(1.221) (1.537) (1.356) (1.340)
Observations 69 69 69 69
Adj. R-squared 0.692 0.712 0.713 0.717
Panel D. Non-align states
Pred. Transfer 16.891 10.953 12.217 10.871
(15.040) (12.327) (9.649) (8.298)
Observations 39 39 39 39
Adj. R-squared 0.215 0.391 0.421 0.378
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (for all panels):
Co-ethnic and Religion No Yes Yes Yes
Population No Yes Yes Yes
Primary and secondary enrolment No Yes Yes Yes
Temperature and rainfall anomalies No Yes Yes Yes
Violence No No Yes Yes
Nightlights No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level, using wild-
bootstrapping as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008).
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Detailed results are provided in Tables A 2.6 and A 2.7 of the Appendix. The related
first-stage results are provided in Tables A 2.8 and A 2.9 of the Appendix.
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Table 2.4 Exclusion Restriction: Oil windfalls and Nightlights
Panel A. Full sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var. Log Nightlights
Oil windfalls -0.078 -0.070 -0.036 0.009
(0.066) (0.063) (0.055) (0.052)
R-squared 0.736 0.739 0.694 0.711
Panel B. Full sample
Oil windfalls (t-1) -0.073 -0.064 -0.036 0.009
(0.067) (0.063) (0.054) (0.045)
R-squared 0.735 0.738 0.694 0.711
Observations 792 792 454 454
Panel C. Period of study
Oil windfalls 0.068 0.039 0.048 -0.003
(0.139) (0.167) (0.175) (0.048)
R-squared 0.686 0.689 0.682 0.735
Panel D. Period of study
Oil windfalls (t-1) -0.112 0.031 -0.056 0.051
(0.220) (0.145) (0.141) (0.072)
R-squared 0.661 0.689 0.682 0.735
Observations 324 288 237 237
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes
Controls (for all panels):
Temperature and rainfall anomalies No Yes Yes Yes
Violence No No Yes Yes
Notes: In panel C and D, we are also able to control for population, primary and sec-
ondary school enrolment.
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level.
All variables are in log form.
The same regressions are estimated in both panels.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Detailed results are provided in Tables A 2.10 and A 2.11 of the Appendix.
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Table 2.5 Exclusion Restriction: Oil windfalls and Health outcomes
Panel A. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. HAZ-score
Oil windfalls during the year of birth -0.146 -0.071 -0.335 -0.487* -1.060*** -0.293
(0.206) (0.269) (0.272) (0.267) (0.353) (0.399)
R-squared 0.146 0.146 0.151 0.192 0.203 0.708
Panel B. WAZ-score
Oil windfalls during the year of birth -0.119 -0.133 -0.317* -0.333* -0.686** -0.385
(0.161) (0.179) (0.172) (0.170) (0.255) (0.263)
R-squared 0.147 0.147 0.149 0.182 0.192 0.712
Observations 30,826 30,826 26,721 25,398 25,398 10,499
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Temperature and rainfall controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Violence No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Parent’s controls No No No Yes Yes No
State-specific time trends No No No No Yes Yes
Mother FE No No No No No Yes
Panel C. HAZ-score
Oil windfalls during the first 12-months of birth 0.358 0.405* 0.625 -0.126 -0.182 0.990
(0.232) (0.218) (0.374) (0.258) (0.353) (0.968)
R-squared 0.155 0.154 0.172 0.200 0.211 0.735
Panel D. WAZ-score
Oil windfalls during the first 12-months of birth 0.107 0.084 0.073 -0.548* -0.537* 0.553
(0.182) (0.218) (0.228) (0.272) (0.310) (0.681)
R-squared 0.149 0.149 0.184 0.209 0.216 0.726
Observations 30,826 26,932 9,238 8,787 8,787 1,856
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Temperature and rainfall controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Violence No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Parent’s controls No No No Yes Yes No
State-specific time trends No No No No Yes Yes
Mother FE No No No No No Yes
Notes: Individual controls include child’s sex, age (in months) and birth order. Parent’s control include mother and fa-
ther’s age (in months), educational attainments, occupation and total number of children under 5.
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level.
R-squared retrieved from regressions with standard errors clustered at the state level.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Detailed results are provided in Tables A 2.12 and A 2.13 of the Appendix.
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Table 2.6 Robustness to alternative samples and dependent variables
Dependent Variable Vote Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Main results 6.011** 4.476** 5.660*** 4.847** 4.931*
(2.504) (1.722) (1.799) (1.876) (2.455)
Panel B. Using incumbents’ % vote shares 1.640* 1.470* 1.731** 1.283* 1.285*
as dep. var. (0.822) (0.772) (0.802) (0.667) (0.672)
Panel C. Using number of valid vote 2.916 2.494* 2.020 1.497* 1.495*
as dep. var. (4.256) (1.371) (1.458) (0.817) (0.858)
Panel D. Using net transfers 8.568** 6.498** 7.934*** 6.541** 6.669*
(3.569) (2.499) (2.522) (2.531) (3.321)
Panel E. Using 2003-2005 oil productions 6.130** 4.657*** 5.844*** 4.955*** 4.795**
as weight (2.466) (1.582) (1.857) (1.650) (2.323)
Panel F. Controlling for past elections 6.598 4.546** 5.120** 6.250** 5.704*
(4.064) (2.165) (2.136) (2.709) (2.859)
Panel G. Classifying Lagos and Ogun 4.733** 3.559** 6.389** 4.468** 5.373*
as non-oil producing states (2.062) (1.399) (2.372) (2.149) (2.699)
Panel H. Dropping Lagos and Rivers states 5.138** 4.378*** 5.489** 4.110** 4.308*
(2.201) (1.541) (1.969) (1.727) (2.279)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (for all panels):
Alignment and swing No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Co-ethnic and Religion No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Primary and secondary enrolment No No Yes Yes Yes
Violence No No Yes Yes Yes
Temperature and rainfall anomalies No No No Yes Yes
Nightlights No No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level, using wild-bootstrapping as proposed by
Cameron et al. (2008).
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Detailed results are provided in Tables A 2.14, A 2.15, A 2.16, A 2.19, A 2.20, A 2.21 and A 2.22 of the
Appendix.
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Table 2.7 VAT transfers and Public goods
Panel A. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. Access to drinking water
Pred. Transfer 12.878* 13.993** -1.434 -1.282 3.305 0.920
(7.052) (7.108) (1.344) (1.470) (9.763) (17.902)
R-squared 0.072 0.073 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.101
Panel B. Access to sanitation facilities
Pred. Transfer 3.934 4.103 1.863 1.493 9.334 5.867
(7.417) (6.933) (1.389) (1.402) (9.194) (8.102)
R-squared 0.140 0.141 0.141 0.142 0.144 0.213
Panel C. Access to electricity
Pred. Transfer -3.229 -3.667 -0.029 -0.372 -1.021 -5.216
(7.272) (7.816) (1.523) (1.445) (8.376) (8.617)
R-squared 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.283
Panel D. Net attendance ratio in primary school
Pred. Transfer 24.606*** 19.935* -1.229 -1.622 14.171 8.197
(8.983) (11.648) (3.481) (2.733) (15.417) (12.096)
R-squared 0.528 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.575
Panel E. Wealth index
Pred. Transfer -1.138 0.393 3.101 3.067 25.444 10.260
(109.487) (39.208) (10.607) (7.662) (54.728) (27.791)
R-squared 0.390 0.390 0.390 0.391 0.391 0.555
Year of survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,392
Controls (for all panels):
Population No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Primary and secondary enrolment No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Temperature and rainfall anomalies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Violence No No No Yes Yes Yes
Nightlights No No No No Yes Yes
Household controls No No No No No Yes
Notes: Household control include household size, sex, age and education of household’s head.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the surveys’ cluster level, using wild bootstrap method (Cameron et al. 2008).
R-squared retrieved from regressions with standard errors clustered at the state level.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Detailed results are provided in Tables A 2.23, A 2.24, and A 2.25 of the Appendix.

Chapter 3
Rainfall inequality, trust and civil conflict in
Nigeria
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increasing awareness that climate change can have destabilizing effect
on societies. Through its effect on crop yields, climate variability has been found to affect the risks of
armed conflicts between and/or within various groups in societies (see Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012;
Hsiang et al., 2013; Maystadt et al., 2014). While these claims have sometimes been disputed (Buhaug
et al., 2014; Selby, 2014), most of the empirical evidence shows that there exists a strong correlation
between climate shocks and violence (for a review, see Burke et al, 2015). Specifically, Schleussner et al.
(2016) demonstrates a stronger links for ethnically fractured societies, which are typically more prone to
conflicts. An important implication of their analysis is that multi-ethnic countries in regions such as Africa
and Asia whose climates are likely to see fundamental shifts in temperature, rainfall, and sea-levels, might
be facing fresh threats of violence. Indeed, since the end of the Second World War, nearly two-thirds of
intrastate civil war have been fought along ethnic or religious lines (Denny and Walter, 2014; Sambanis,
2001). This already strained relations between ethnic or tribal and religious rivals can be exacerbated
by the consequences of climate change. But, what are the mechanisms through which such climatic
variations might translate into changing incentives for violence?
In this study, we focus on the case of Nigeria to investigate the relationship between changes in
the distribution of rainfall between ethnic groups and armed conflicts prevalence. As a first step, we
investigate whether changes in the distribution of rainfall across ethnic groups living within the same
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state – i.e. largest administrative unit of Nigeria – increase the incidences of civil conflicts within that
state. We take the location of the different ethnic groups within a state from the detailed Nigeria Local
Government Handbook. We then spatially merge the location of ethnic groups with a high-frequency
and high-resolution rainfall data provided by the European Center for Medium-Term Weather Forecasts
(ECMWF). Our key measure of “rainfall inequality” between ethnic groups is then constructed following
Guariso and Rogall (2017) and is based on the standard Gini coefficient. Our analysis cover 37 states and
19 years, from 1997 to 2015, which is the period for which all our data sources are available.
Our main result indicates that a one standard deviation increase in rainfall inequality between ethnic
groups living within a state increases the risks of civil conflict prevalence by about seven percentage points.
In the second part of the chapter, we move to investigate the channels through which rainfall inequality
may induce higher prevalence of civil conflict. In doing so, we match our ethnicity level information with
micro-level data provided by the Afrobarometer. We then construct an ethnic level indicator for general
trust; trust in neighbour and government; within-group and between-group trust; government satisfaction;
and government corruption. The results suggest that a more unequal distribution of rainfall leads to lower
satisfaction with the government and creates mistrust between predominantly farming ethnic groups and
those engaged in herding.
Nigeria is an interesting country to consider for at least two reasons. First, it is a highly heterogenous
society with more than 300 ethnic groups, a long history of civil conflicts, and currently confronting
poor leadership, development challenges, and deep-seated ethnic divisions. The underlying reasons for
these divisions have been attributed to the distribution of scarce resources and political power across the
various ethnic groups that dot the country’s landscape (Papaioannou and Dalrymple-Smith, 2015). Indeed,
the perceived dominance of the political and military leaders from the North, and the failure of political
leaders to provide an equitable revenue sharing formula has led to the intensity of violent conflicts in
recent years.
Secondly, Nigeria is one of the countries identified as a hot spot for climate change, where there is a
high possibility of extreme impacts across the different vegetation zones (Müeller et al., 2014). Indeed, it
is predicted that “certain parts of the country, specifically the semi-arid North could experience reductions
in fresh water availability up to 25-30% due to higher temperature and decreases in rainfall. In contrast,
the Niger Delta region in the South is likely subject to more frequent flooding, also due to increased
irregularity in rainfall” (Müeller et al., 2014). These climatic challenges could have extreme negative
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impacts on health, food security, employment, and economic growth, which could, in turn, lead to more
violence. Indeed, this sequence is already playing out in a few conflict-prone spots such as the Niger Delta
and the arid North-east. Specifically, in recent years there has been increased incidences of violent conflict
between predominantly pastoralists and predominantly farming ethnic groups. Data from Armed Conflict
Location and Event Data project (ACLED) show that around 1,600 lives were lost to this type of violence
in 2015 alone (Baca, 2015). One potential driver of these conflicts is climate-induced competition over
water and arable land. To the best of our knowledge, this study represents the first attempt to investigate
this link and its underlying mechanisms empirically.
Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, despite a rapidly growing literature on the
potential links between climate variability and conflict, little attention has been paid to examining the
cause and effect chain. There are some exceptions to this; for example, recent papers by Schleussner,
et al., (2016) and Guariso and Rogall (2017) focus on how climatic conditions can increase the risks of
armed conflicts in multi-ethnic socities. Specifically, Guariso and Rogall (2017) use a dataset of 214
ethnicities across 42 African countries to demonstrate how increase in rainfall-based inequality between
ethnic groups increases the risks of ethnic conflicts, especially among ethnic groups that have recently lost
political power. However, their analysis focuses on a specific channel, related to the balance of political
power between ethnic groups. There is a growing consensus among policy makers and academics that
more research is needed to investigate better how this broad trend translates in practice within specific
contexts. This is because much of the evidence that has been presented have been sensitive to the definition
of samples and the variable of interest (see Burke et al., 2009; Ciccone, 2011; Miguel and Satyanath,
2011). For this, a more local level analysis is needed. Our study fills this void by focusing on the cause
and effect chain through which variations in climatic conditions can affect an ethnically fractionalized
society like Nigeria.
Second, our study complement the literature on the relationship between inequality and conflict (see
Cederman et al., 2011; Huber and Mayoral, 2014; Kuhn and Weidmann, 2015; Østby, 2008; Stewart,
2005). While Empirical support for this link remain mixed, most of these studies have had to contend with
endogeneity issues and severe data constraints, thus inhibiting an empirically robust causal interpretation.
For example, study by Cederman et al. (2011) relied on digitized map of economic activity provided by
Nordhaus et al. (2006), which has a limited geographical and temporal scope for Sub-Saharan African
countries, to construct their horizontal income inequality measure. Moreover, the digital map does not
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capture informal activities such as subsistence farming, which remain an important source of livelihood
to a large segment of African population, hence inducing potential bias in the inequality measurement.
Other studies such as Huber and Mayoral (2014); Østby (2008) rely on household surveys, which are not
frequently available and thus tend to be noisy and unreliable (Beegle et al., 2012). To that purpose, we
construct a measure of inequality using a high-frequency rainfall dataset, which is available at a resolution
of 0.5-degree longitude×0.5-degree latitude. Given the spatial and temporal coverage of gridded weather
dataset available, we believe that using rainfall data will help to overcome endogeneity concerns and the
lack of disaggregated income data.
Lastly, our study also relates to the literature on the link between inequality and trust. Most studies
that have examined this relationship have typically struggled to make causal inferences due mostly to
endogeneity issues. While recent studies (e.g. Barone and Mocetti (2016); Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011))
tend to focus on instrumental variable approach to address endogeneity, the lack of valid instruments has
continued to question causality claims. In that regards, we reappraise the relationship between inequality
and trust using our unique measures of rainfall inequality, which can be considered as plausibly exogenous
to the determinants of trust. In particular, our analysis explores how inequality induces decline in trust,
thus heightening the risks of civil conflict prevalence. By doing so, our paper also contributes to the
literature on conflict and trust, which has grown fast in recent years but remain deficient in identifying the
precise causal links due to concerns about selection bias and omitted variables (see Bauer et al., 2016; De
Luca and Verpoorten, 2015; Rohner et al., 2013).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a contextual background to
the study. Section 3.3 describes the data and empirical strategy, while section 3.4 presents and discusses
the results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Background
Nigeria is a culturally diverse society with a long history of religious, ethnic and civil strives that dates
back to the pre-independence era. The amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914, which
hitherto were administered as two autonomous colonies by the British colonial government, to create
present-day Nigeria has often been cited as the roots to many of the rivalries that dot the political and
social landscape of the country (Papaioannou and Dalrymple-Smith, 2015). After gaining independence
in 1960, Nigeria was plunged into a secession crisis with the Eastern part of the country pulling out to
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create the state of Biafra in May 1967. Perceived marginalisation in the distribution of scarce resources
and political power by the ruling Northern elites underlies the main reasons for the secession, which
culminated into a full civil war in July 1967.1
The war, which has been described as one of Africa’s bloodiest civil war with casualties ranging
between 1 and 3 million (Akresh et al., 2012), was followed by several years of military rule that
suppressed resentments among the different groups. However, with the return to democracy in 1999, the
grievances that built up over the decades of military adventurism into governance came to the fore as
several restive groups began to emerge across the country. For example, in the oil-rich South-South region,
the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger-Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteers
Force (NDPVF) were two militia groups that led violent protests against the Nigeria government, to
demand for resource controls and better environmental quality standards (International Crisis Group,
2006). The protests, which later evolved into a full-fledged insurgency in 2006, resulted in several
fatalities, kidnappings of oil workers and attacks on oil installations. The insurgency was bolstered
by the lack of basic infrastructural facilities (such as electricity, water and hospital) and high rate of
unemployment in the region, and continued to spread until June 2009 when the Nigerian government
initiated an amnesty program to disarm and reintegrate the militants.
Religious rivalry between Muslims and Christians is another major source of violence in Nigeria.
While the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria classifies it as a secular state, the
advancement of religious teachings, especially in most part of Northern Nigeria where Islamic law were
introduced, as solutions to political and socio-economic issues, further exacerbated the already tensed
relationship between the two major religious groups (Sampson, 2014). Christian communities, particularly
those in the affected states, perceived the introduction of Shari’ah (Islamic moral codes) as a threat of
“Islamisation” and hence protested against its adoption as state laws. These protests often leads to violent
clashes between Muslim and Christians, especially in Northern states such as Kaduna and Plateau where
there is a growing Christian population.
In addition, the “Boko Haram” terrorist group, which has unleashed an atrocious campaign against
both Christians and Muslims in the North-Eastern part of the country, has further stoked the embers of
hatred between the two dominant religions.2 In particular, the group’s stated objective of establishing
1The failed state of Biafra was championed by the Igbo – a major ethnic group that resides mostly in the South-Eastern
part of Nigeria – and other minority ethnic groups (mostly in Nigeria’s oil rich south-south region).
2The insurgency has led to over ten thousand deaths, displaced several others from their homes and worsened the already
poor economy in the North East.
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an Islamic caliphate across Northern Nigeria and its assault on churches heightened religious tensions
and pitted neighbours against each other (International Crisis Group, 2014). While the root cause of
the insurgency is often attributed to the extra-judicial killing of its leader, the International Crisis Group
(ICG) in a report published in 2014, noted that sustained economic hardship, rising inequality and social
frustrations have continually helped to foster the growth of extremist groups in Nigeria. Indeed, the
failure of political leaders to provide an “equitable” way to distribute limited resources across the different
groups in the country; a flawed legal system that allows crimes to go unpunished; widespread poverty; and
traditional breakdown in conflict resolution mechanisms underlies many of the violent conflicts Nigeria
has experienced since the civil war.
Some of the worst violence involved land disputes between ethnic groups and neighbouring communi-
ties, especially those in oil-producing states where land ownership attracts some form of compensation
payments from multinational companies (Small Arms Survey, 2005). The situation is not much different
in Northern Nigeria where clashes involving herdsmen and farming communities in southern and north
central zones have surged in recent years. The root causes for this increase might be attributed to rising
population pressures and climatic-induced changes. The expansion of human settlements together with
the rapid pace of urbanisation has led to the loss of grazing lands, which have long been designated by
the central government as reserved areas, thereby increasing pressure on farmlands and the likelihood of
conflicts over water pollution and crop damages (Baca, 2015).
Besides, climate changes have intensified droughts and desertification in the semi-arid Northern part
of Nigeria. According to a report released in 2016 by the Nigeria Meteorological Agency, the annual
rainy season in the country have reduced by an average of 30 days (i.e. from 150 to 120) over the last
three decades. Furthermore, it is predicted that future dry spells, especially in Northern regions, may
get worse as the world continues to experience hot streak of temperatures.3 At the same time, reports
by the Food and Agriculture Organisation indicates that 50 to 75% of land areas in the North-East and
North-West regions are vulnerable to desertification, and the phenomenon is spreading towards the south
at the rate of 0.6km per year.4
These developments have compelled nomadic herders, most of which are ethnic Fulani from Northern
Nigeria, to move southwards in search of water and pastures for their herds (International Crisis Group,
3Nigeria Meteorological Agency, Drought and Flood Monitoring Bulletin, August 2017.
4FAO Country Programming Framework (CPF) Federal Republic of Nigeria 2013 - 2017.
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2017).5 As they migrate into lands that are owned by predominantly farming communities, violent
conflicts over crop damages or cattle rustling, often erupts. Over the last two decades, this type of violence
has increased in both intensity and geographical scope. The Assessment Capacities Projects (ACAPS)
reported that there have been at least 360 clashes between farmers and herdsmen in the last five years,
resulting in a casualty of approximately 2,400 people in 2016 alone, compared to just 20 battles in the
fifteen years before that.6 With the conflict expanding into southern states, the herders-farmers’ crisis
continues to pose a major threat to Nigeria’s national security and may likely aggravate the already fragile
relations among the different ethnic and religious groups in the country, if proactive actions are not taken
to address the deadly conflict. In our empirical analysis, we investigate the link between climatic events
and conflicts and shed light on the potential channels.
3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Data sources
Our sample covers the 37 states of Nigeria (including the Capital city Abuja) over a period of 19 years,
from 1997 to 2015. In constructing the dataset, we combine information from several different sources,
detailed below.
Conflict variable: Data on conflict was taken from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
project (ACLED). The ACLED dataset summarizes conflict event by the name of the main actors, location
of events, number of fatalities, and event type. Thus, we identify violent events linked to ethnic militia,
religious groups, farmers, and pastoralists occurring in each Local Government Area (LGA) or state
in Nigeria. We then define civil conflict events as a binary variable, indicating whether a state has
experienced a violent event resulting in at least 20 casualties. ACLED provides the most detailed coverage
of conflict events currently available. As a robustness check, we also use the UCDP geo-referenced
conflict event dataset, which has the relative advantage of covering more time periods. Thus, in using
the UCDP, we extend our analysis to cover the period 1990 to 2015, for which the data is available for
Nigeria.
5The Fulanis are regarded as the world’s largest nomadic group, and occupies a large expanse of land from West to Central
Africa countries.
6The report can be accessed at https://www.acaps.org/country/nigeria/special-reports.
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Ethnicity variable: To construct our ethnicity variable, we identify the main, second and third most
popular languages in each of Nigeria’s 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) using the 1998 Nigeria
Local Government Handbook. The handbook contains information about the historical location of 210
main ethnic groups, spread across the country.7 We define the borders of each ethnic group using the
administrative boundary of the area for which an ethnic group is recorded as the main group in the
handbook. Data on administrative boundaries is taken from Global Administrative Areas (GADM). A
major concern could be that the construction of our ethnicity variable may not reflect the historical
distribution of ethnic groups in Nigeria. To that purpose, we compare our ethnic composition to those
recorded in the Geo-referencing of Ethnic Groups (GREG) dataset provided by Weidmann, et al., (2010)
in an alternative definition.
Rainfall variables: Our rainfall inequality data was constructed based on rainfall data provided by the
European Centre for Medium-Term Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) ERA-interim datasets. The ECMWF
dataset provides re-analysis of weather data, obtained through a climatic model that combines information
from different primary sources, which include weather stations, satellite images and others (Kållberg
et al., 2004).8 The database provides precipitations values at six hourly frequency from 1979 to 2015
at a resolution of 0.5-degree longitude×0.5-degree latitude (corresponding to a pixel size of about 55
square kilometers at the equator). Ethnic groups in our sample covers an average of 12 grid-cells. For the
analysis, we focus on rainfall during the growing season, which is when farming and herding activities
may become more sensitive to adverse conditions. We follow the same procedures of Kudamatsu et al.,
(2014), and rely on the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) to define the beginning and end
of the plant-growing season at a high resolution of 8×8km. We then aggregate the information at the
level of our rainfall grid cell to obtain the average start and end of the growing season within each cell.9
Temperature variables: Data on temperature come from ECMWF ERA-interim datasets at the same
frequency and resolution as the rainfall data.
Religious fragmentation and competition variable: We combine data from the Annual Abstract of
Statistics published by the Nigeria National Bureau of Statistics and 2009/2010 Nigerian Harmonized
Living Standard Survey (HNLSS) to identify the share of the population of the various religious group
in the LGA (or state). After that, we construct an ethnic-level (or state-wide) Herfindahl (religious)
7The Local Government Handbook has already been used as a good source of data for the spread of ethnic groups across
Nigeria (Larreguy and Marshall, 2016).
8Given the sparse distribution of the 44 weather stations across the 774 LGA of Nigeria, re-analysis data appears to be the
most reliable source of weather-related information for the country.
9Figure A 3.1 illustrates how the different data sources was combined.
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fragmentation index and religious competition. We define religious competition in each LGA (state) by:
1−|η1−η2|, where η1 and η1 indicates share of the population for the two largest religious groups in
the state (or LGA).
State per capita revenue allocation: Data on states’ revenue allocation was obtained from Nigeria’s
Federal Ministry of Finance, and is available only from 2007 onwards. The per capita allocations were
estimated using the aggregate allocations to each state.
Trust-related measures: Data on trust comes from the Afrobarometer surveys, which samples the
economic, social and political attitudes of citizens aged 18 and above. The surveys are based on random
samples stratified by states and are therefore not representative at the level of Local Government Areas
(LGAs). We pool all six available rounds, (eight survey years in total covering 1999 - 2015) to obtain
a sample of 19,914 respondents from 582 of Nigeria’s 774 LGAs.10 We then construct seven main
indicators, namely: general trust; trust in neighbour and government; within-group and between-group
trust; government satisfaction; and government corruption. The general trust measure is an index that
captures to what extent respondents trust the following: government officials, religious organisations,
security agencies such as the Army and Police, own and other ethnic groups, own-family and relatives.11
Trust in neighbour and government is an index capturing to what extent respondents trust their neighbour
and each of the following: the President, the Legislature, the Local councilor, and the electoral commission,
respectively. The Cronbach’s alpha scale reliability coefficient for the trust in government scale is 0.72.12
Within-group and between-group trust measures: To construct these measures, we first average
a four-point ordinal scale asking to what extent respondents trust their own and other ethnic groups,
respectively. We then compute a within-group trust measure, that captures the respondents’ level of trust
in own ethnic group, across the different LGAs of the respondent’s ethnic group in a state. Between-group
trust measures capture trust between the different ethnic groups living within a state.
The government satisfaction scale is a summative scale combining six indicators that the government
handles the economy, unemployment, health, education, inflation, and water-related issues very well as
opposed to very badly. The scale has a Cronbach’s alpha scale reliability coefficient of 0.77. Lastly, the
government corruption scale combines five indicators that the respondents considers the elected officials
10The survey was conducted in 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2013 and 2015. The response rate in 2008, for which
such information is publicly available, is 72%.
11All responses ranges from 0 - 3 but were rescaled from 0 to 1 and then average across respondents of the same ethnicity
to obtain an ethnic level index.
12The Cronbach’s Alpha provides a measure of survey’s internal consistency and assess how well a set of variables are
related as a group. All responses were then standardized to indicate whether respondents trusts a lot or somewhat in each of the
group above.
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at the Presidency, National Assembly, and Local Government corrupt or very corrupt. Its Cronbach’s
alpha scale reliability coefficient is 0.79.
3.3.2 Rainfall-Based Inequality Measures
In constructing our rainfall inequality measures, we follow closely the approach by Guariso and Rogall
(2017). Our key variable of interest is the Between-Group Inequality (BGR) measure, defined at level of
each one of the states in Nigeria and for each year. The measure captures inequality in the distribution of
rainfall during the growing season between the ethnic groups living within a State. The BGR is computed
as the weighted average of the differences in rainfall among ethnic groups living within the same state,
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where Ns refers to the number of ethnic groups located within state s, θi,s is the relative size of the
ethnic group i in state s, ri,s is the level of rainfall in ethnic group i’s homeland, and r˜s is the yearly average
amount of rainfall in the state.
We also define two additional rainfall-based measures of inequality: Within-Group Inequality (WGR)
and Within-State Inequality (WSR). To construct WGR, we proceed in two steps: first, we construct a
measure of inequality across the different areas that cover an ethnic homeland within a state. The areas
are defined by the 0.5×0.5-degree grid-cells in which the rainfall data was provided. More formally, the











where Gi is the amount of rainfall grids covering ethnic group i’s boundary, πm is the relative size of
grid-cell m, ri,m refers to the amount of rainfall over the grid-cell m, and ri is the quantity of rain that fell
over ethnic group i’s homeland. In the second step, we obtain the state-level measure of within-group
inequality by taking the weighted average of WGRi,s across all ethnic groups living within the state, where
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Our last measure, Within-State Inequality (WSR), captures rainfall inequality between grid cells that
falls within the same state. The construction of the WSR follows a similar approach to the one used in the
first step for WGR, except that here we compare areas across the state, rather than focusing on specific











Where Gs refers to the total number of rainfall grids covering the state, while πm is the relative size of
grid-cell m. Table A 3.1 present the correlation coefficients of the inequality measures, while Table A 3.2
shows the summary statistics of the main variables of interest.
3.3.3 Empirical Strategy
We start by empirically investigating the relationship between rainfall-based inequality and the prevalence
of civil conflicts across our sample, by running the following analysis:
Con f licts,y=β1inequalitys,y+β2rain f alls,y+ΘXs,y+αs+ζy+αst+ εs,y (3.5)
Where s and y denotes the state and year, respectively. The dependent variable is Con f lict, a binary
variable taking on the value of one if state s experiences civil conflict resulting in at least 20 casualties
in year t. In a robustness check, we also use the number of fatalities in armed conflicts occurring
within states as an alternative dependent variable. Inequality is our variable of interest and indicates one
of the rainfall-based inequality measures described above, constructed considering rainfall during the
growing season, while rain f all is the yearly average rain that fell within a state’s boundaries. X is a
vector of geographical and institutional covariates that may affect conflict at the state level. For instance,
most analysis of armed conflict in Nigeria emphasize the role of religion as a major factor. Thus, we
construct a measure of religious fragmentation and competition in a state. We compute the fragmentation
measure as one minus the Herfindahl index of religious group shares and then classify a state as having
a high religious fragmentation (equals one) if its index is above median. Similarly, we define religious
competition in each state by: 1−|η1−η2|, where η1 and η2 indicate the state share of the population for
the two largest religious groups. In addition, we include a dummy for oil producing states to proxy for
natural resources driven conflict in the Niger-Delta area of the country. Other additional control variables
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include temperature anomalies – the deviation of temperature from its long-term mean value (January
1981 - December 2015), per capital allocations to states, and population. We further include state and
year fixed effects – αs, and ζy – to absorb period and time-invariant effects across states. For instance, the
presence of mountainous terrain or the distance from the seat of power may confound the investigated
relationships (see, Harari and LaFerrara (2014); Miguel, et al., (2004)). Lastly, we augment the model
with state specific time trend αst to account for differential linear trends across states.
Given a binary dependent variable, a natural choice of estimation would be to conduct a probit
(or logit) estimation, but we use the standard OLS and fit a linear probability model to allow us to
adopt spatial-econometrics methods as in Harari and LaFerrara (2014) and Maystadt et al., (2014),
which are problematic to implement in limited dependent variable models. Indeed, given the nature of
our georeferenced dataset, one concern for our empirical approach may be that observations are not
independent across space. To that purpose, we apply Conley’s (1999) standard errors, which is robust to
spatial dependence of an unknown form in the error term, following the procedure suggested by Hsiang
(2010). Also, in an alternative specification, we re-estimate the above model, controlling for spatial lags
of the variables of interests. Here, we follow Harari and LaFerrara (2014) and Maystadt et al., (2014)
in constructing a symmetric weighting matrix W of order 2 and thereafter obtain the spatial lags of the
independent variables by multiplying the matrix W and the vector of observations.
In the second part of the chapter, we try to investigate the channels through which rainfall inequality
could lead to higher prevalence of civil conflict. The corresponding empirical model is:
polievai,s,y=β inequalityi,s,y+ΘXs,y+αs+ζy+αst+ εs,y (3.6)
Where i, s and y denotes the ethnic, state, and survey year, respectively. The dependent variable
polieva refers to one of the seven main indicators described above, and inequality refers to the between-
group rainfall inequality. X are economic controls such as population and per capita allocations to
state, which may confound the observed relationship. In addition, we include a measure of religious
fragmentation and competition between the various ethnic groups living within a state. Also, we include
state and survey-year fixed effects – αs, and ζy – to absorb time-invariant effects across states. For
instance, the distance from the seat of power may confound the investigated relationships. Lastly, we
augment the model with state specific time trend αst to account for differential linear trends across states.
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3.4 Main Results
3.4.1 Civil conflict and BGR inequality
We first present the results of our main specification described in equation (3.5) in Table 3.1. In column
(1) of the Table, we report the baseline regression without any fixed effects or controls, while in column
(2) we introduce year fixed effects and religion controls. These baseline specifications indicate a positive
and significant relationship between BGR inequality and the prevalence of civil conflict at the state level.
Specifically, the estimated coefficient in column (2) suggests that a one standard deviation increase in
BGR inequality would lead to an 8.57 (0.186×0.461) percentage point increase in the prevalence of civil
conflict. However, this effect disappears when we add both state fixed effects and climatic controls in
column (3) and becomes significant with the inclusion of state-specific time trends in column (4). This
latter specification indicates that a one standard deviation increase in rainfall inequality between-groups
will heighten the risks of civil conflict prevalence by about five percentage points. In column (5), the
effect increase to about seven percentage points when we control for economic characteristics of the
states. Compared to the average conflict prevalence in the sample (23%), this result implies an increase of
about 30 percent in civil conflict prevalence. While this effect appears smaller than the one estimated by
Guariso and Rogall (2016), its magnitude is still in the upper level of the ranking made by Hsiang et al.
(2013) in their meta-analysis, and within the range found for studies on Sudan (Maystadt et al., 2014),
and Somalia (Maystadt and Ecker, 2014).
In addition, we do not find any evidence to suggest that this effect persists over time as the lagged
coefficients of BGR inequality in column (6) and (7) are not statistically different from zero. We also
do not find evidence that within-group and within-state rainfall inequality affect the prevalence of civil
conflict either when they are introduced separately as in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.2 or when they
are considered together with between-group inequality as in columns (4) and (5) of the same table,
respectively.13
13Surprisingly, when we include between-group temperature inequality in the same specification with BGR-inequality, we
find a negative relationship between temperature inequality and conflict. However, this result does not alter our main variable
of interest.
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3.4.2 Robustness
We check the robustness of our results to a set of alternative specifications of the benchmark model. First,
we show that the dynamics is not much different between civil and communal conflicts. Most anecdotal
evidence (Baca, 2015; Sayne, 2011) on the potential impact of climate change in Nigeria has often cited
competition for arable land between pastoralists and farmers as a possible trigger to violence. Indeed,
climate-induced shocks that tend to result in less rainfall and higher temperature can greatly disrupt
herders and farmers means of livelihood and hence induces more grievances. Maystadt, et al., (2014)
provides suggestive evidence that temperature anomalies heighten intergroup violence between pastoralist
and agro-pastoralist’s communities in Sudan.
To that purpose, we check the sensitivity of our main results to an alternative definition of conflict –
communal and non-communal conflicts. We define communal conflict as battles between pastoralists and
farmers, resulting in at least 20 fatalities, while non-communal conflicts are other violent events excluding
battles between farmers and pastoralists.14 Results reported in Table 3.3 shows that the effect of BGR
inequality is quantitatively similar to the benchmark results presented in Table 3.1. Indeed, the result in
columns (3) and (6) indicates that a one standard deviation change in BGR inequality would translate
into 7.27 and 5.60 percentage points increase in the prevalence of communal non-communal conflicts,
respectively.
Second, we show that our results are robust to using number of fatalities and violent events occurring
in each state as alternative dependent variables, respectively. Specifically, the results reported in column
(5), Panels B and C of Table 3.4 shows that a one standard deviation change in BGR inequality would lead
to 18.9 and 5.5 percentage points increase in the number of fatalities and violent events, respectively. In
addition, we show in Panel D of Table 3.4 that our results are also robust to using the UCDP geo-referenced
conflict event dataset, which allows us to extend our analysis to cover the period 1990 to 2015.
Next, we check whether our results hold, when we control for spatial and temporal dependence
between observational units. Given the high mobility of pastoralists, one major concern might be that
our results are driven by climate induced migration. To test for this, we include spatial lags of the main
variable of interest. The results reported in Panel E of Table 3.4 indicates that the effect of BGR inequality
on the prevalence of civil conflict remain positive and significant. As a form of falsification test, we also
compute an alternative between-group inequality measure based on rainfall outside of the growing seasons.
14Communal conflicts involving farmers and pastoralists typically accounts for about 30% of total conflict occurring in
each year in Nigeria.
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Given the importance of rainfall in agricultural productions in Nigeria, we would expect the effect of
BGR inequality on civil conflict to be less or even null during the non-growing season. Indeed, the results
presented in Panel F of Table 3.4 shows that, while the effect is smaller and marginally significant for the
baseline specification without any fixed effects or controls, the impact disappears with the inclusion of
these controls.
Furthermore, we assess the robustness of our results to using alternative geo-referenced ethnic dataset
for the definition of BGR inequality measure. One might be worried that the construction of our ethnicity
variable does not reflect the historical distribution of ethnic groups in Nigeria. In that regards, we use
the GREG dataset to identify the historical locations of main ethnic groups across Nigeria and then
redefine the inequality measures using the ethnic homeland as defined in the GREG data. Panel G of
Table 3.4 reports the result for this alternative definition. We find that the impact of BGR inequality on
civil conflict prevalence is much stronger compared to when we define the inequality measures using the
local government handbook. A possible explanation for this might be related to the replacement of some
minority ethnic groups with the “dominant group” they belong to in the GREG dataset thereby inducing
higher variations in between-group inequality within states.
We then consider a monthly-level analysis to control for any spurious seasonal correlation that may
arise due to variations in weather and conflict. Results reported in Panel H of Table 3.4 indicates that the
coefficients of BGR inequality remain positive and significant, but the effect is much lower compared
to the main result. Finally, we show that our results remain robust to the use of a probit model without
spatial correction in the standard errors. In Panel I of Table 3.4, we report the coefficients of the average
marginal effects of BGR inequality on civil conflict prevalence. The result in column (5) indicates that a
one standard deviation increase in BGR inequality increases the likelihood of civil conflict prevalence by
about 9.4 percentage points.
3.4.3 Transmission Mechanisms
Our previous results showed a significant relationship between rainfall inequality and conflict prevalence.
When thinking about the channels, one could think of several reasons why variations in climatic conditions
among organized political and ethnic groups in Nigeria could lead to violence. First, poor institutional
response to a mix of weather-related shock could lead to increased resource scarcity and competition,
thus heightening the risks of violence. In particular, the increased incidences of kidnapping for ransom
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and violent conflict between pastoralists and farmers in recent years had been attributed to lack of
economic opportunities and governments’ failure to provide designated areas for grazing to the pastoralists’
communities (Baca, 2015).
In such circumstances, climate-induced changes that disrupt food and livestock production substan-
tially would increase the risks of conflicts, and create distrust among ethnic groups. An illustrative
example is a recent report by Sayne (2011) stating that “in the south, many farmers now plant over
grazing routes long agreed upon with Fulani herders" citing climate related factors such as changes in
planting techniques due to weather variability as reasons. Such breakdowns in agreement could create
mistrust among the two groups and therefore increase structural conflict risks. Besides, poor responses
to weather-induced shocks could reinforce citizen’s grievances on government’s corruption and lack of
accountability thereby deepening the cycle of violence (see figure 3.1 below). Against this background,
we turn to the reduced-form relationship between inequality, trust and political preferences.
Source: Adapted from Sayne (2011) and modified by the authors
Fig. 3.1 Channels of Transmission
Inequality, trust and Political Preferences
While the empirical debate on this relationship continues apace, the weight of the evidence suggests there
is a strong negative association between inequality, trust and political participation (see Jordahl (2009),
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for a detailed review of empirical studies). However, establishing a causal effect is far from being an easy
task due to several reasons. First, the relationship between inequality and trust is likely to be mutually
reinforcing. For instance, Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011) demonstrates that countries with higher levels
of trust are more likely to have larger welfare states, thus reducing inequality. Similarly, one may argue
that higher trust could lead to better performing institutions and markets, which in turn would favour an
equitable income distribution process (Uslaner, 2008).
Secondly, most of the empirical studies focusing on the relationship between inequality and the level of
social capital are cross-country analysis, which are usually problematic when it comes to drawing causal
inferences due mostly to comparability issues between countries, risks of omitting important variables
and measurement errors in the inequality measures. At the same time, while robust empirical evidence
focusing on within country analysis are quite limited outside of the US, findings for other countries are
less conclusive (see, La Ferrara, 2002; Leigh, 2006; Gustavsson and Jordahl, 2008). In this section,
we provide a reappraisal of the relationship between inequality, trust and political preferences and, in
particular, attempt to address the limitations of previous studies using our unique measures of inequality.
Table 3.5 presents results of the impact of rainfall inequality on trust, and political evaluations. The
results shown in column (1) of Table 3.5 indicates that an increase in BGR inequality reduces the likelihood
that respondents of the same ethnicity would rate high in the general trust scale. More specifically, column
(2) and (3) imply that a one standard deviation increase in BGR inequality reduces the likelihood of
between and within-group trusts by 10.47 and 8.61 percentage points, respectively. Column (4) identifies
a larger effect for trust towards neighbours. The point estimates indicates that higher BGR inequality
reduces the likelihood that respondents from the same ethnic group would express that they trust a lot in
their neighbour by 11.14 percentage points. Surprisingly, the effect is smaller for trust in government, as
the result in column (5) show a 1.75 percentage point reduction.
We also find that an increase in BGR inequality reduces the likelihood that respondents of the same
ethnicity would express satisfaction with the way government handles issues related to unemployment,
health, education, inflation, and the general economy. Column (6) of Table 3.5 estimates that a one
standard deviation increase in BGR inequality reduces the probability that respondents who share the
same ethnicity, would express that they are satisfied with government by three percentage points. Also,
column (7) shows that a one standard deviation change in BGR inequality increases the likelihood that
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respondent from the same ethnic group would consider elected government officials as very corrupt by
five percentage points.
Average Control Direct Effect
To explore the potential mechanisms through which rainfall inequality may affect the prevalence of
conflict, we apply sequential g-estimation as suggested by Acharya et al. (2016) to estimate the average
control direct effect (ACDE) of BGR inequality net government satisfaction and trust in government on the
likelihood of civil conflict. Specifically, we aim to examine whether any effect of BGR inequality persists
after controlling for the intermediate confounder (or our government satisfaction and trust variables in
this case). To proceed, we estimate in the first stage, the full benchmark model including the trust-related
variables, and measures of government satisfaction and corruption (Table A 3.11.). Thereafter, we divide
the vector of controls into pre-treatment and intermediates. We use rainfall and temperature levels as our
pretreatment variables. We then treat all the other controls (i.e. religious, economic and the trust-related
controls) as intermediate confounders. While it is possible that we misclassified these confounders, we
check that our results are not sensitive to these classifications.
In the second stage of the g-estimation, we use only the pre-treatment variables as controls. One
concern with our approach to estimating the ACDE might be that, for linear probability model, the
estimates can be biased from model misspecification or if there exist unmeasured confounders between
citizen’s satisfaction with government, trusts and civil conflict. However, Angrist and Pischke (2009)
demonstrate that such bias is likely to be low for marginal effects estimation. Nevertheless, we report
bootstrapped confidence intervals for both stages. The results reported in Table 3.6 suggests that the
effects of BGR inequality on civil conflict persists even after accounting for citizen’s satisfaction with
government handling of the economy, between-group trusts and level of trust in elected government
officials. However, the effects dies out when we consider conflict between pastoralists and farmers,
thus giving credence to a channel in which climate-induced shocks reinforce citizen’s grievances on
government handling of the economy, and create mistrust between predominantly farming ethnic groups
and pastoralists thereby deepening the cycle of violence.
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3.5 Conclusions
There is much discussion and debate over the role of climate-induced shocks in violent conflicts. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that the effects of climate change can
aggravate stressors such as social tensions, poverty, and environmental degradation, that allows conflict to
flourish. However, understanding the exact transmission mechanisms through which variations in climatic
conditions can exacerbate these conflict stressors requires a better local-level and country-specific analysis.
In this chapter, we show how changes in the distribution of rainfall between ethnic groups increase the
risks of armed conflicts prevalence in Nigeria, and in particular, investigate the mechanisms underlying
the observed relationships. Our main results show that a 1 standard deviation change in between-group
rainfall inequality during the growing season increase communal and civil conflict prevalences by about
7 percentage points. The result is robust to a set of alternative specifications. Our analysis suggests a
mechanism in which climatic-induced shocks reinforce citizen’s grievances over government handling of
the economy and creates mistrust between predominantly farming communities and those engaged in
nomadic herding.
One important limitation of our study, however, is that we are unable to adequately isolate how
economic factors such as climate-induced resource scarcity may contribute to intensify conflict risks.
Instead, we focus on the social capital channel potentially linking inequality to conflict. While the
dearth of data on socio-economic characteristics of communities and household constrain our ability to
evaluate that channel, we acknowledge that there may exist an effect of between-group rainfall inequality
that does not operate exclusively through social capital. Nonetheless, our analysis underscores the
importance of developing conflict-sensitive mitigation and adaptation strategies to reduce the adverse
effects of climatic shocks. In particular, initiatives aimed at reducing Nigeria’s frequent farmers-herders’
violence should focus on strengthening traditional conflict mediation and reconciliation mechanisms
and addressing environmental issues that push nomadic pastoralists to migrate towards the south for
water and pastures. Indeed, recent work by Linke et al. (2017) demonstrate the mediating role of formal
and informal institutions in moderating the effects of climate-induced conflicts in rural Kenya. Finally,
while our results present an empirical evidence of how changes in the distribution of rainfall between
ethnic group increase the risk of conflicts, the analysis is limited in predicting future risks relating to
how increased frequency and intensity of weather shocks would affect inequality and ability to mitigate
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competition over resources. Certainly, this will be a path for further research, if there exists an extensive
and quality dataset that can allow for a robust empirical analysis.
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Table 3.1 Estimation of Linear Probability Model - Civil conflict and BGR inequality
Dependent Variable Civil conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
BGR inequality 0.383*** 0.461*** 0.143 0.277** 0.359* 0.280* 0.287*
(0.096) (0.111) (0.237) (0.138) (0.191) (0.149) (0.161)
BGR inequality (t-1) 0.911 0.842
(1.127) (1.115)
BGR inequality (t-2) 0.437
(1.101)
Rainfall 0.092 0.258* 0.241** 0.251* 0.243*
(0.063) (0.138) (0.103) (0.142) (0.137)
Temperature 0.020 0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013
(0.048) (0.043) (0.046) (0.043) (0.043)
Religion controls Included
Economic controls Included
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.020 0.093 0.151 0.379 0.430 0.406 0.425
Observations 703 703 703 703 333 703 703
Notes: Religion controls include an indicator that the state has high religious fragmentation and a measure of the state religious tension.
Economic controls include population and per capital allocations to States.
All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X−Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin)
BGR indicates Between-Group Rainfall Inequality
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for spatial dependence of an unknown form (Conley, 1999)
* denotes significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table 3.2 Alternative Estimations - Civil conflict and inequality
Dependent Variable Civil conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BGR inequality 0.359* 0.361* 0.369*
(0.191) (0.191) (0.191)
WGR inequality 0.005 0.058
(0.380) (0.378)
Within state inequality 0.195 0.273
(0.512) (0.509)
BGT inequality
Rainfall 0.277 0.222 0.095 0.265 0.099
(0.218) (0.231) (0.393) (0.230) (0.390)
Temperature -0.014 -0.007 -0.008 -0.015 -0.016
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Economic controls Included Included Included Included Included
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.430 0.427 0.427 0.430 0.431
Observations 333 333 333 333 333
Notes: Economic controls include population and per capital allocations to States.
All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X−Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin)
BGR and WGR refers to Between-Group and Within-Group Rainfall Inequality, while BGT is Between-Group
Temperature inequality
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for spatial dependence of an unknown form (Conley, 1999)
* denotes significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table 3.3 Civil conflict and inequality - communal conflict vs non-communal
Dependent Variable Communal conflict Non-communal conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BGR inequality 0.309*** 0.079 0.391** 0.306*** 0.145 0.301*
(0.107) (0.231) (0.189) (0.219) (0.252) (0.172)
Rainfall 0.089 -0.017 0.116 -0.010 -0.009 0.323
(0.229) (0.246) (0.230) (0.218) (0.109) (0.234)
Temperature -0.055 0.017 -0.021 -0.059 0.027 -0.024
(0.045) (0.048) (0.043) (0.045) (0.049) (0.043)
Religion controls Included Included
Economic controls Included Included
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No Yes No No Yes
R-squared 0.091 0.166 0.455 0.079 0.162 0.467
Observations 703 703 333 703 703 333
Notes: Religion controls include an indicator that the state has high religious fragmentation and a measure of the state religious tension. Economic
controls include population and per capital allocations to States.
All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X−Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin)
BGR indicates Between-Group Rainfall Inequality
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for spatial dependence of an unknown form (Conley, 1999)
* denotes significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table 3.4 Robustness to alternative samples and dependent variables
Dependent Variable Civil conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Main results 0.383*** 0.461*** 0.143 0.277** 0.359*
(0.096) (0.111) (0.237) (0.138) (0.191)
Panel B. Using number of fatalities 1.669*** 1.993*** 0.699 0.894 1.015*
as dep. var. (0.351) (0.405) (0.847) (0.632) (0.544)
Panel C. Using number of violent events 1.138*** 1.109*** 0.514 0.601* 0.298*
as dep. var. (0.204) (0.216) (0.351) (0.318) (0.170)
Panel D. Defining civil conflict based 0.337** 0.121 0.322** 0.327** 0.333**
on UCDP dataset (0.155) (0.074) (0.133) (0.139) (0.149)
Panel E. Including spatially lagged 0.381*** 0.439*** 0.140 0.264* 0.374**
BGR inequality (0.096) (0.115) (0.238) (0.153) (0.190)
Panel F. BGR inequality outside 0.283* 0.357 0.139 0.162 0.268
the growing season (0.166) (0.220) (0.236) (0.240) (0.217)
Panel G. Defining BGR inequality based on 1.189*** 1.431*** 0.331 0.647** 0.805*
GREG dataset (0.315) (0.365) (0.280) (0.321) (0.418)
Panel H. Considering monthly-level 0.053* 0.055 0.180*** 0.153*** 0.095***
analysis (0.029) (0.037) (0.034) (0.032) (0.048)
Panel I. Probit model (AME) without 0.391*** 0.468*** 0.292 0.312* 0.504***
spatial correction in SE (0.101) (0.114) (0.233) (0.163) (0.114)
Climatic controls Included Included Included Included
Religion controls Included
Economic controls Included
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Religion controls include an indicator that the state has high religious fragmentation and a measure of the state religious tension. Economic controls
include population and per capital allocations to States.
All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X−Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin)
BGR indicates Between-Group Rainfall Inequality
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for spatial dependence of an unknown form (Conley, 1999)
* denotes significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
Detailed results are provided in Tables A 3.3., A 3.4., A 3.5., A 3.6., A 3.7., A 3.8., A 3.9. and A 3.10. of Appendix 2.
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Table 3.5 BGR inequality, trust and political evaluations
Dependent Variables Trust Variable:
General Between-group Within-group Neighbour Government Govt satisfaction Govt corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
BGR inequality -0.575*** -0.563*** -0.463*** -0.599*** -0.094*** -0.160*** 0.288***
(0.092) (0.118) (0.102) (0.119) (0.031) (0.027) (0.050)
Rainfall -0.102*** -0.070 -0.102*** -0.079* -0.010 0.015*** -0.007
(0.031) (0.043) (0.034) (0.043) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Temperature 0.021 0.012 -0.005 0.019 0.070*** 0.077*** -0.034***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Economic controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Survey-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.180 0.199 0.173 0.175 0.275 0.221 0.073
Observations 812 812 812 812 812 812 812
Notes: Economic controls include population and per capital allocations to states.
General Trust is a summative scale, indicating that respondents trusts somewhat or a lot in their relatives, neighbours, own ethnic group and others.
Trust in government is a summative scale, indicating that respondents trust somewhat or a lot in the President, state Governor and Local Government Mayor.
Government satisfaction: an indicator that the government handles the economy, health, inequality, and water-related issues very well as opposed to very badly
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state-level
* denotes significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
Table 3.6 ACDE of BGR inequality on conflict
Civil conflict Communal conflict
Estimate 95% Bootstrapped CI Estimate 95% Bootstrapped CI
BGR inequality 0.345 [-0.077 - 0.766] 0.191 [-0.184 - 0.567]
BGR inequality (ACDE) 0.343 [0.030 - 0.755] 0.193 [-0.030 - 0.867]
Notes: For the ACDE, the mediator include government satisfaction scale: an indicator that the government handles the economy,
employment, inflation, health, inequality, and water-related issues very well as opposed to very badly; general trust is a summative
scale, indicating that respondents trusts somewhat or a lot in their relatives, neighbours, own ethnic group and others; between-group
trust is a measure that captures the level of trust between the different ethnic groups living within a state, and trust in government scale:
a summative scale, indicating that respondents trust somewhat or a lot in the President, Local Government Mayor, National Assembly,
electoral commission, and ruling party. Nonparametric bootstrapped 95% CI based on 1,000 replications shown in bracket.

Chapter 4
Which punishment deters bribery? A
theoretical note on the economics of corruption
4.1 Introduction
The last decades has seen an extensive attention been paid to analysing the economics of corruption. The
main focus of these analyses is not on the morality or otherwise of corruption but on monetary quid pro
quo deals where agents (either public or private) are induced to ignore the interests of their superiors in
favour of their own self-interest and that of the bribers. Under this interpretation, corruption involves a
hidden transaction between a public official and private individual to seek and extract illicit income for
personal benefits. Early research by economists (see Bayley, 1970; Leff, 1970; Nye, 1970) were in tacit
support of this “black market” mechanism of allocation, reflecting their moral commitment to the price
system. In an efficient corrupt system, public services are allocated to those with the highest willingness
to pay bribe, and in most cases, bribes are paid to officials to circumvent bureaucratic rules that hamper
efficient function of the market system.
Although contemporary studies (see Lambsdorff, 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) have shown that
this intuition is oversimplified, the price mechanism analysis remain the central theme of economic studies
on the impact of corruption on resource allocations. However, it is now widely accepted that corruption
does not generally lead to efficiency. Rose-Ackerman’s seminal works (Rose-Ackerman, 1975, 1978)
as well as Shleifer and Vishny’s (1993) influential paper demonstrate that illegal systems of bribe-price
can be more distortionary than taxation. The rent seeking behaviour of corrupt government officials
may induce them to redesign public systems to encourage bribery. Such actions involve not only the
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illicit exploitation of individual’s willingness to pay as a decision criterion but also undermine efficient
provision of public services.
Yet, in many developing countries, private citizens are often required to pay bribes to obtain basic
public services. Indeed, data from the 2015 Global Corruption Barometer produced by Transparency
International show that twenty-two percent of respondents surveyed in Sub-Saharan Africa report having
paid a bribe in the last 12 months. The situation is worst in countries such as Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and
Sierra Leone where one out of two respondents surveyed say they paid a bribe to access public services
such as education, health, customs and tax revenue, licenses and land services, etc. This pervasiveness of
bribery has important consequences for those without money and connections. As with the incidence of
regressive tax, the burden of bribery may fall disproportionately on the poor as they are more likely to pay
a higher percentage of their income as bribes than the rich (Hunt and Laszlo, 2012).
Moreover, the distortionary effects of corruption can compromise the quality of public goods provided,
in such a manner that the population may have to rely on private providers to access vital public goods
and services. This again disproportionately favours the high-income groups because the costs of these
services may be so high that the poor cannot afford to pay. This non-access to basic services such as
education and health care facilities has the potential to perpetuate inter-generational poverty and hence
widens income inequality. Indeed, micro-level studies such as Hunt and Laszlo (2005) and Mocan (2008)
have demonstrated that the nominal amount of bribe paid is a positive function of income, whose burden
decreases as income rises.
Given these distortionary effects, an interesting question to ask is how can the incidence of bribe
requests and payments be reduced? As Rose-Ackerman (2010) notes, bribe offering and taking “are
generally criminal offence”, and most countries impose some form of punishments to deter both public
and private agents from engaging in corrupt transactions. According to Nigeria’s Independent Corrupt
Practices and Other Related Offences Act (2012), a public official found culpable of soliciting for bribes
shall “forfeit the bribe and pay a fine of [at least] five times the sum of the value of the bribe or a fixed fine
of ten thousand Naira (i.e. about $35), whichever is higher.” In India too, the Prevention of Corruption
Act (1988) stipulates that any person guilty of giving and receiving bribe shall be liable for up to five
years imprisonment, in addition to paying a fine. Despite these penalties, the menace of bribery remains
an everyday and commonplace occurrence in most of these countries.
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This chapter offers a simple theoretical model that looks into how different enforcement mechanisms
may yield different outcomes in terms of bribe levels and proportion of people engaging in bribery. In
particular, we focus on a specific issue that has often been overlooked: how the monetary value of a
bribe is affected by the willingness to pay and affects the equilibrium level of inequality. In doing so,
the model extends the setting by Hunt and Laszlo (2005) and show the effects of a switch from a fixed
punishment mechanism to a proportional one, in which the private cost to the bureaucrat of engaging
in bribery is linearly related to the bribe itself. Our analysis shows that severe punishments for corrupt
bureaucrats would generally cause an increase in bribe size, making bribing more expensive (and therefore
less widespread). However, the effects of a proportional punishment that varies with the amount of bribe
depends on how much effort is required to deliver the public service. When effort of “normal” delivery is
large or the service is much valuable to the client, the bribe level in equilibrium more than compensates
the bureaucrat for his effort and is also increasing in the net surplus available for the client with the least
scruples. We also discuss the effects of our result on willingness to pay and inequality.
The model has some interesting policy implications: if agent’s opportunity cost of time is sufficiently
low, harsher punishments to the bureaucrat can be effective in reducing the spread of corruption. However,
in countries where bribery is pervasive or there is a general level of dishonesty, a fixed fine to the
bureaucrat can be more taxing on the poor, as a rise in the expected punishment would imply an increase
in the amount of bribe for everyone on the average. When this is the case, a punishment mechanism that
impose a penalty on agents might further exacerbate the burden on the poor if it is lower than the fixed
fine on bureaucrats.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review of related literature.
Section 4.3 presents the theoretical framework and results, and section 4.4 discuss the main findings and
concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
It is now widely recognised that corruption has detrimental effects on societies. Hence, an important body
of work is devoted to analysing the economic, social and political consequences of corruption. We review
the most relevant studies for our paper.1
1Lambsdorff (2006) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature.
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At the centre of theoretical and empirical studies on public and private sector quality and productivity
is whether corruption detrimentally affects the quality of goods and services or not. Kaufmann et al.
(1999) aptly describe this argument as whether: corruption “greases the wheel” by reducing inefficiencies
associated with bureaucratic delays or “throws sand in the wheel” by misallocating resources or lowering
the security of property rights. Commenting on these views, Lambsdorff (2007) noted that corruption may
induce preferences for wrong firms and projects, and thereby reduce the quality of public investments.
For example, suppose a contracting process was undermined to such an extent that corrupt government
officials award the contracts to firms offering the highest bribe. Competitors with high scruples who
might be more efficient would lose in the process, thus creating several distortionary effects for the
economy. First, quality controls can be circumvented as corrupt contractors are incentivized to save costs
in order to break even. In such circumstances, high price-quality ratio would no longer be guaranteed.
Second, wrong projects may be selected by corrupt bureaucrats to maximize their chances of extracting
bribes. Winston (1979) argues that corruption flourishes when the probability of detection is low, and this
probability depends on the number of people involved, the number and duration of the transactions and the
simplicity and standardization of the procedures. In that regards, corrupt government officials are usually
incentivized to disregard inexpensive “off-the-shelf” projects in favour of projects with non-transparent
negotiations and huge capital investments.
Beyond these distortionary effects, Rose-Ackerman (1999) confirms that corruption reduces produc-
tivity by inducing the efforts exerted by corrupt public official. The reason for such reduction is that
lower level of efforts increases the willingness of private agents to pay bribe in exchange for quicker
and quality service. Thus, several empirical studies have investigated the link between corruption, the
quality of public goods and services, environmental regulations and productivity. In particular, Gupta et al.
(2001) find that countries with high level of perceived corruption have low quality of public healthcare
provision, which they proxy by the percentage of children with low birth weights, as well as low quality
of public education proxy with student drop-out rates. Using a cross-section of more than 100 countries,
Welsch (2006) show that corruption adversely impacts reported ambient pollution of air and water through
reducing the effectiveness of environmental regulations, and an indirect channel that lowers income.
Although the empirical investigations discussed above present some mixed results, it is now widely agreed
that corruption introduces some distortions into public and private sectors.
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In recent times, theoretical contributions on the economic analysis of corruption has started to focus
on measures to combat it. Our work speak to at least three strands of this literature. First, the paper offers
a new view on how different punishment mechanisms may affect bribery outcomes and willingness to pay.
In doing so, our paper contributes to a growing literature on measures to reduce corruption (see Hindricks,
et al., 1999; Andreanova and Melisasas, 2008; Dixit, 2016). While this literature focuses on the role of
explicit incentive structures, such as institutional controls and the use of efficient wages, in controlling
corruption, we highlight how the intrinsic characteristics of public and private agents may alter bribery
outcomes. In particular, we model the interactions between bureaucrat and private agent as a dynamic
game in which the bureaucrat moves first and decides whether to solicits for bribe or not. This modelling
choice is intended to elicit the conditions under which the bureaucrat may angle for bribes, given the
punishment system in place.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the use of asymmetric punishment to control the “scourge”
of bribery.2 Following the suggestions of Basu (2011) for India to “legalize bribe giving, double the
fine for bribe taking, and make the bribe taker pay back the bribe if discovered,” there has been an
increased focus on the merits and limitations of asymmetric punishment (e.g. Dréze, 2011; Dufwenberg
and Spagnolo, 2014; Felli and Hortala-Vallve, 2016; Oak, 2015). Although the measure propose by Basu
(2011) was to incentivize private citizens to report incidence of bribe payments and requests by public
officials, Dréze (2011) argues that the proposal eliminates the moral cost associated with committing an
illegal act and therefore, might lead to an increase in the incidence of bribing. On their part, Dufwenberg
and Spagnolo (2014); Oak (2015) shows that legalizing bribe giving in an environment with inefficient
legal system would incentivize the bureaucrat towards angling for low-value harassment bribes.
However, an earlier study by Lambsdorff and Nell (2007) demonstrate that, while asymmetry pun-
ishment might increase the risks inherent in corrupt transactions, it is ineffective in cases of bargaining
game where detection is costly. In this paper, therefore, we consider different punishment mechanisms
in a dynamic game environment, where the bureaucrat enjoys a first mover advantage and therefore
extract most of the rent. By doing so, our paper provides a formal model to the extensive discussion
offer by Rose-Ackerman (2010) on how different punishment system may affect the negotiations between
briber and bribee. The paper also complements the study by Dufwenberg and Spagnolo (2014), who
show that, if institutional quality is high, asymmetric punishment may deter bribery in a repeated game,
2Here, asymmetric punishment refers to penalizing one agent less than the other, so as to incentivize agents to report a
crime.
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where the bureaucrat builds a reputation of being dishonest. While in their setting, the size of the bribe is
independent of the punishment scheme, we consider an alternative setting in which the private cost to the
bureaucrat of engaging in corruption varies with the amount of bribe.
Finally, our paper also contribute to the literature on the relationship between corruption and inequality.
Theoretical studies have generally emphasized the relative importance of institutional quality in explaining
productive differentials resulting from high rent-seeking activities (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Chong
and Gradstein, 2007; Mandal and Marjit, 2010; Spinesi, 2009). In particular, Spinesi (2009) develops
a Schumpeterian growth model in which the quality of institutions encourages inequality and growth.
The author shows that public inefficiencies resulting from rent-seeking activities induce higher wage
inequality by diverting a share of the labour force from productive to unproductive activities. These points
are consistent with Mandal and Marjit (2010) who show that corruption diverts resources from productive
sectors to non-productive ones, thereby engendering wage differentials in the different sectors. Banerjee
(1997) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005) formalize the idea that that corruption creates a distortionary
effect in the positive externality generated by government expenditure - thus increasing inequality.
On the empirical side, there are several pieces of literature examining the corruption-inequality
nexus at both macro and micro level. At the macro level, Gupta et al. (2002) demonstrates that rising
corruption induces high income inequality and poverty through lower economic growth, distortions
in social programs, and biased tax systems in favour of the rich. Focusing on a number of countries,
Gyimah-Brempong and de Camacho (2006) shows that countries with relatively low corruption tend to
have larger distributional impact of corruptions suggesting that the link between corruption and inequality
might be non-linear. On the other hand, the micro literature on the relationship between corruption and
inequality are less conclusive. For example, Hunt and Laszlo (2012) show how the burden of bribe as a
share of income decrease with agent’s income, while Mocan (2008) and Svensson (2003) report that the
nominal amount of bribe paid increases with agent’s income implying that people with higher income are
worst hit by corruption.
Our interpretation of these facts is that at the macro level, the positive correlation between corruption
and inequality is due to the productivity effects resulting from corrupt rent-seeking activities, thus
impacting negatively on growth and economic welfare. However, the mechanism leading to these effects
do not incorporate the bribery channel, which the micro literature argues can generate income and
productivity effects (Hunt and Laszlo, 2005; Mocan, 2008). It is commonly accepted that the poorest
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segment of the society are worst hit by corruption since they are likely to rely more on basic public
services, and hence more likely to be exposed to bribery. In that regards, the portion of income lost to
corruption is likely to be higher when the household is poor. In this chapter, therefore, we extend the
setting by Hunt and Laszlo (2005) to conceptualize how different punishment mechanisms affects the
monetary value of a bribe and equilibrium level of inequality.
4.3 Theoretical Framework
The model extends the setting by Hunt and Laszlo (2005) to show how different punishment mechanisms
can affect bribery outcomes. In the model, a bureaucrat has discretionary power to offer public service to
a continuum of agents with identical preferences, but differing valuation of time. In their interactions,
the bureaucrat and agent play a two stage game. The bureaucrat move first and decides whether to ask
for a bribe or not. His preferences are characterised by two parameters: an honest bureaucrat receives
utility Ub per stage from having discharge his duty diligently and honestly, and experiences disutility of
normal effort E in each stage. For simplicity, we assume that the bureaucrat’s wage is normalized to zero.
Therefore, the total utility of an honest bureaucrat across the two periods is:
2(Ub−E) (4.1)
We assume that Ub > E so that if the bureaucrat decides not to ask for bribe, he performs his job diligently
without shirking. On the other hand, if the bureaucrat decides to angle for bribe, he shirks in the first stage
by providing less than the statutory amount of services to the private agent.
The agents observes the move of the bureaucrat and decides whether to accept the lower quality of
service or offer a bribe in order to obtain a better service than the initial level of service provided by the
bureaucrat. We assume that agents have identical preferences except in the utility they gain from the
public service R. This can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of time, as bribing may let the agent
skip the queue or by-pass certain procedures, which an honest official would require compliance.3 In this
regard, we expect agents with a higher valuation of time R to be willing to pay larger bribes to obtain
quicker service.4 If she refuses to bribe, she receives utility Ua, which we define as agent’s aversion to
3Following Banerjee (1997); Hunt and Laszlo (2005), we assume that the bureaucrat control over bureaucratic procedures
is costless in that he has discretionary powers to wave certain paperwork.
4The idea that those who have a higher valuation of time have a higher willingness to pay has been justified in Lui (1985).
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dishonesty.5 In the event the private agent does not bribe, the bureaucrat punishes her further by shirking
in the second stage. Thus, by decreasing the amount of service to an acceptable level, the bureaucrat
successfully creates a black market for corrupt-transaction, in which he is a monopolist. This assumption
is motivated by the findings of Guriev (2004) who demonstrates that corruption increase the equilibrium
level of red tape, and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) who shows that bureaucratic delays reduce the level of
services offered by public officials.
Both bureaucrat and agent engage in bribery if they find it advantageous. The bureaucrat’s main
gain consists in the bribe, while for the agent, it is a convenience of having a speedier service from the
bureaucrat. In that regards, we assume that if bribery occurs, then the agents receive utility E from the
efforts exerted by the bureaucrat. There are also costs to both parties in engaging in corruption. In this
model, we include both a “moral” cost of participating in dishonest transactions (Ub and Ua), and the cost
related to the possibility of being detected and punished for the corrupt deal.
In this paper, we consider three punishment mechanisms: (I) a fixed punishment (as briefly mentioned
in (Hunt and Laszlo, 2005)) in which the bureaucrat receiving a bribe is caught with probability δ and
fined a fixed amount F ; (II) a fixed punishment system in which with a given probability both bureaucrat
and agents may be caught and fined; and (III) a proportional punishment, in which the private cost to the
bureaucrat of engaging in bribery is linearly related to the bribe itself. We describe below the benchmark
case when the bureaucrat is faced with a fixed punishment mechanism, and thereafter, discuss how each
punishment system affects equilibrium outcomes.
4.3.1 Scenario I: Fixed punishment to bureaucrat
We solve this by backward induction, starting from the second-stage utility of bureaucrat and agent.
Suppose the agent decides to pay a bribe, the bureaucrat exerts efforts E in the second stage and receives
a bribe B, but risks punishment (δF). His second stage utility is, therefore:
B−E−δF (4.2)
Where δF is the expected punishment from receiving a bribe. If the agents decides not to pay the bribe,
the bureaucrat exerts no efforts and therefore shirks further in the second stage, and the agents receives
5We assume that R, Ua and Ub are independent.
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zero utility. The bureaucrat, therefore, angles for a bribe as long as (4.2) is non-negative, i.e.:
B > E +δF (4.3)
On the other hand, agent accepts to bribe if E +R−B >Ua, that is:
B < E +R−Ua (4.4)
From equations (4.3) and (4.4), we can see that bribery occurs if δF <R−Ua: the expected punishment
to the bureaucrat must be lower than the net gain (R−Ua) to the agent. The result is quite intuitive: if
there is a stringent punishment or higher probability of being caught, both the bureaucrat and agents are
not incentivized towards corruption. On the contrary, more bribery occurs if there are agents with a higher
valuation of time or very low scruples, thus increasing the incentives to be corrupt. Indeed, Hunt (2007);
Mocan (2008) and Svensson (2003) presented empirical evidence indicating that those who have higher
income, have a higher valuation of time and therefore tend to demand quicker services. These findings
are consistent with the claim that bribe payment increases with income. In addition, the net benefit from
reduced bureaucracy to agents may be greater in society with a higher incidence of corruption in which
there is a general level of low aversion to dishonesty (Ua’s) compared to environments where corruption
is less widespread (Miller, 2006; Mishra, 2006). In this case, all agents will further be inclined towards
corruption.
In this benchmark case, we assume that the bureaucrat can observe the agent’s aversion to dishonesty
Ua and valuation of time R. The bureaucrat maximizes his utility (equation 4.2) by picking the largest
bribe conditional on the agents choosing to bribe, taking advantage of his first-mover opportunity. In
other words, the equilbrium bribe is:
B∗ = E +R−Ua (4.5)
The bureaucrat extracts a larger bribe if the agent has lower Ua, the more valuable to the agent is the
service he’s offering (R), the higher is the effort that the bureaucrat exerts (E), which also represents the
agent’s utility for “normal” delivery of the public service. Substituting equation (4.5) into (4.2), we obtain
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the bureaucrat’s second-stage utility conditional on bribery occurring:
R−Ua−δF (4.6)
This is independent of E, as the bribe fully compensates for it.
While opting to solicit for a bribe, the bureaucrat will have to compare the total utility from honest
behaviour (as in 4.1) with the sum of second stage utility from angling for a bribe (equation 4.6) and
zero utility from shirking in the first stage. The bureaucrat chooses honest behaviour if: 2(Ub−E) >
R−Ua−δF , that is:




The bureaucrat opts for honesty if he has high Ub, and decide to seek for a bribe if the effort of normal
delivery is high or the agent’s opportunity cost of time is high compared to the agent’s scruples (i.e. high
R−Ua) or the punishment is weak. When δF > R−Ua, either the bureaucrat or agent do not want to
accept bribery as the expected punishment from engaging in corruption is higher compared to the one
under honest behaviour. He will, therefore, choose honesty if Ub > E.
We can summarize the results in this scenario in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Equilibrium with fixed penalty for corrupt bureaucrats under complete information.
The bureaucrat solicits for a bribe if: Ub < E +
R−Ua−δF
2 and behaves honestly otherwise.
No agent is willing to pay a bribe if: R <Ua+δF.
In equilibrium, the optimal level of the bribe B is:
B∗ = E +R−Ua
Equilibrium outcome under incomplete information
Our previous analysis relies on the assumption that the bureaucrat knows the agent’s aversion to dishonesty
Ua and opportunity cost of time or willingness to pay R. It is indeed possible that the bureaucrat knows R,
as he may be able to judge from the agent’s address or appearance. On the other hand, it is implausible
that the bureaucrats can judge the agent’s aversion to dishonesty Ua.
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Following Hunt and Laszlo (2005), we assume that Ua is uniformly distributed along the interval[
Ua,Ua
]
. The distribution is common knowledge, but its realization is private information to the agent.
Suppose the bureaucrat chooses to angle for a bribe, equation (4.4) implies that agent pays if Ua <
E +R−B, from which we can calculate the probability π that the agent accepts to pay the bribe:
π = P(Ua < E +R−B) = E +R−B−UaUa−Ua
(4.8)
The bureaucrat chooses to ask for a bribe B by maximizing his expected utility π(B−E−δF). Taking
the first order condition (and concentrating for the time being on interior solutions), we can define the
optimal level of bribe as:




The result is quite intuitive. A bureaucrats angles for a larger bribe the greater is the effort required to do
his job diligently (E), the costlier is shirking to the agent (R−Ua), and if the largest is the probability of
detection (δ ) and the fixed fine (F) is large, as the bribe income will have to compensate for the higher
risks.6 By substituting (4.9) into (4.8), it can easily be seen that the equilibrium probability of agents







Thus, if the punishment technology becomes stricter, a smaller proportion of people with larger opportunity
cost of time R would engage in bribing, and the bribe larger. We can also calculate the bureaucrat’s






Comparing (4.11) and (4.1), the bureaucrat chooses honesty over asking for bribe if






6This can be more taxing on agents with low ability to pay since an increase in the expected punishment by a unit, would
translate into an increase in the amount of bribe by δF for everyone on an average.
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The official chooses honesty if he has high scruples Ub, and if the expected punishment δF is high.
He is also likely to ask for a bribe if efforts E is high, or the net benefit for the agent with the least scruples
(R−Ua) is high.
We must also consider the corner solutions. If the agents opportunity cost of time is very small
(R < Ua+δF), bribery will not occur (π∗ = 0) because either agents with low R will not find it convenient
to pay a costly bribe, or the bureaucrat is not asking for a bribe as the amount agents are willing to pay
does not repay for the potential risk of punishment. If R is instead very large (R > 2Ua−Ua + δF),
bribery will occur independently of the agent’s scruple (π∗ = 1), and the outcome will be identical to the
full information case described in the previous section. These results can be summed up in the following
Proposition:
Proposition 2. Equilibrium with fixed penalty for corrupt bureaucrats. The bureaucrat angles for bribe





and behaves honestly otherwise.
No agent is willing to pay a bribe if: R < Ua+δF.






for R ∈ [Ua+δF,2Ua−Ua+δF ]
E +R−Ua for R > 2Ua−Ua+δF
4.3.2 Scenario II: Fixed punishment for both bureaucrat and agent
The analysis above relies on the assumption that only corrupt bureaucrats are punished when caught
soliciting for a bribe. In many countries, both offering and taking bribes are considered illegal, and both
agents and bureaucrats may be prosecuted for engaging in corrupt transactions. Thus, it is plausible to
consider a set-up where agent’s decision to bribe can be altered by a punishment system with a common
probability of detection δ , and fixed fines for both bureaucrat (Fb) and agent (Fa).7
As in the baseline case, the bureaucrat will choose the largest bribe possible, conditional on the agent
accepting it, i.e.: B∗ = E +R−Ua−δFa. The bureaucrat internalizes the punishment for the agents, and
hence the optimal level of bribe becomes cheaper for everyone. The utility of the bureaucrat in the second
7We assume that Fb > Fa, which is a reasonable assumption since the bureaucrat could also face a disciplinary action from
his superiors.
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stage is, therefore:
R−Ua−δFa−δFb (4.13)
Note that the above expression does not depend on the bureaucrat’s effort, as the bribe requested will
fully compensate it. The decision of the bureaucrat on whether to angle for a bribe or not depends on
comparing the honesty pay-off with the utility from engaging in bribery. The bureaucrat will behave
honestly if 2(Ub−E)> R−Ua−δFa−δFb, i.e.:




The bureaucrat chooses honesty if he has high moral scruples (Ub), and decide to angle for a bribe if the
net benefit from having reduced bureaucracy is high (i.e. high R−Ua) or effort of standard delivery (E) is
high. If δ (Fa+Fb)> R−Ua, the agent or bureaucrat will not be incentivized towards bribery because the
punishment pay-off to both is higher compared to the expected gain from corruption. In that case, the
bureaucrat will prefer honesty if Ub > E.
These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Equilibrium with fixed penalty for corrupt bureaucrats and agent under complete
information. The bureaucrat solicits for a bribe if: Ub < E+ R−Ua−δFa−δFb2 and choose honesty otherwise.
No agent is willing to pay a bribe if: R <Ua+δ (Fa+Fb).
In equilibrium, the optimal level of the bribe B is:
B∗ = E +R−Ua−δFa
One consequence we can draw from this result is that bribes are negatively related not only to the honesty
of agents (which may not be readily affected by policy makers) but also to the punishment imposed on
agents.
Equilibrium outcome under incomplete information
We now expand on the previous section analysing the equilibrium in case agents are heterogeneous in
their honesty Ua, as we did for Scenario I. In this case, the probability of bribing by the agent (π) is given
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by:
π = P(Ua < E +R−B−δFa) = E +R−B−Ua−δFaUa−Ua
(4.15)
Conditional on the bureaucrat angling for bribe (and concentrating for the time being on the interior
solution), the optimal bribe becomes:




The result is comparable to equation (4.9), with the added feature that the optimal bribe level is also
decreasing in the punishment for the agents Fa: an anti-corruption policy, which seeks to punish clients for
paying bribes lowers the optimal bribe level, making bribery cheaper for everyone. Combining equations













we can derive the condition under which the bureaucrat chooses honesty over asking for a bribe:






The bureaucrat chooses honesty over angling for a bribe if he has high Ub, and if the punishment system
δ (Fa+Fb) is strict. On the other hand, he is likely to ask for a bribe if efforts of normal delivery of
service E is high, or the surplus available for the agent with the least scruples, i.e. (R−Ua) is high. When
the agent’s opportunity cost of time is very low (R < Ua+δ (Fa+Fb)), no bribery happens, while when
it is very high (R > 2Ua−Ua + δFa + δFb), all agents irrespective of their scruples Ua will accept to
pay a bribe as in the complete information case These results can be formulated through the following
Proposition:
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Proposition 4. Equilibrium with fixed penalty for corrupt bureaucrats and agent. The official angles





and behaves honestly otherwise.
No agent is willing to pay a bribe if: R < Ua+δ (Fa+Fb).






for R ∈ [Ua+δ (Fa+Fb),2Ua−Ua+δFa+δFb]
E +R−Ua−δFa for R > 2Ua−Ua+δFa+δFb
From the above proposition, notice that as long as Fb > Fa, ∂B∂Fb > 0 and
∂B
∂Fa < 0; i.e. the bureaucrat
who risks fiercer punishment will ask for more expensive bribes, thus decreasing the proportion of agents
engaging in bribing.
4.3.3 Scenario III: Proportional punishment
In the above analysis, we assume that the expected punishment to the bureaucrat is fixed and independent
of the bribe paid. In reality, bureaucrats who are successful in extracting bribes may need to hide their
illicit wealth from the public or altering their consumption patterns to avoid detection. In so doing, a
corrupt bureaucrat would typically incur some private costs, which are larger, the larger is the amount of
bribe.8 Similarly, often the punishment being inflicted on a corrupt bureaucrat is not fixed but depends on
the bribe itself. To encompass these occurrences, as a first approximation, we model these costs as linearly
dependent on the bribe and also encompassing the expected cost of punishment. The bureaucrat’s expected
utility under bribery becomes: B−E−αB, where αB is the cost (in expectation) to the bureaucrat of
concealing illicit income received from corruption plus punishment. The bureaucrat, therefore, prefers
bribery if bribe yields higher returns than the disutility of effort E, or the probability of detection α is
lower or the total cost of concealing illicit wealth is small, i.e.:
B > E +αB (4.20)
8Intuitively, the larger the size of bribe one gets, the more visible it is to the public or government, so more resources
would be needed to conceal it.
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Both bureaucrat and private agent prefer bribery when αB < R−Ua. This means that the expected cost,
to the bureaucrat, of hiding illicit wealth must be lower than the net gain to the agent from having reduced
bureaucracy.
Conditional on the agent choosing to bribe, the bureaucrat will ask for a bribe in this scenario if it
is similar to the amount shown in equation (4.5). By substituting equation (4.5) into the bureaucrat’s
expected utility under bribery, we can write his second stage as:
(R−Ua)−α(E +R−Ua) (4.21)
Where α(E +R−Ua) is the cost of concealing bribe income. Therefore, his decision on whether or not
to solicit for bribe will depend on the total utility he gets from honesty (i.e. equation (4.1)) compared to











The bureaucrat chooses honesty if he has high scuples Ub, and decide to solicit for a bribe if the normal
effort of being honest is high or the agent’s gain is high compared to her scruples (i.e. high R−Ua) or if
the cost of concealing corrupt proceeds is small.
These results can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Equilibrium with proportional penalty for corrupt bureaucrats under complete infor-
mation. The bureaucrat solicits for a bribe if: Ub < (1− α2 )E + (1−α)2 (R−Ua) and behaves honestly
otherwise.
No agent is willing to pay a bribe if: R−Ua < αE1−α .
In equilibrium, value of the bribe B is:
B∗ = E +R−Ua
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Equilibrium outcome under incomplete information
Expanding these results to the incomplete information case, we can calculate the bureaucrat’s expected







And find the optimal level of bribe (concentrating for the time being on the interior solution) as:










that rewards the bureaucrat proportionally to his effort, and increasing in the surplus available for agents
with the least scruples (R−Ua).
Combining equations (4.8) and (4.24), one can see that the fraction of agent willing to pay bribe















and derive the condition under which the bureaucrat chooses honest behaviour over asking for a bribe:








The official is likely to choose honesty over asking for a bribe if he has high Ub. On the other hand, he is
likely to ask for a bribe if efforts of standard delivery (E) is high, or the net surplus for the agent with the
least scruples, i.e. (R−Ua) is high.
As usual, we need to remind ourselves that agents with very low opportunity cost of time (R <
Ua+
αE
1−α ) will not want to bribe, and agents with very high opportunity cost of time (R> 2Ua−Ua+ αE1−α )
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will always be willing to pay the bribe exactly as in the complete information case (B∗ = E +R−Ua).
Combining these results, we define Proposition 6 below:
Proposition 6. Equilibrium with proportional punishment for corrupt bureaucrats. The bureaucrat





and behaves honestly otherwise.
No agent is willing to pay a bribe if: R−Ua < αE1−α .













E +R−Ua for R > 2Ua−Ua+ αE1−α
Looking at propositions (5) and (6), we can see how in this scenario the “normal” level of effort E is
over-compensated by the bribe. Thus, the agent will have to trade-off the potential benefit from having
reduced bureaucracy against the expected cost of punishment. And the more valuable is the public service
to the agent, the larger is the amount of bribe she will have to pay to compensate for the bureaucrat’s
effort. However, if E is small or close to zero, bribing is cheap relative to the potential benefit of having
reduced bureaucracy (i.e. R−Ua), so everyone will be incentivized towards bribing.
4.4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter, we have evaluated how different punishment mechanisms may lead to different outcomes
in terms of bribe levels. First, harsher punishments for corrupt bureaucrats are effective in decreasing the
spread of corruption. Second, as the equilibrium level of bribe payment has to compensate for the risk
of detection, bribing becomes more expensive (and therefore less widespread) as punishment become
harsher. Indeed, from Proposition 2, it can be seen that, in some circumstances, if expected penalty is low
to start with, a rise in the probability of detection δ or an increase in the fixed fine F will imply a larger
bribe size for everyone on an average.9
Introducing a (fixed) punishment for the agent, bribery becomes cheaper for everyone, as this decreases
the expected value of the favourable treatment under corruption. So, to reduce the incidence of bribery,
the expected punishment to the agent must be large enough to offset the value of the public service.
More generally, if the punishment to the agent is large relative to the potential benefit of having reduced
9This result echoes the analysis by Mookherjee and Png (1995) in an environment with pollution enforcements.
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bureaucracy, the agent does not have the incentive to bribe, and the only possible outcome is for the
bureaucrat to behave honestly. However, as long as the bureaucrat’s punishment is larger than the agent’s
(Fb > Fa), bribery survives under the incomplete information case and is increasing in equilibrium. But,
the proportion of agent willing to engage in bribing decreases, because the extra punishment reduces the
possibility of the indifferent agent accepting to bribe.
When the expected cost of punishment is modelled as proportional to the bribe itself, the effort of
delivery or usefulness of the public service plays a more significant role, affecting both the incidence and
optimal level of bribery. Our analysis shows that the bureaucrat will be incentivized towards bribery if, and
only if, the bribe income is sufficiently large to cover the expected costs of punishment and/or concealing
illicit wealth. However, as long as the agent is willing to bribe, the optimal level of the bribe under
complete information, stays constant at E +R−Ua. In the incomplete information case, the bribe size
must incorporate an extra compensation for the effort of the bureaucrat. If delivery of the public service
requires less effort, the optimal bribe level in equilibrium rises linearly in R−Ua. On the other hand, if
much effort is needed to deliver the public service, the bureaucrat gets a bribe that over-compensate him
for his efforts. This decreases substantially the proportion of agents engaging in bribing.
To interpret the policy implications of our results, it is essential to analyse the conditions under which
bribing may occur, and how these affect willingness to pay and inequality. For the purpose of comparisons,
we look into how results change at the variation of two agent’s parameters: R and Ua. The first is the
agent’s willingness to pay which, depending on the context, could signal her wealth or valuation of the
public service or opportunity cost of time. The second is the agent’s aversion to dishonesty, which possibly
could depend on the extent of corruption in the society. Below, we first summarize the contexts in which
bribery might occur, then we discuss how a change in the punishment mechanism affect both welfare
determination and equilibrium outcomes.
First, in some circumstances, bribery occurs either when agent’s net valuation of the public service is
large enough to offset the expected punishment of engaging in corrupt deals (i.e. R−Ua ≥ δF) or when
there is a general level of low aversion to dishonesty (Ua ≤ R+δF).10 As the expected punishment to the
bureaucrat increases, the proportion of agents bribing decreases, as more bribe is required to incentivize
the bureaucrat towards bribery. In this case, only agents with larger opportunity cost of time would engage
in bribing, so the change in bribe size is simply a reallocation of surplus between wealthy agents and
bureaucrat. However, where bribery is pervasive or if there is a general level of dishonesty, a fixed penalty
10This condition also holds when there is a fixed penalty for both the agent and bureaucrat.
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to the bureaucrat can be more taxing on agents with low R, since an increase in the expected punishment
would translate into an increase in the amount of bribe for everyone on the average.
Second, although, a fixed penalty to both bureaucrat and agent reduces the equilibrium level of bribe
under the complete information scenario, it might not be desirable unless it eliminates bribery. Suppose,
the penalty to the agent is large enough so that δFa ≥ E +R, the extent to which the elimination of
bribery improves welfare depends on the honesty (Ub) of the bureaucrat to deliver the public service in an
uncorrupted transaction and the utility of the agent outside bribery Ua. Under the incomplete information
case, however, if Fb > Fa, the impact of a fixed punishment to both players on welfare is indeterminate:
while a larger proportion of agents are not incentivized towards bribery, the marginally bribing agent
becomes richer.
Furthermore, the effects of a proportional punishment on the optimal level of bribe depend on how
much effort is required to deliver the public service. In this setting, agents are willing to bribe if the net
returns from bribing weakly exceed the expected cost of compensating the bureaucrat for his effort (i.e.
R−Ua ≥ αE1−α ). Where the delivery of the public service requires much effort or is much valuable to the
agent, the bribe is so expensive that only agent with a larger opportunity cost of time or willingness to pay
would engage in it.
Finally, one important caveat is that our analysis is limited to a particular type of bureaucratic
corruption in which government officials responsible for delivering public services to citizens can impose
red tape as a means to extract bribes. Indeed, while there are several other ways to extend the analytical
framework, we believe that our main conclusions are not likely to be affected in significant ways.
Nonetheless, we hope the following posers will stimulate further theoretical analysis: how would the
analysis fare if we consider a more complex form of corruption, such as grand thefts, in which a senior
government official or politician can use his influence to secure a construction project to unqualified
private companies in order to receive kickbacks? What would happen if the agent can engage in whistle-
blowing as suggested by Basu (2011) or if agents who are ineligible for the public service offer to pay a




This thesis provides an insight into the issues surrounding the political economy of development in
Nigeria through the lens of an applied economist. In particular, the research presented in Chapters 2
and 3 asked two overarching questions: (1) can politicians manipulate the distribution of resources to
buy political support? And (2) how much does changes in the distribution of rainfall between groups
contributes to rising armed conflict prevalence in Nigeria? Chapter 4 shifts the focus away from resource
distribution, inequality and conflict towards measures to address the endemic culture of corruption in
developing countries. Specifically, the chapter presents a theoretical model that looks into how different
punishment mechanisms may result in different outcomes in terms of bribe levels and willingness to pay.
The following paragraphs briefly summarise the main findings of each chapter and also outline the policy
implications, with the aim that this will help developmental efforts in Nigeria and also set a path for
further research.
Chapter 2 provides a first attempt to investigate how much the centralised rule-based transfer system
in Nigeria can be manipulated to effectively buy political support. Using oil windfalls as a source of
exogenous variation in the political discretion the central government can exert in rule-based transfers, I
show that a 10% increase in VAT transfers from the central government to the states improves the electoral
fortune of the incumbent government in the Presidential election by 49.31 percent. While the study was
unable to demonstrate directly manipulative behaviour, the result suggests an indirect channel in which
oil-induced variations in transfers do not translate to investments in public good provisions but increased
support for the incumbent only when the governors are aligned to the President’s party. This gives support
to a mechanism in which large increases in natural resource rents increase political power and the ability
to buy votes (Robinson et al., 2014).
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The study has some interesting implications. First, a rule-based transfer system in which the central
government determines the distributable pool obscurely incentivizes patronage politics. Indeed, the dearth
of data on social development factors and the lack of transparency in the data revision process might
have strengthened the process for political manipulation of VAT transfers in Nigeria. To that purpose,
institutional and political reforms, which should aim at enhancing transparency in the data updating and
review process, are urgently needed to contain the adversarial element of clientelistic and ethnic networks
demanding for a restructure of the federal systems. Second, the use of transfers to buy electoral support
diminishes the ability of the state government to provide local public goods and creates a clientelistic
setting where governors who are aligned with the incumbent President can be rewarded for their support.
The way that the direct redistribution of oil windfalls to citizens, as proposed, e.g. by Moss et al. (2015)
under an oil-to-cash scheme, may reduce such perverse effects remains largely unanswered. Finally, this
analysis underlines the need for an extensive dataset that would allow researchers interested in this subject
to assess further the precise channel(s) through which centralised rule-based transfers may be manipulated
to buy political support.
Chapter 3 study the relationship between changes in the distribution of rainfall among ethnic groups
living within the same state and armed conflict prevalence. The main results show that a one standard
deviation change in between-group rainfall inequality during the growing season increases the risks of civil
conflicts in Nigeria by about seven percentage points. In addition, I show that the dynamics are not much
different between civil and communal conflicts, which involves farmers and pastoralists communities. In
the second part of the chapter, I investigate the transmission channels underlying the observed relationship.
The result suggests a mechanism in which climatic-induced shocks reinforce citizen’s grievances over
government handling of the economy and creates mistrust between predominantly farming communities
and those engaged in nomadic herding. An important limitation of the analysis, however, is that the study
was unable to adequately isolate how economic factors, such as climate-induced resource scarcity, may
contribute to intensify conflict risks. Instead, it focus on the social capital channel potentially linking
inequality to conflict.
Nonetheless, the empirical results presented in chapter 3 underscores the importance of developing
conflict-sensitive mitigation and adaptation strategies to reduce the adverse effects of climatic shocks.
In particular, initiatives aimed at reducing Nigeria’s frequent farmer-herder violence should focus on
strengthening traditional conflict mediation and reconciliation mechanisms, and addressing environmental
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issues that push nomadic pastoralists to migrate towards the south for water and pastures. Also, while the
results do present an empirical evidence of how changes in the distribution of rainfall between ethnic group
increase the risk of conflicts, the analysis is limited in predicting future risks relating to how increased
frequency and intensity of weather shocks would affect inequality and ability to mitigate competition over
resources. Certainly, this will be a path for further research, if there exists an extensive and quality dataset
that can allow for a robust empirical analysis.
Chapter 4 evaluated how different punishment mechanisms may affect the equilibrium value of bribes
and the proportion of people engaging in bribery. I show that harsher punishments for corrupt bureaucrats
would generally cause an increase in bribe size, making bribing more expensive (and therefore less
widespread). However, the effects of a switch from a fixed punishment mechanism to a proportional
one, which varies with the amount of bribe, depends on how much effort is required to deliver the public
service. When effort of “normal” delivery is large, or the service is highly valuable to the client, the bribe
level in equilibrium more than compensates the bureaucrat for his effort, and is also increasing in the net
surplus available for the client with the least scruples. I also discuss how the results affects willingness to
pay, and hence inequality.
The model has some important policy implications: if agent’s opportunity cost of time is sufficiently
low, stricter punishments to the bureaucrat can be effective in reducing the spread of corruption. However,
in countries where bribery is pervasive or there is a general level of dishonesty, a fixed fine to the
bureaucrat can be more taxing on the poor, as a rise in the expected punishment would imply an increase
in the amount of bribe for everyone on the average. When this is the case, a punishment mechanism that
impose a penalty on agents might further worsen the situation, especially if the penalty is lower than the
fine on bureaucrats. An important caveat to borne in mind is that the analysis is limited to a particular
type of bureaucratic corruption in which government officials responsible for delivering public services to
citizens can impose red tape as a means to extract bribes. Thus, it is useful to consider how the results
might translate in regard to more complex forms of corruption such as grand thefts or political corruption.
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Table A 2.1. Description of variables    
Variables Description Source   
     
Percent vote 
shares 
This is the percentage of valid votes scored by the party of the 
incumbent (central) government at the Presidential elections 
Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) 
  
     
Num. of votes This is the absolute number of valid votes scored by the party of 
the incumbent (central) government in the presidential 
elections 
INEC   
     
Vote margin This is the difference in the number of valid votes scored by the 
party of the incumbent (central) government and the leading 
opponent at the Presidential elections 
INEC   
     
Alignment An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the central and 
state governments belong to the same political party on the 
30th of the previous month, and there is no emergency rule in 
the state as at that date. 
Constructed from INEC data and various Newspaper 
publications relating to party affiliations of states 
     
Swing An indicator variable that takes the value of one if the winning 
margin (i.e. the difference between the percentage votes share 
of the two political parties that secure the highest number of 
votes in a state) is less than or equal to 10 percent. 
Constructed from Election data 
provided by INEC 
  
     
Co-ethnic and 
religion  
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for states where 
at least 50% of the population has the same ethnic affiliation 
and religion as the incumbent President. 
Constructed from INEC data and various Newspaper 
publications relating to Profile of Presidential 
candidates 
     
Population  The estimated total number of persons inhabiting a state at any 
given period  
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)   
     
Nightlight High resolution data on light density measured by satellites at 
nights 
 U.S. Air Force's Defense Meteorological Satellite 
Program/Operational Linescan System (DMSP/OLS) 
     
Climatic 
anomalies 
The deviation of rainfall and temperature from their long term 
quarterly mean (defined from 1950) divided by their long-term 
quarterly standard deviations.  
University of East Anglia Climatic Research 
Unit (UEA-CRU) 
 
     
Primary 
enrolment  
The total number of pupils of official primary school age who are 
enrolled in primary education  
NBS   
     
Secondary 
enrolment  
The total enrolment in secondary education, regardless of age NBS   
     
Violence Altercation, where force is used between one or more politically 
organised groups at a particular time and location 
Armed Conflict Location and Event 
Dataset (ACLED) 
  
     
VAT transfers VAT transfers account for 15 percent of total (net) federal 
allocations to states. Transfers from the VAT pool is based on 
equality, population, and relative state contributions to VAT 
revenues 
Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF)   
     
Gross statutory 
transfers 
This is the main component of the Federal Allocations, 
determined strictly according to the horizontal allocation 
formula. Gross statutory transfers accounts for (about) 75 
percent of total federal allocations to states 
FMF   
     
Net transfers this is gross statutory allocation plus 13% derivation for oil 
producing states less contractual obligations of states 
FMF   
     
Oil price index This index is constructed by multiplying the production value at 
the state level in 2003 with the international oil price 
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).    
Source: INEC, NBS, DMSP/OLS, UEA-CRU, ACLED, FMF, and FRED    
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Table A 2.2. VAT Transfers and Oil Windfalls (First Stage Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Log VAT Transfers
Oil windfalls 0.189*** 0.196*** 0.206*** 0.199*** 0.208*** 0.208***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Alignment -0.046** -0.047** -0.048** -0.048**
(0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Swing 0.027* 0.024 0.025 0.025
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Co-ethnic 0.022 0.033 0.034
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Religion 0.001 0.006 0.006
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Population 0.040 -0.007 -0.004
(0.068) (0.067) (0.089)
Primary enrolment 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Secondary enrolment 0.028 0.028* 0.028*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Violence -0.008 -0.006 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Temperature Anomalies -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.007) (0.007)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarterly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 18.22 16.25 17.75 14.78 17.18 17.20
Number of States 36 36 36 36 36 36
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
All variables (except alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion) are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.3. Election Outcome and VAT Transfers (Second Stage Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Vote Margin
Pred. Transfer 6.423** 6.011** 4.476** 5.660*** 4.847** 4.931*
(2.935) (2.504) (1.722) (1.799) (1.876) (2.455)
Alignment 0.423 0.255 0.171 0.327
(0.644) (0.340) (0.336) (0.374)
Swing -1.106*** -1.239*** -1.216*** -1.262***
(0.329) (0.362) (0.353) (0.364)
Co-ethnic -0.572 -0.767 -1.073**
(0.340) (0.495) (0.459)
Religion -9.945*** -9.421*** 3.046
(2.907) (2.972) (1.890)
Population 14.856*** 15.520*** 12.326***
(0.000) (0.000) (4.262)
Primary enrolment -0.239 -0.158 -0.067
(0.245) (0.281) (0.275)
Secondary enrolment -0.029 -0.049 0.120
(0.136) (0.149) (0.210)
Violence -0.023 -0.068 0.030
(0.122) (0.156) (0.151)
Temperature Anomalies 0.192 0.253
(0.165) (0.159)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108
Adj. R-squared 0.337 0.535 0.654 0.736 0.737 0.788
Number of States 36 36 36 36 36 36
Notes: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses using wild-bootstrapping as proposed by Cameron et al.
(2008).
All variables (except percentage of votes share, alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion) are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.4. Election Outcome and VAT Transfers (OLS Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable Vote margin
VAT transfers -0.191 -0.022 0.158 0.205 0.315 0.273 0.400
(0.173) (0.463) (0.361) (0.527) (0.659) (0.972) (0.782)
Alignment 0.266 -0.033 -0.089 0.073
(0.548) (0.395) (0.365) (0.412)
Swing -1.055*** -1.175*** -1.125*** -1.172***
(0.323) (0.299) (0.283) (0.318)
Co-ethnic -0.155 -0.270 -0.582
(0.303) (0.470) (0.465)
Religion -6.065*** -5.357** -2.773
(2.173) (2.308) (2.591)
Population 14.749*** 14.674*** 11.589**
(3.651) (3.863) (4.160)
Primary enrolment -0.152 -0.054 0.023
(0.342) (0.363) (0.301)
Secondary enrolment -0.031 -0.024 0.143
(0.247) (0.242) (0.250)
Violence -0.026 -0.076 0.019
(0.183) (0.208) (0.203)
Temperature Anomalies 0.045 0.110
(0.178) (0.164)
Rainfall anomalies 0.244 0.208
(0.143) (0.153)
Nightlights 3.371*
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108 108
R-squared 0.019 0.552 0.552 0.717 0.764 0.781 0.783
Number of States 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
All variables (except percentage of votes share, alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion) are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.5. Election Outcome and Oil Windfalls (Reduced Form)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Vote margin
Oil windfalls 1.177** 0.922** 1.041** 1.126** 1.009* 1.027*
(0.561) (0.396) (0.438) (0.464) (0.549) (0.576)
Alignment 0.215 0.250 -0.010 -0.061 0.091
(0.497) (0.456) (0.331) (0.308) (0.347)
Swing -0.987*** -0.979*** -1.106*** -1.097*** -1.140***
(0.305) (0.307) (0.236) (0.244) (0.261)
Co-ethnic -0.208 -0.449 -0.605 -0.908*
(0.390) (0.340) (0.507) (0.480)
Religion -2.737 -9.939*** -9.392** -6.816*
(2.059) (2.631) (3.412) (3.644)
Population 15.084*** 15.484*** 12.307***
(3.416) (3.713) (4.119)
Primary enrolment -0.216 -0.145 -0.055
(0.281) (0.293) (0.277)
Secondary enrolment 0.130 0.088 0.260
(0.235) (0.234) (0.232)
Violence -0.067 -0.096 0.001
(0.165) (0.184) (0.179)
Temperature Anomalies 0.099 0.158
(0.153) (0.145)
Rainfall anomalies 0.144 0.109
(0.136) (0.147)
Nightlights 3.361*
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108
R-squared 0.572 0.730 0.739 0.772 0.785 0.787
Number of States 36 36 36 36 36 36
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
All variables (except percentage of votes share, alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion) are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.6. Election Outcome and VAT Transfers (Second Stage Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable Vote margin
Swing States Non-swing States
Pred. Transfer 10.836** 7.549* 8.581* 10.257 3.302* 1.544** 1.794** 0.242**
(4.411) (4.579) (5.208) (7.820) (1.718) (0.720) (0.866) (0.116)
Alignment 0.583 0.362 0.192 0.356 0.212 0.268 0.222 0.208
(0.867) (0.380) (0.309) (0.304) (0.154) (0.258) (0.245) (0.226)
Swing -0.521 -0.309 -0.433* -0.260 -1.499*** -1.443*** -1.361*** -1.258***
(0.346) (0.631) (0.233) (0.232) (0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029)
Co-ethnic -0.175* -0.163* -0.165* 0.046 0.064 0.065
(0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057)
Religion 0.049* 0.051* 0.050* -0.013 -0.009 -0.009
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Population -0.006 -0.032 -0.290 3.217 2.196 2.342
(0.113) (0.108) (0.192) (3.187) (2.948) (2.891)
Primary enrolment 0.015 0.014 0.019 0.013 0.007 0.007
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039)
Secondary enrolment 0.054 0.055 0.058 0.043 0.045 0.044
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
Temperature Anomalies 0.211 -0.015 -0.016* 0.219*** 0.229*** 0.201***
(0.179) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Rainfall anomalies 0.537 0.007 0.008 -0.018 0.006 0.006
(0.460) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005)
Violence 0.011 0.011 0.000 0.000
(0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009)
Nightlights 0.165* -0.038
(0.082) (0.059)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 42 42 42 42 66 66 66 66
Adj. R-squared 0.293 0.307 0.348 0.359 0.511 0.636 0.682 0.704
Number of States 14 14 14 14 22 22 22 22
Notes: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses using wild-bootstrapping as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008).
All variables (except alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion) are in log form.










Table A 2.7. Election Outcome and VAT Transfers (Second Stage Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable Vote margin
Align States Non-align States
Pred. Transfer 3.539*** 2.574** 2.284* 2.285* 16.891 12.328 12.217 10.871
(1.221) (1.237) (1.356) (1.340) (15.040) (12.327) (9.649) (8.298)
Co-Ethnic 0.149 0.046 0.046 -0.193 -0.226 -0.234
(0.104) (0.075) (0.077) (0.157) (0.170) (0.163)
Religion -2.171*** -1.752* -0.793 -2.074*** -0.703 -0.994
(0.728) (0.926) (0.566) (0.724) (0.536) (1.126)
Population 1.039 1.111 1.356 -3.971 -1.376 -1.618
(1.106) (1.147) (1.471) (2.694) (1.501) (1.580)
Primary enrolment -0.357* -0.333 -0.337 -0.171 -0.102 -0.100
(0.194) (0.289) (0.289) (0.369) (1.019) (0.309)
Secondary enrolment -0.052 -0.066 -0.071 -0.036 -0.166 -0.262
(0.146) (0.151) (0.147) (0.308) (0.206) (0.149)
Temperature Anomalies 0.142** 0.128** 0.128*** 0.406 0.392 0.367
(0.057) (0.053) (0.047) (0.341) (0.301) (0.319)
Rainfall anomalies 0.072 0.056* 0.055 -0.005 0.058* 0.058*
(0.036) (0.032) (0.033) (0.020) (0.031) (0.033)
Violence 0.000 0.002 0.010 0.027
(0.019) (0.051) (0.069) (0.704)
Nightlights 0.090 0.496
(0.358) ((0.309))
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 69 69 69 69 39 39 39 39
Adj. R-squared 0.692 0.712 0.713 0.717 0.215 0.391 0.421 0.378
Number of States 23 23 23 23 13 13 13 13
Notes: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses using wild-bootstrapping as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008).
All variables (except alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion) are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.8. VAT Transfers and Oil Windfalls (First Stage Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable Log VAT Transfers
Swing States Non-swing States
Oil windfalls 0.181*** 0.189*** 0.192*** 0.186*** 0.201*** 0.173*** 0.163*** 0.163***
(0.038) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
Co-ethnic -0.154* -0.153* -0.155* 0.184*** 0.181*** 0.183***
(0.083) (0.084) (0.085) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048)
Religion 0.052* 0.053* 0.051* -0.080* -0.078* -0.078*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
Population -0.060 -0.083 -0.384 0.762 0.562 0.572
(0.115) (0.129) (0.228) (0.857) (0.984) (1.000)
Primary enrolment 0.012 0.012 0.018 -0.024 -0.023 -0.019
(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Secondary enrolment 0.043 0.042 0.047 0.013 0.015 0.014
(0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Temperature Anomalies -0.016 -0.017* -0.017* -0.016* -0.017* -0.017*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009 (0.009) (0.009)
Rainfall anomalies 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Violence 0.010 0.016 0.000 0.002
(0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009)
Nightlights -0.125** 0.031
(0.056) (0.024)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 448 448 448 448 704 704 704 704
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 5.85 4.36 4.48 4.92 11.54 8.27 8.68 8.70
Number of States 14 14 14 14 22 22 22 22
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
All variables (except alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion) are in log form.










Table A 2.9. VAT Transfers and Oil Windfalls (First Stage Results)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable Log VAT Transfers
Align States Non-align States
Oil windfalls 0.226*** 0.230*** 0.231*** 0.231*** 0.128*** 0.126*** 0.122*** 0.121***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Co-ethnic 0.070 0.070 0.070 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.067) (0.069) (0.069)
Religion -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 0.022 0.019 0.019
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Population 1.965 1.967 2.042 -0.031 -0.010 -0.081
(3.045) (3.058) (3.036) (0.052) (0.049) (0.076)
Primary enrolment 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Secondary enrolment 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.009* 0.013** 0.014**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Temperature Anomalies -0.023** -0.023** -0.023** -0.010 -0.009 -0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Rainfall anomalies 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009* 0.009* 0.009*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Violence 0.010 0.009 -0.010 -0.011
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Nightlights -0.029 -0.017
(0.050) (0.030)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 736 736 736 736 416 416 416 416
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 15.33 12.77 15.99 16.00 5.25 5.79 4.36 4.45
Number of States 23 23 23 23 13 13 13 13
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
All variables (except alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion) are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.10. Exclusion Restriction: Oil windfalls and Nightlights (full sample)
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (6)
Dep. var. Log nightlights
Oil windfalls -0.078 -0.070 -0.036 0.009
(0.066) (0.063) (0.055) (0.052)
Rainfall anomalies -0.025 -0.015 -0.014
(0.024) (0.025) (0.014)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes
Observations 792 792 454 454
R-squared 0.736 0.739 0.694 0.711
Panel B
Dep. var. Log nightlights
Oil windfalls (t-1) -0.073 -0.064 -0.036 0.009
(0.067) (0.063) (0.054) (0.045)
Oil windfalls 0.008
(0.046)
Rainfall anomalies -0.024 -0.015 -0.014
(0.024) (0.025) (0.014)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes
Observations 792 792 454 454
R-squared 0.735 0.738 0.694 0.711
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. The
same regressions are estimated in both panels. All variables are in log form.
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Table A 2.11. Exclusion Restriction: Oil windfalls and Nightlights (period of study only)
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (6)
Dep. var. Log nightlights
Oil windfalls 0.068 0.039 0.048 -0.009
(0.139) (0.167) (0.175) (0.052)
Population 3.090*** 3.083*** 2.985*** 1.291***
(0.690) (0.700) (0.730) (0.326)
Primary enrolment 0.038 0.038 0.062 0.035
(0.047) (0.046) (0.051) (0.043)
Secondary enrolment 0.161* 0.157* 0.152 -0.089*
(0.081) (0.081) (0.094) (0.049)
Rainfall anomalies 0.033 0.036 0.037
(0.020) (0.034) (0.033)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes
Observations 288 288 237 288
R-squared 0.686 0.689 0.682 0.727
Panel B
Dep. var. Log nightlights
Oil windfalls (t-1) -0.112 0.031 -0.056 0.051
(0.220) (0.145) (0.141) (0.072)
Population 3.931*** 3.084*** 2.960*** 1.306***
(0.936) (0.708) (0.739) (0.331)
Primary enrolment 0.084* 0.038 0.062 0.035
(0.048) (0.046) (0.050) (0.042)
Secondary enrolment 0.159* 0.156* 0.150 -0.090*
(0.094) (0.081) (0.094) (0.050)
Rainfall anomalies 0.035 0.033 0.040
(0.021) (0.036) (0.035)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes
Observations 324 288 237 237
R-squared 0.661 0.689 0.682 0.735
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. The
same regressions are estimated in both panels. All variables are in log form.
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Table A 2.12. Exclusion Restriction: Oil windfalls and Health outcomes
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. HAZ-score
Oil windfalls -0.146 -0.071 -0.335 -0.487* -1.060*** -0.293
(0.206) (0.269) (0.272) (0.267) (0.353) (0.399)
Temperature -0.272 -0.066 -0.078 0.467 0.647*
(0.394) (0.351) (0.340) (0.322) (0.349)
Rainfall -0.050 -0.077 -0.051 0.020 -0.032
(0.092) (0.098) (0.094) (0.081) (0.125)
Violence -0.094 -0.095 -0.132*** -0.105**
Individual controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Parent’s controls No No No Yes No No
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No No Yes Yes
Mother FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 30,826 30,826 26,721 25,398 25,398 10,499
R-squared 0.146 0.146 0.151 0.192 0.203 0.708
Panel B
Dep. var. WAZ-score
Oil windfalls -0.119 -0.133 -0.317* -0.333* -0.686** -0.385
(0.161) (0.179) (0.172) (0.170) (0.255) (0.263)
Temperature anomalies 0.157 0.261 0.253 0.623*** 0.694***
(0.191) (0.179) (0.183) (0.183) (0.241)
Rainfall anomalies 0.125* 0.116 0.129* 0.143* 0.205**
(0.065) (0.074) (0.069) (0.076) (0.086)
Violence -0.036 -0.038 0.031 0.028
(0.033) (0.032) (0.025) (0.037)
Observations 30,826 30,826 26,721 25,398 25,398 10,499
R-squared 0.147 0.147 0.149 0.182 0.192 0.712
Notes: Individual controls include child’s sex, age (in months) and birth order. Parent’s control include mother and
father’s age (in months), educational attainments, occupation and total number of children under 5. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the state level. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. The same regressions are
estimated in both panels. R-squared retrieved from regressions with standard errors clustered at the state level.
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Table A 2.13. Exclusion Restriction: Oil windfalls and Health outcomes
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. HAZ-score
Oil windfalls (1st 12-months of birth) 0.358 0.405* 0.625 -0.126 -0.182 0.990
(0.232) (0.218) (0.374) (0.258) (0.353) (0.968)
Temperature anomalies 0.013 0.098 0.126** 0.144*** -0.084
(0.029) (0.061) (0.062) (0.049) (0.162)
Rainfall anomalies -0.030 -0.064 -0.042 -0.042 0.059
(0.025) (0.041) (0.038) (0.033) (0.077)
Violence 0.003 -0.015 -0.029 -0.151
(0.077) (0.069) (0.054) (0.130)
Individual controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Parent’s controls No No No Yes No No
Month of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No No Yes Yes
Mother FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 30,826 26,932 9,238 8,787 8,787 1,856
R-squared 0.155 0.154 0.172 0.200 0.211 0.735
Panel B
Dep. var. WAZ-score
Oil windfalls (1st 12-months of birth) 0.107 0.084 0.073 -0.548* -0.537* 0.553
(0.182) (0.218) (0.228) (0.272) (0.310) (0.681)
Temperature anomalies 0.026 0.079 0.118** 0.119** 0.172
(0.024) (0.056) (0.049) (0.049) (0.116)
Rainfall anomalies -0.024 -0.054** -0.038 -0.037* 0.080
(0.017) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.063)
Violence 0.022 0.008 0.008 -0.062
(0.044) (0.043) (0.039) (0.086)
Observations 30,826 26,932 9,238 8,787 8,787 1,856
R-squared 0.149 0.149 0.184 0.209 0.216 0.726
Notes: Individual controls include child’s sex, age (in months) and birth order. Parent’s control include mother and
father’s age (in months), educational attainments, occupation and total number of children under 5. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the state level. * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. The same regressions are
estimated in both panels. R-squared retrieved from regressions with standard errors clustered at the state level.
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Table A 2.14. Alternative specifications: Using percentage votes share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Incumbents’ Percentage Votes Share
Pred. Transfer 1.470* 1.731** 1.283* 1.285*
(0.772) (0.802) (0.667) (0.672)
Alignment 0.132 0.144 0.104 0.108
(0.090) (0.098) (0.072) (0.079)
Swing -0.085* -0.092** -0.077 -0.078
(0.042) (0.042) (0.050) (0.055)
Co-ethnic -0.159 -0.198 -0.205
(0.137) (0.161) (0.152)
Religion -2.096*** -1.696* -0.738
(0.732) (0.896) (0.532)
Population 0.959 1.082 0.996
(1.070) (1.141) (1.332)
Primary enrolment -0.031 0.006 0.008
(0.092) (0.058) (0.050)
Secondary enrolment -0.070** -0.072 -0.068
(0.034) (0.044) (0.051)
Violence 0.030 0.013 0.016
(0.049) (0.038) (0.043)
Temperature Anomalies 0.050 0.052
(0.040) (0.038)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 108 108 108 108
Adj. R-squared 0.893 0.888 0.899 0.895
Number of States 36 36 36 36
Notes: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses using wild-
bootstrapping as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008).
All variables (except percentage of votes share, alignment, swing, co-ethnic and
religion) are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.15. Alternative specifications: Number of Valid Votes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Log Number of Valid Votes
Election Outcome and VAT Transfers (2SLS)
Pred. Transfer 2.494* 2.020 1.497* 1.495*
(1.371) (1.458) (0.817) (0.858)
Alignment 0.425 0.334 0.293 0.290
(0.306) (0.387) (0.310) (0.304)
Swing -0.151 -0.137 -0.119 -0.118
(0.190) (0.150) (0.174) (0.177)
Ethnicity -0.227 -0.244 -0.238
(0.612) (0.826) (0.699)
Religion -2.716 -2.232 -2.980
(2.412) (2.819) (2.158)
Population -1.186 -1.130 -1.075
(3.133) (3.393) (4.070)
Primary enrolment 0.380 0.417 0.416
(0.448) (0.467) (0.475)
Secondary enrolment -0.203 -0.201 -0.204
(0.186) (0.224) (0.302)
Violence 0.273 0.256 0.254
(0.238) (0.221) (0.185)
Temperature Anomalies 0.043 0.042
(0.168) (0.151)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 108 108 108 108
Adj. R-squared 0.815 0.812 0.799 0.791
Number of States 36 36 36 36
Notes: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses using wild-
bootstrapping as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008).
All variables (except percentage of votes share, alignment, swing, co-ethnic
and religion) are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.16. Alternative specifications: Net Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Vote margin
Election Outcome and Net Transfers (2SLS)
Pred. Transfer 6.498** 7.934*** 6.541** 6.669*
(2.499) (2.522) (2.531) (3.321)
Alignment 0.454 0.284 0.186 0.341
(0.684) (0.347) (0.336) (0.366)
Swing -0.846*** -0.920*** -0.946*** -0.988**
(0.273) (0.269) (0.274) (0.353)
Co-ethnic -0.220 -0.524 -0.822**
(0.255) (0.434) (0.387)
Religion -10.049*** -9.503*** 2.964
(2.937) (2.998) (1.890)
Population 13.667*** 14.380*** 11.449**
(0.000) (0.000) (4.212)
Primary enrolment -0.137 -0.076 0.019
(0.250) (0.318) (0.190)
Secondary enrolment 0.169 0.107 0.275
(0.210) (0.204) (0.213)
Violence -0.026 -0.079 0.019
(0.134) (0.162) (0.159)
Temperature Anomalies 0.260 0.322*
(0.185) (0.182)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 108 108 108 108
Adj. R-squared 0.730 0.772 0.785 0.787
Number of States 36 36 36 36
Notes: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses using wild-bootstrapping
as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008).
All variables (except percentage of votes share, alignment, swing, co-ethnic and
religion) are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.17. Alternative specifications: Net Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Log Net Transfers
Net Transfers and Oil Windfalls (First Stage Results)
Oil windfalls 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.154*** 0.154***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
Alignment -0.037* -0.037 -0.038 -0.037
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Swing -0.022 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023
(0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Ethnicity -0.029 -0.012 -0.013
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Religion 0.014 0.017 0.017
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Population 0.179 0.169 0.129
(0.113) (0.116) (0.206)
Primary enrolment -0.010 -0.011 -0.011
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Secondary enrolment -0.005 -0.003 -0.002
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Violence -0.005 -0.003 -0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Temperature Anomalies -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.007) (0.007)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarterly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 4.88 4.54 5.33 5.31
Number of States 36 36 36 36
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
All variables (except alignment, swing, ethnicity and religion) are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.18. Falsification Test: Gross Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable Log Gross Transfers
Gross Transfers and Oil Windfalls (First Stage Results)
Oil windfalls 0.182*** 0.068* 0.080* 0.084* 0.082 0.098 0.097
(0.038) (0.041) (0.046) (0.047) (0.059) (0.069) (0.069)
Alignment -0.016 -0.018 -0.019 -0.019
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Swing 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.012
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Co-ethnic -0.027 -0.007 -0.007
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Religion 0.010 0.015 0.015
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Population 0.177 0.153 0.144
(0.238) (0.227) (0.255)
Primary enrolment 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Secondary enrolment 0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Violence -0.009 -0.006 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Temperature Anomalies -0.030*** -0.030***
(0.006) (0.006)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarterly FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 22.56 2.81 2.99 3.25 2.44 2.14 2.13
Number of States 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
All variables (except alignment and swing) are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.19. Alternative specifications: Using 2003-2005 as a weight
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Vote Margin
Pred. Transfer 4.657*** 5.844*** 4.955*** 4.795**
(1.582) (1.857) (1.650) (2.323)
Alignment 0.419 0.252 0.168 0.307
(0.638) (0.327) (0.318) (0.375)
Swing -1.108*** -1.241*** -1.219*** -1.259***
(0.329) (0.363) (0.353) (0.363)
Co-ethnic -0.570 -0.756 -1.029**
(0.339) (0.453) (0.440)
Religion -9.794*** -9.277*** 3.431*
(2.863) (2.927) (1.767)
Population 14.952*** 15.594*** 12.431***
(0.000) (0.000) (4.298)
Primary enrolment -0.259 -0.178 -0.082
(0.237) (0.265) (0.247)
Secondary enrolment -0.030 -0.049 0.118
(0.136) (0.153) (0.210)
Violence -0.030 -0.072 0.024
(0.123) (0.153) (0.162)
Temperature Anomalies 0.191 0.243
(0.153) (0.151)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 108 108 108 108
Adj. R-squared 0.657 0.741 0.740 0.788
Number of States 36 36 36 36
Notes: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses using wild-bootstrapping as
proposed by Cameron et al. (2008).
All variables (except percentage of votes share, alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion)
are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.20. Alternative specifications: controlling for past elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Vote Margin
Pred. Transfer 4.546** 5.120** 6.250** 5.704*
(2.165) (2.136) (2.709) (2.859)
Alignment 0.426 0.232 0.184 0.328
(0.636) (0.395) (0.379) (0.412)
Swing -1.107*** -1.230*** -1.204*** -1.253***
(0.328) (0.358) (0.347) (0.360)
Co-ethnic -0.619 -0.391 -0.852
(0.400) (0.661) (0.664)
Religion -9.526*** -9.997*** 3.049
(2.773) (3.140) (1.952)
Lag vote share (opposition) -0.006 0.053 -0.301 -0.167
(0.252) (0.119) (0.283) (0.252)
Population 14.725*** 15.875*** 12.650***
(0.000) (0.000) (4.356)
Primary enrolment -0.186 -0.356 -0.181
(0.355) (0.372) (0.344)
Secondary enrolment -0.025 -0.045 0.116
(0.146) (0.150) (0.211)
Violence -0.029 -0.070 0.025
(0.120) (0.155) (0.173)
Temperature Anomalies 0.199 0.255
(0.165) (0.159)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 108 108 108 108
Adj. R-squared 0.643 0.723 0.736 0.782
Number of States 36 36 36 36
Notes: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses using wild-bootstrapping as
proposed by Cameron et al. (2008).
All variables (except percentage of votes share, alignment, swing, co-ethnic and religion) are
in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.21. Alternative specifications: Ten Oil Producing States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Vote margin
Election Outcome and VAT Transfers (2SLS)
Pred. Transfer 3.559** 6.389** 4.468** 5.373*
(1.399) (2.372) (2.149) (2.699)
Alignment 0.406 0.336 0.187 0.407
(0.621) (0.280) (0.285) (0.334)
Swing -1.106*** -1.262*** -1.212*** -1.277***
(0.329) (0.369) (0.351) (0.368)
Co-ethnic -0.787* -0.786 -1.212**
(0.439) (0.578) (0.552)
Religion -10.537*** -9.027** -6.995*
(3.080) (3.814) (3.483)
Population 15.120*** 15.355*** 12.151**
(0.000) (0.000) (4.584)
Primary enrolment -0.226 -0.127 -0.051
(0.257) (0.291) (0.317)
Secondary enrolment -0.076 -0.065 0.106
(0.165) (0.163) (0.219)
Violence -0.030 -0.072 0.031
(0.145) (0.160) (0.166)
Temperature Anomalies 0.142 0.227
(0.149) (0.146)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 108 108 108 108
Adj. R-squared 0.639 0.732 0.726 0.784
Number of States 36 36 36 36
Notes: In this table, we change the definition of oil-producing states by classifying La-
gos and Ogun States, which are considered as off-shore oil states as non-oil producing
states.
Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses using wild-bootstrapping as
proposed by Cameron et al. (2008).
All variables (except percentage of votes share, alignment, swing, co-ethnic and reli-
gion) are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.22. Alternative specifications: Excluding Lagos and Rivers States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Vote margin
Election Outcome and VAT Transfers (2SLS)
Pred. Transfer 4.378*** 5.489** 4.110** 4.308*
(1.541) (1.969) (1.727) (2.279)
Alignment 0.444 0.246 0.122 0.279
(0.692) (0.348) (0.287) (0.331)
Swing -1.041*** -1.203*** -1.147*** -1.208***
(0.308) (0.349) (0.329) (0.345)
Co-ethnic -0.550 -0.645 -1.021*
(0.496) (0.588) (0.576)
Religion 15.226*** 16.680*** 14.370***
(4.413) (0.000) (4.471)
Population 14.953*** 15.327*** 12.373***
(0.000) (4.398) (4.069)
Primary enrolment -0.301 -0.198 -0.103
(0.237) (0.273) (0.246)
Secondary enrolment 0.015 0.020 0.189
(0.175) (0.150) (0.235)
Violence -0.026 -0.072 0.037
(0.131) (0.169) (0.139)
Temperature Anomalies 0.176 0.237
(0.163) (0.151)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 102 102 102 102
Adj. R-squared 0.635 0.712 0.714 0.769
Number of States 34 34 34 34
Notes: Standard errors clustered at state level in parentheses using wild-bootstrapping
as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008).
All variables (except percentage of votes share, alignment, swing, co-ethnic and
religion) are in log form.
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
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Table A 2.23. Interpretation: VAT transfers and Public goods
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. Access to drinking water
Pred. Transfer 12.878* 13.993** -1.434 -1.282 3.305 0.920
(7.052) (7.108) (1.344) (1.470) (9.763) (17.902)
Population -1.977 -2.538 -2.728 -2.116 -1.844
(2.026) (2.178) (2.148) (2.097) (1.948)
Primary enrolment -0.190** -0.006 -0.012 -0.066 -0.037
(0.091) (0.035) (0.036) (0.113) (0.117)
Secondary enrolment -0.334** 0.001 -0.007 -0.112 -0.057
(0.148) (0.048) (0.063) (0.202) (0.209)
Temperature Anomalies -0.008 -0.036 0.048 0.012
(0.034) (0.042) (0.174) (0.286)
Rainfall anomalies -0.140** -0.010 -0.043 -0.033
(0.070) (0.039) (0.043) (0.039)




Household controls No No No No No Yes
Year of survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,392
R-squared 0.072 0.073 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.101
Panel B
Dep. var. Access to sanitation facility
Pred. Transfer 3.934 4.103 1.863 1.493 9.334 5.867
(7.417) (6.933) (1.389) (1.402) (9.194) (8.102)
Population -1.689 -0.735 -1.014 -0.946 -0.613
(1.826) (2.021) (2.069) (1.876) (1.653)
Primary enrolment -0.007 0.016 0.020 -0.048 0.003
(0.155) (0.039) (0.038) (0.113) (0.064)
Secondary enrolment -0.085 -0.037 -0.023 -0.258 -0.182
(0.145) (0.040) (0.047) (0.206) (0.175)
Temperature Anomalies 0.025 -0.003 0.153 0.102
(0.035) (0.020) (0.150) (0.131)
Rainfall anomalies -0.239*** -0.000 -0.014 0.000
(0.077) (0.004) (0.055) (0.005)




Observations 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,392
R-squared 0.140 0.141 0.141 0.142 0.144 0.213
Notes: Household control include household size, sex, age and education of household’s head. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the surveys’ cluster level, using wild bootstrap method (Cameron
et al. 2008). * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. The same regressions are estimated in both panels. R-squared retrieved from regressions with standard errors clustered at the surveys’ cluster level.
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Table A 2.24. Interpretation: VAT transfers and Public goods
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. Access to electricity
Pred. Transfer -3.229 -3.667 -0.029 -0.372 -1.021 -5.216
(7.272) (7.816) (1.523) (1.445) (8.376) (8.617)
Population -0.426 -0.500 -0.798 -0.600 -0.318
(2.382) (2.300) (2.226) (2.296) (2.142)
Primary enrolment 0.030 -0.013 -0.011 -0.003 0.055
(0.097) (0.046) (0.041) (0.525) (0.100)
Secondary enrolment 0.073 -0.006 0.007 0.014 0.107
(0.181) (0.046) (0.055) (0.151) (0.188)
Temperature Anomalies -0.028 -0.039 -0.044 -0.107
(0.034) (0.040) (0.137) (0.141)
Rainfall anomalies -0.096* 0.011 0.008 0.024
(0.058) (0.043) (0.044) (0.040)




Household controls No No No No No Yes
Year of survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,392
R-squared 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.283
Panel B
Dep. var. Net attendance ratio in primary school
Pred. Transfer 24.606*** 19.935* -1.229 -1.622 14.171 8.197
(8.983) (11.648) (3.481) (2.733) (15.417) (12.096)
Population (aged 6-12) 0.767*** 0.766*** 0.766*** 0.766*** 0.766*** 0.540***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population 11.154*** 10.123*** 9.288*** 10.039*** 10.606***
(0.000) (0.000) (2.823) (3.051) (0.000)
Primary enrolment -0.319** -0.064 -0.068 -0.253 -0.163
(0.130) (0.106) (0.092) (0.173) (0.139)
Secondary enrolment -0.238 0.208*** 0.201** -0.128 -0.007
(0.363) (0.000) (0.079) (0.392) (0.260)
Temperature Anomalies 0.157** -0.049 0.210 0.123
(0.072) (0.073) (0.256) (0.205)
Rainfall anomalies -0.192*** -0.045 -0.118* -0.086
(0.068) (0.124) (0.068) (0.054)




Observations 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,392
R-squared 0.528 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.530 0.575
Notes: Household control include household size, sex, age and education of household’s head. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the surveys’ cluster level, using wild bootstrap method (Cameron
et al. 2008). * significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. The same regressions are estimated in both panels. R-squared retrieved from regressions with standard errors clustered at the surveys’ cluster level.
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Table A 2.25. Interpretation: VAT transfers and Public goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var. Wealth index
Pred. Transfer -1.138 0.393 3.101 3.067 25.444 10.260
(109.487) (39.208) (10.607) (7.662) (54.728) (27.791)
Population -3.505 -2.467 -2.535 -3.191 -2.186
(19.316) (17.520) (16.931) (18.910) (7.345)
Primary enrolment -0.060 -0.095 -0.094 -0.332 -0.115
(0.660) (0.234) (0.194) (0.645) (0.359)
Secondary enrolment -0.095 -0.165 -0.154 -0.665 -0.329
(1.243) (0.195) (0.261) (1.044) (0.590)
Temperature Anomalies 0.059 0.013 0.379 0.152
(0.114) (0.200) (0.857) (0.465)
Rainfall anomalies -0.583*** 0.002 -0.038 0.022
(0.189) (0.069) (0.528) (0.146)




Household controls No No No No No Yes
Year of survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,967 69,392
R-squared 0.390 0.390 0.390 0.391 0.391 0.555
Notes: Household control include household size, sex, age and education of household’s head. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the surveys’ cluster level, using wild bootstrap method (Cameron et al. 2008). *
significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. The same regressions are estimated in both panels. R-squared retrieved
from regressions with standard errors clustered at the surveys’ cluster level.
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(a) Actual grants (b) Hypothetical grants
Note: All grants were deflated by 2007 constant Naira (page 9). The hypothetical VAT allocation to each region
were calculated applying the horizontal formula for VAT allocation to the total net VAT transfers (after deductions)
available for distribution to states annually.
Fig. A 2.1 Actual and hypothetical grants based on population and landmass
Fig. A 2.2 Real international oil prices and average VAT transfers in oil and non-oil producing States
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Fig. A 2.3 Political and Leadership Transitions in Nigeria, 1999 - Date
Appendix B: Supplementary Tables and
Figures for Chapter 2
Fig. A 3.1 Map showing how the different dataset was combined to construct BGR inequality
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Table A 3.1. Cross-correlation table
Variables BGR inequality WGR inequality WSR inequality BGT inequality WGT inequality WST inequality
BGR inequality 1.000
WGR inequality 0.028 1.000
WSR inequality 0.702 0.711 1.000
BGT inequality 0.580 0.024 0.453 1.000
WGT inequality -0.103 0.857 0.520 0.090 1.000
WST inequality 0.316 0.624 0.681 0.699 0.763 1.000
Table A 3.2. Summary Statistics
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Rainfall 703 59.501 24.471 2.185 180.90
Temperature 703 18.068 5.935 5.188 39.489
Indicator that the State has high religious fragmentation 703 0.485 0.382 0 1
Measure of State religious tension 703 0.258 0.255 0 0.720
Number of violent events 703 9.855 23.53 0 315
Fatalities 703 81.33 428.0 0 7,396
Civil conflict 703 0.232 0.422 0 1
Communal conflict 703 0.284 0.500 0 1
BGR inequality 703 0.174 0.186 0 1
WGR inequality 703 0.102 0.143 0 1
Within-state inequality 703 0.162 0.142 0 1
BGT inequality 703 0.134 0.152 0 1
WGT inequality 703 0.137 0.176 0 1
Within-state Temperature inequality 703 0.184 0.170 0 1
Oil producing state dummy 703 0.351 0.478 0 1
General Trust 1,204 0.499 0.401 0 1
Between-group Trust 1,204 0.525 0.473 0 1
Within-group Trust 1,204 0.573 0.404 0 1
Trust neighbour 1,204 0.511 0.500 0 1
Trust in government scale 1,624 0.341 0.379 0 1
Government corruption scale 1,624 0.530 0.432 0 1
Government satisfaction scale 1,624 0.362 0.329 0 1
Notes: All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X −Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin). BGR indicates Between-
Group Rainfall Inequality. WGR indicates Within-Group Rainfall Inequality. BGT indicates Between-Group Temper-
ature Inequality. WGT indicates Within-Group Temperature Inequality.
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Table A 3.3. Robustness to using number of fatalities
Dependent Variable Number of fatalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BGR inequality 1.669*** 1.993*** 0.699 0.894 1.015*
(0.351) (0.405) (0.847) (0.632) (0.544)
Rainfall 0.314 0.234 0.129 0.437**
(0.821) (0.782) (0.112) (0.206)
Temperature -0.256 -0.101 -0.216* -0.342**
(0.188) (0.190) (0.131) (0.155)
Religion controls Included
Economic controls Included
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.029 0.222 0.372 0.426 0.523
Observations 703 703 703 703 333
Notes: All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X−Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin).
BGR indicates Between-Group Rainfall Inequality.
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for spatial dependence of an unknown form (Conley,
1999)
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table A 3.4. Robustness to using number of violent events
Dependent Variable Number of violent events
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BGR inequality 1.138*** 1.109*** 0.514 0.601* 0.298*
(0.204) (0.216) (0.351) (0.318) (0.170)
Rainfall 0.027 0.189 0.273 0.567
(0.458) (0.395) (0.205) (0.417)
Temperature -0.095 -0.004 -0.105 -0.158**
(0.107) (0.094) (0.068) (0.079)
Religion controls Included
Economic controls Included
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.045 0.331 0.546 0.612 0.671
Observations 703 703 703 703 333
Notes: All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X−Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin).
BGR indicates Between-Group Rainfall Inequality.
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for spatial dependence of an unknown form (Conley, 1999)
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table A 3.5. Robustness to using alternative conflict dataset (UCDP)
Dependent Variable Civil conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BGR inequality 0.337** 0.121 0.322** 0.327** 0.333**
(0.155) (0.074) (0.133) (0.139) (0.149)
Rainfall 0.027 0.169** 0.349* 0.567
(0.458) (0.075) (0.182) (0.417)
Temperature -0.195 -0.218 -0.168* -0.183**
(0.107) (0.172) (0.087) (0.093)
Religion controls Included
Economic controls Included
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.045 0.331 0.546 0.584 0.671
Observations 703 703 703 703 333
Notes: All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X−Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin).
BGR indicates Between-Group Rainfall Inequality.
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for spatial dependence of an unknown form
(Conley, 1999)
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table A 3.6. Robustness to including spatial lag of BGR inequality
Dependent Variable Civil conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BGR inequality 0.381*** 0.439*** 0.140 0.264* 0.374**
(0.096) (0.115) (0.238) (0.153) (0.190)
Spatially lagged BGR 0.068** 0.095 0.155 0.238* 1.664*
(0.033) (0.139) (0.181) (0.134) (0.977)
Rainfall 0.126 0.093 0.130 0.252
(0.230) (0.232) (0.081) (0.217)
Temperature -0.010 0.020 0.014 -0.012
(0.047) (0.048) (0.037) (0.043)
Religion controls Included
Economic controls Included
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.021 0.094 0.151 0.362 0.433
Observations 703 703 703 703 333
Notes: All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X−Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin).
BGR indicates Between-Group Rainfall Inequality.
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for spatial dependence of an unknown form
(Conley, 1999)
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table A 3.7. Robustness to considering BGR inequality outside the growing season
Dependent Variable Civil conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BGR inequality (non-growing) 0.283* 0.357 0.139 0.162 0.268
(0.166) (0.220) (0.236) (0.240) (0.217)
Rainfall 0.023 0.016 0.039 0.068*
(0.045) (0.045) (0.0261) (0.037)
Temperature -0.017 0.020 0.024 -0.014
(0.046) (0.048) (0.040) (0.043)
Religion controls Included
Economic controls Included
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.020 0.093 0.151 0.284 0.430
Observations 703 703 703 703 333
Notes: All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X−Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin).
BGR indicates Between-Group Rainfall Inequality.
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for spatial dependence of an unknown form (Con-
ley, 1999)
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table A 3.8. Robustness to using alternative ethnic dataset (GREG)
Dependent Variable Civil conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BGR inequality 1.189*** 1.431*** 0.331 0.647** 0.805*
(0.315) (0.365) (0.280) (0.321) (0.418)
BGR inequality (t-1)
BGR inequality (t-2)
Rainfall 0.023 0.018 0.053* 0.070*
(0.045) (0.046) (0.029) (0.037)
Temperature -0.018 0.019 -0.016 -0.011
(0.046) (0.048) (0.042) (0.044)
Religion controls Included
Economic controls Included
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.019 0.091 0.151 0.431 0.435
Observations 703 703 703 703 333
Notes: All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X−Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin).
BGR indicates Between-Group Rainfall Inequality.
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for spatial dependence of an unknown form (Con-
ley, 1999)
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table A 3.9. Robustness to considering monthly-level analysis
Dependent Variable Civil conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BGR inequality 0.053* 0.055 0.180*** 0.153*** 0.095***
(0.029) (0.037) (0.034) (0.048) (0.034)
Rainfall 0.007 0.084*** 0.089*** 0.076***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021)
Temperature -0.085*** -0.062*** -0.058*** -0.086***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014)
Religion controls Included
Economic controls Included Included
Month FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.051 0.106 0.303 0.428 0.433
Observations 5,182 5,182 5,182 3,966 3,996
Notes: All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X−Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin).
BGR indicates Between-Group Rainfall Inequality.
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for spatial dependence of an unknown form (Conley,
1999)
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
134 Appendix B: Supplementary Tables and Figures for Chapter 2
Table A 3.10. Robustness to using probit model
Dependent Variable Civil conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BGR inequality 0.391*** 0.468*** 0.292 0.312* 0.504***
(0.101) (0.114) (0.233) (0.163) (0.114)
Rainfall 0.123 -0.053 0.047 0.007
(0.224) (0.094) (0.083) (0.146)
Temperature -0.016 -0.018 -0.027 -0.022
(0.045) (0.025) (0.032) (0.038)
Religion controls Included
Economic controls Included
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends No No No Yes Yes
Observations 703 703 703 703 333
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state-level
All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X−Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin)
BGR indicates Between-Group Rainfall Inequality
* significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table A 3.11. Civil conflict, trust and inequality
Dependent Variable Civil conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
BGR inequality 0.301 0.298 0.307 0.373* 0.303 0.346* 0.345
(0.196) (0.193) (0.191) (0.213) (0.194) (0.183) (0.214)
Rainfall 0.011 0.020 0.338 0.323 0.004 0.385 0.384
(0.039) (0.052) (0.214) (0.239) (0.214) (0.054) (0.239)
Temperature -0.022 -0.022 -0.011 -0.017 -0.022 -0.018 -0.017
(0.044) (0.043) (0.042) (0.048) (0.043) (0.048) (0.048)
General Trust -0.401* -0.010
(0.214) (0.065)
Between-group Trust -0.341** -0.103*
(0.163) (0.055)
Trust in government scale -0.403* -0.023 -0.012 -0.019
(0.214) (0.052) (0.066) (0.094)
Government satisfaction scale -0.038*** -0.406* -0.048***
(0.012) (0.239) (0.015)
Government corruption scale -0.024 -0.026
(0.046) (0.046)
Economic controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Survey-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.448 0.446 0.442 0.470 0.447 0.475 0.475
Observations 296 296 296 296 296 296 296
Notes:All inequality measures have been normalized by taking (X−Xmin)/(Xmax−Xmin)
BGR indicates Between-Group Rainfall Inequality
General Trust is a summative scale, indicating that respondents trusts somewhat or a lot in their relatives, neighbours, own ethnic group and others.
Trust in government is a summative scale, indicating that respondents trust somewhat or a lot in the Government.
Between-group trust is a measure that captures the level of trust between the different ethnic groups living within a state.
Government satisfaction: an indicator that the government handles the economy very well as opposed to very badly.
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state-level
* denotes significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%

